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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three main chapters which investigate the economic implica-
tions of monetary and scal policies on the macroeconomy.
The rst main chapter examines the e¤ects of government spending and tax revenue
shocks on various macroeconomic aggregates. There is a consensus among academics and
practitioners that output reacts positively to scal stimulus, but the e¤ects on private
consumption, real wage, exchange rate and trade balance are still a matter of debate in
both theoretical and empirical literature. In this study, I provide new empirical evidence
that may rationalize these disagreements by estimating the e¤ects of government spending
and tax shocks on macroeconomic aggregates using vector autoregression model for two
industrialized open economies, the United States and the United Kingdom. I show that
the recursive and Blanchard-Perotti identication approaches yield similar responses for
both economies, but the responses computed under the sign restriction method di¤ers
in the short-term. In addition, this study proposes a robust and novel identication
specication for open economy variables, namely trade balance and exchange rate. As
ancillary analysis, this study nds that (i) government spending yields higher output
multiplier compared to tax cuts, and (ii) some of the scal stimulus for an open economy
is leaked to its trading partners via the trade channel. Finally, I provide additional
empirical evidence to the current literature by showing that the e¤ects of government
spending shocks on output have weakened in the post-1980s.
The second chapter aims to examine the drivers of exchange rate movements and
how it a¤ects ination by evaluating the temporal interrelations between real exchange
rate and macroeconomic variables. Understanding what drives exchange rates dynam-
ics is instrumental for both academics and policymakers as they signicantly a¤ect a
countrys trade competitiveness, inuence exports, imports, and overall output growth.
The exchange rate a¤ects the prices of imported goods and services, which feeds through
domestic consumer prices, ultimately determining consumers purchasing power. Move-
ments in the exchange rate can make it costly (or cheaper) to service foreign denominated
debt and can have a substantial impact on foreign investments earnings. In this study, I
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provide empirical evidence from a Bayesian time-varying parameter vector autoregres-
sion model with stochastic volatility that real exchange rate movements and volatility
increased over time following a monetary policy shock. The simulation results from the
standard two-country New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model 
suggest that price rigidities, exchange rate pass-through, degree of openness to trade, and
monetary policy response to ination and output growth drive most of the movements
in the real exchange rate, whereas changes in its volatility can be mainly attributed to
feasible calibrations of nominal rigidities and home bias.
Finally, the third chapter focuses on the spillovers and spillbacks of monetary policy.
On the onset of the Global Financial Crisis, central banks aimed to promote price stability
and domestic economic growth by engaging in expansionary monetary policy, which led to
signicant interest rate di¤erentials between advanced economies and emerging economies.
Foreign policymakers, in particular in emerging countries, criticized the Federal Reserve
of deliberately weakening the dollar to gain an advantage in trade. Despite a large body
of literature in this eld, the following question about monetary policy spillovers remain
open: Is expansionary monetary policy beggar-thy-neighbor or boost-thy-neighbor? In this
study, I show that international trade spillovers of monetary policy in the United States
substantially change over time, with a monetary policy tightening leading to more adverse
international spillovers during recessions. Using a combination of empirical and theoretical
tools, this study documents these ndings and explains that during economic downturns,
a decline in the trade elasticity and a lower exchange rate pass-through to import prices
cause the U.S. trade balance to increase following a monetary policy tightening, despite
the appreciation of the U.S. dollar. This occurs through a reduction of the expenditure
switching e¤ect. In turn, this lowers foreign GDP. In good times, in contrast, the trade
spillovers to the foreign economy following a monetary policy tightening in the United
States tend to be favorable and support foreign economic growth. The degree in which
countries trade and the extent to which exchange rate movements are reected in import
prices are therefore crucial for the international spillovers and spillbacks of monetary
policy. Variation in these key spillovers parameters can explain more generally why the
international transmission of monetary policy in the United States changes over time.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
After the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2007, the turbulence in the nancial
markets escalated into an unprecedented crisis of global proportions. Credit ow with-
ered as banks stopped lending to each other, to rms and households. Increased nancial
frictions rapidly a¤ected the real economy, which in turn feedback to the nancial sector,
leading a pervasive loop which resulted in the most severe and orchestrated global eco-
nomic downturn since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The average growth rate of the
worlds gross domestic product (GDP) was -6.2% at an annual rate in the fourth quarter
of 2008 and -7.5% in the rst quarter of 2009, causing unemployment to rise, consumer
condence to drop and deationary pressures to increase. Against this background, mon-
etary and scal authorities across the world have reacted to mitigate risks of nancial
contagion, foster economic growth and encourage consumption.
1.1 Monetary Policy Instruments
Against an environment of rapidly declining ination rates, major central banks namely
the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, Bank of England, and Bank of Japan 
have engaged in monetary policy measures that were unprecedented in scope, breadth and
implementation. The Federal Reserve reduced the base interest rate from 5.25% before
the onset of the Global Financial Crisis to 0.25% in December 2008. In a similar fashion,
the European Central Bank reduced its policy rate on the main renancing operations
by 325 basis points. After reaching base interest rate close or at the zero lower bound,
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monetary authorities turned to other stabilization tools, such as quantitative easing and
large-scale asset purchase programs. These policy instruments were aimed to provide
liquidity to the banking sector, encourage the ow of credit to rms and households, and
to safeguard the stability of the nancial system. Despite these unprecedented monetary
policy measures, they alone were not enough to stimulate economic growth and maintain
price stability, which is usually the primary mandate of central banks.
1.2 Fiscal Policy Instruments
Further to providing monetary backing to the nancial system, governments resorted to
scal measures intended to mitigate the adverse impacts of the crisis on the real economy.
In addition to the workings of the automatic stabilizers, which cushion the e¤ects of a
negative shock by the automatic lowering of tax receipts and increased transfer payments
on unemployment benets, the discretionary use of scal policy helped to mitigate the
e¤ects of the Global Financial Crisis. Governments across the world sought to prop
their economies through large scal stimulus packages comprised of tax cuts and sizeable
government spending programmes, which were designed to stabilize economic activity
and ination by stimulating aggregate spending. Such packages included the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act in the United States and the European Economic Recovery
Plan in the euro area.
Government spending increases have fed direct through the economy by increasing de-
mand for goods and services, which results in higher employment and income. These have
an indirect e¤ect on the economy by promoting private consumption and investment. On
the other hand, tax cuts increase disposable income for households and rms, which were
especially true during the Global Financial Crisis, when many households and businesses
faced restricted access to credit markets and increased borrowing costs. Under these con-
ditions, tax cuts could then stimulate aggregate demand and thus mitigate deationary
pressures. Despite extensive research in the scal policy literature, the quantitative and
qualitative e¤ects of government spending and tax cuts are still controversial. There is
a consensus among academics and practitioners that aggregate output reacts positively
13
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to scal stimulus, but the e¤ects on private consumption, real wage, exchange rate and
trade balance are still a matter of debate in both theoretical and empirical literature.
1.3 Exchange Rate
The unprecedented expansionary monetary measures by large central banks, in particular
to the Federal Reserve, have raised criticisms by some foreign policymakers. They argued
that aggressive expansionary monetary policies aimed to foster economic recovery in their
home countries were harming their foreign counterparts, in particular to emerging market
economies, who heavily rely on their exports. Foreign policymakers, including the Brazils
former Finance Minister, Guido Mantega, claimed that the Federal Reserve has deliber-
ately weakened the U.S. dollar so to gain an advantage in foreign trade. Such policy,
known as currency war or beggar-thy-neighbor policy, could also prompt other economies
to intentionally devaluate their currencies so not to lose their competitiveness in the in-
ternational arena. For example, the Swiss National Bank purchased large quantities of
foreign currency in 2004 to prevent the appreciation of the Swiss franc, and thus protect
Switzerlands export-led economy.
While the Federal Reserve was not the only major central bank to engage in aggressive
monetary policies, the leading role of the U.S. dollar in international trade and nancial
markets made its actions signicant. Most recently, as the Federal Reserve has started
to normalize its monetary policy by announcing gradual increases of the U.S. policy
interest rate, the Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, Raghuram Rajan, argued that
shifts in Federal Reserve policy were creating spillovers to emerging market economies
and destabilized their nancial markets. In February 2016, Christine Lagarde, Managing
Director of the International Monetary Fund, pledged the Federal Reserve to carefully
assess the international spillovers and spillbacks of U.S. monetary policy as the Federal
Reserve normalizes its policy1.
Expansionary monetary policies cause the home currency to depreciate, which in turn
tend to increase the home countrys exports and reduce its imports, strengthening its
1 The speech "The Role of Emerging Markets in a New Global Partnership for Growth" was delivered at
University of Maryland on 4 February 2016.
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trade balance. Lower interest rates in the home country also encourage domestic demand,
employment and income. Larger wages increase demand for goods and services, including
imports. As a result, monetary policy a¤ect trade balance through the exchange-rate and
income channels, which work in opposite directions and they may not o¤set each other.
Despite the international monetary policy spillovers have been the subject of economic
debate since the groundbreaking studies of Mundell (1963), and Fleming (1962), the
following fundamental question about monetary policy spillovers remain unanswered. Is
monetary policy stimulus beggar-thy-neighbor or boost-thy-neighbor?
1.4 Fiscal Policy in an Open Economy Framework
In chapter 2 of this thesis, I examine the potential causes of disagreements on the e¤ects
of government spending and tax revenue cuts in the scal policy literature. I provide
new empirical evidence that may rationalize these di¤erences by estimating the e¤ects
of government expenditures and tax revenue shocks on macroeconomic aggregates using
vector autoregression model for two industrialized open economies, the United States and
the United Kingdom. I demonstrate that most identication approaches employed in
the literature produce qualitatively and quantitatively very similar results following scal
shocks. I nd that the recursive and Blanchard-Perotti identication methods tend to
yield similar responses for both economies, but the impulse responses estimated under
the sign restriction approach tends to di¤er in the short-term. This may be explained by
the ltering out of undesirable transitory shocks, such as technology and monetary shocks.
The ndings of this study also suggest that government spending tends to generate higher
output multiplier compared to tax revenue cuts. Another signicant contribution of this
study is related to the scal stimulus leakages in an open economy framework. Trade
openness is likely to reduce scal multipliers. As international trade increases, a larger
part of any scal stimulus will leak abroad through higher import volumes and prices, thus
dampening the impact on domestic output. Thus, this study empirically substantiates
the call for an orchestrated scal stimulus amongst trade partners in times of economic
downturn in view to equalize the spillovers via the trade channel and to minimize the
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scal free-riding problem. Lastly, I present ancillary empirical evidence to the current
literature by showing that the e¤ects of government spending innovations on output and
its constituent parts have weakened in the post-1980s.
1.5 The E¤ects of Monetary Policy on Exchange Rate
The chapter 3 of this thesis aims to explore the evolution of real exchange rate dynamics
over time. Understanding what drives exchange rates dynamics is instrumental for both
academics and policymakers as they signicantly a¤ect the countrys trade competitive-
ness, inuence net exports, and aggregate output. There is a large body of empirical
literature on the drivers of exchange rate uctuations, but most empirical studies are
conducted in a time-invariant setting. However, there are compelling reasons to consider
an econometric modelling approach that allows for temporal drifts in the coe¢ cients of
the model variables. First, the last fty years were characterized by di¤erent exchange
rate regimes and monetary policy stance, with the most recent period associated with
sluggish economic growth, large movements in the exchange rates and zero lower bound
nominal interest rates. It is, therefore, unlikely that time-invariant models can adequately
capture these structural changes in the world economy. Second, the relationship between
macroeconomic variables, such as output, ination, and interest rate, are also likely to
have changed over time. Lastly, there is extensive empirical evidence that volatility of
structural shocks in the U.S. and other large economies has changed over time. This study
provides compelling empirical evidence that real exchange rate movements and volatility
increased over time following monetary policy shock. From the theoretical simulation
viewpoint, I nd that nominal rigidities, exchange rate pass-through, home bias, the de-
gree of trade openness, and monetary policy response to ination and output growth
drive most of the movements in the real exchange rate. I also show that exchange rate
pass-through is positively correlated to ination, which is in line with Taylors hypothesis.
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1.6 Time Variation in the U.S. Monetary Policy Spillovers
Finally, in chapter 4, I examine whether the expansionary monetary policy in the United
States is beggar-thy-neighbor or boost-thy-neighbor. By using a combination of time-
varying empirical and theoretical models, I evaluate the time variation in the interna-
tional transmission of U.S. monetary policy and investigate its drivers. I nd substantial
shorter-run time variation in the domestic impact and the international transmission of
U.S. monetary policy shocks, particularly through the trade balance which is a key deter-
minant of international spillovers. The empirical results show that the U.S. trade balance
switches signs in recessions compared to normal times, turning foreign output spillovers
from favorable into unfavorable following a monetary policy tightening. In addition, dur-
ing economic downturns, monetary policy shock in the U.S. is associated with higher
exchange rate volatility. This study also shows that during recessions, the trade elasticity
as well as the exchange rate pass-through to import prices decline, which both support
an increase in the U.S. trade balance by reducing the expenditure switching e¤ect. This
implies the foreign trade balance is adversely a¤ected following a monetary policy tight-
ening in the U.S., despite a depreciation of the foreign country currency vis-à-vis the U.S.
dollar and foreign GDP declines due to negative trade spillovers.
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Fiscal Policy in an Open Economy
2.1 Introduction
Following the Global Financial Crisis, large government decits coupled with sluggish
economic growth have left a legacy of unsustainable levels of sovereign debt forcing poli-
cymakers to engage in consolidation measures by phasing out scal stimulus and increasing
tax receipts. The conventional supremacy view that monetary policy alone could smooth
the business cycle was ruptured when nominal interest rate reached the zero lower bound,
and scal policy, as a macroeconomic stabilization instrument, has enjoyed again renewed
popularity after the recent economic downturn that began in 2007. However, there is
little consensus in the scal policy literature on how to reduce debt in an environment
where economic growth is still fragile and credit channels are still weakened. There is
unanimity among academics and practitioners that aggregate output positively responds
to scal stimulus, but its e¤ects on private consumption, real wages, exchange rate and
trade balance are still a matter of debate in both theoretical and empirical literature.
Governments often use scal policy to smooth economic uctuations, in particular dur-
ing economic downturns. For example, during the Global Financial Crisis, Governments
across the world sought to prop their economies through large scal stimulus packages
comprised of tax cuts and sizeable government spending programs, which were designed
to stabilize economic activity and ination by stimulating aggregate spending. Such pack-
ages included the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act in the United States and the
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European Economic Recovery Plan in the euro area. There is a consensus that aggregate
output reacts positively to scal stimulus, but the e¤ects on private consumption, real
wage, exchange rate and trade balance are still a matter of debate in both theoretical and
empirical literature. This disagreement is documented by Perotti (2007), which I quote:
perfectly reasonable economists can and do disagree on the basic theoretical e¤ects of
scal policy, and on the interpretation of the existing empirical evidence. For instance,
neoclassical models predict that private consumption and the real wage should fall follow-
ing a positive shock to government consumption, while some models with neo-Keynesian
features predict the opposite.
The vector autoregression (VAR) methodology has become the main econometric tool
to evaluate shock dynamics to macroeconomic aggregates, in particular after the inu-
ential papers of Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Christiano et al. (1996). The VAR
literature di¤erentiates itself by the identication approach adopted. To date, there are
four main well established identication approaches, specically: (i) the recursive ap-
proach, rst introduced by Sims (1980) and further developed to scal policy analysis by
Fatás and Mihov (2001), (ii) the Blanchard-Perotti approach, introduced by Blanchard
and Perotti (2002) themselves, and arguably the most popular method among practition-
ers, (iii) the sign restriction approach, introduced by Uhlig (2005) to study monetary
policy, and used to study scal shocks and policy experiments by Mountford and Uhlig
(2009), and nally (iv) the event-study or narrative approach, designed by Ramey and
Shapiro (1998), and largely used to evaluate the e¤ects of military build-up expenditures.
The latter approach is not evaluated in this study as it is too restrictive to the types of
shocks that can be investigated with it, as also observed by Fragetta and Melina (2011)
and Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012).
There are two mainstream econometric approaches to minimize the problem of para-
meter proliferation: (i) the use of structural Factor Autoregression (FAVAR) models, and
(ii) by imposing shrinkage restrictions on large VAR models. However, as observed by
Kilian and Lütkepohl (2017), these alternative modelling approaches have their own lim-
itations. For example, the structural impulse responses generated by these two modelling
approaches are only approximately valid, and the approximation may be poor.
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In this study, I undertake an empirical examination of the e¤ects of government spend-
ing and tax revenue shocks on various macroeconomic aggregates of interest, including
output, consumption, wages, hours worked, trade balance and exchange rate. My em-
pirical investigation employs vector autoregressive modelling method and uses quarterly
data from two developed economies, the United States (U.S.) and the United Kingdom
(U.K.). I show that the recursive and Blanchard-Perotti identication approaches tend
to yield similar responses for both economies, but the impulse responses estimated under
the sign restriction approach di¤ers in the short-term. This may be explained by the
ltering out of undesirable transitory shocks, such as technology and monetary shocks. I
also propose a novel identication specication to estimate the dynamics of government
spending shocks on open economy variables, namely exchange rate and trade balance.
The impulse responses of this proposed specication is robust when compared to recent
peer reviewed studies by Ravn et al. (2012) and Beetsma and Giuliodori (2011). The
ndings of this study suggest that government spending tends to generate higher output
multiplier compared to tax cuts. Another important contribution of this study is related
to the scal stimulus leakages in an open economy framework. This study empirically
substantiates the call for a concerted scal stimulus amongst trade partners in times of
economic downturn in view to equalize or balance out the spillovers via the trade channel
and to minimize the scal free-riding problem. Finally, I present additional empirical
evidence to the current literature by showing that the e¤ects of government spending
innovations on output and its constituent parts have weakened in the post-1980s.
The presence of competing economic theories has motivated a large body of empirical
investigations that measure the e¤ects of scal multipliers. However, little e¤ort has been
devoted to understanding what drives these di¤erences in empirical results. Motivated
by this gap in the literature, the Chapter 2 of my thesis shows that by controlling for
di¤erences in the specication of the reduced form of vector autoregression model, I was
able to reconcile some of the disagreement in the scal policy literature. This is the
key novelty and contribution of this chapter of my thesis. My empirical ndings of a
government spending shock are aligned with most current generation New Keynesian
DSGE models with deep habits and rule of thumb consumers.
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This study is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a comprehensive literature
review of the theory on scal policy and the related empirical literature. Section 2.3
describes the dataset of the macroeconomic aggregates, their sources and transforma-
tions. Section 2.4 sets out the adopted econometric methodology and gives a descriptive
explanation of the identication approaches used in this study. Section 2.5 provides an
interpretation of the results and attempts to reconcile them with the economic theory.
Section 2.6 outlines the results of policy experiments, such as balanced-budget expendi-
ture shocks and decit-nanced tax cuts, using the sign restriction identication approach.
Section 2.7 reports the results of various robustness and sensibility checks. Section 2.8
concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
2.2.1 Theoretical Literature
The driving force behind any economic model, when investigating the transmission mecha-
nism of scal shocks, is whether agents behave in a rational and forward looking manner.
In the following sections, I provide an outline of the existing theoretical and empirical
literature on the e¤ects of scal policies on macroeconomic variables.
2.2.1.1 Keynesian Framework
According to the classical literature, scal policy has no e¤ect in stimulating or damping
aggregate demand since wages and prices are fully exible and the aggregate supply curve
is vertical. On the other hand, the Keynesian framework, represented by the traditional
IS-LM and the extended Mundell-Fleming (also known as IS-LM-BoP) models, advocates
that wages and prices are rigid and private consumption is dependent only to the current
level of income. In this structure, while a scal stimulus will always expand aggregate
income for a closed economy, the e¤ects for an open economy are conditional to the
adopted exchange rate regime and to the degree of trade openness.
For a closed economy, considering the money supply xed, an expansionary expendi-
ture shock drives up aggregate output and interest rate to increase, which in turn causes
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private investment to crowd out, dependent upon the elasticity of private investment to
interest rate. The nal e¤ect of an expansionary expenditure shock is a rise in output,
investment and consumption. A scal stimulus represented by cuts in taxation increase
disposable income, causing consumption and aggregate output to increase. Akin to the
expenditure shock, private investment is also crowded out by the rise in the interest rate.
It is noted that the tax multiplier is normally lower than the expenditure multiplier given
that part of the increased disposable income, as a result of tax cuts, will not be spent,
but saved. The di¤erence between the tax and expenditure multipliers depends on the
marginal propensity to consume.
The e¤ects of a scal shock for an open economy depend on the adopted exchange
rate regime. Under a exible exchange rate regime, an expansionary scal shock increases
output, demand for money and, ultimately, interest rate. Assuming no restrictions on
capital mobility and xed foreign interest rate, foreign capital, attracted by the high do-
mestic interest rate, ows into the economy causing the local exchange rate to appreciate.
Considering that prices are sticky, the stronger domestic currency disincentives exports
and encourages imports, causing the trade balance to deteriorate, o¤setting the scal ex-
pansion. Therefore, the scal stimulus in an open economy with exible exchange rate
regime is fruitless, given that the scal multiplier is zero. On the other hand, under a
regime of xed exchange rate, an expansionary scal shock forces the monetary authorities
to increase money supply in view to maintain the xed exchange rate parity, amplifying
the e¤ects of scal shocks to a level greater than what it would have been for a closed
economy.
Given these facts, it is easy to demonstrate that, in an interrelated global economy,
scal decisions taken locally can a¤ect the economic conditions of foreign trading partners,
in particular when considering currency union, such as the euro area where the exchange
rate regime is xed among the countries participant to the currency union, but oating
with the rest of the world. As previously described, an expansionary scal shock by an
Euro member, for example, causes domestic interest rate to rise and imports to grow,
increasing the aggregate output of the trading partners via the trade channel. Concur-
rently, the inux of foreign capital, including from countries within the monetary union,
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increases interest rate and dampens aggregate output of the monetary union country
members via the interest rate channel. Intuitively, the spillover e¤ect outlined previously
depend on the size of the scal shock. If the scal expansion is su¢ ciently large to result
in an appreciation of the unied currency within the global arena, the scal stimulus will
be o¤set by the deteriorating net exports, following to the Mundell-Fleming framework.
This strengthens the argument of a concerted scal expansion, in particular at times of
deep global recession, as experienced recently. For a detailed exposition on this topic,
refer to Beetsma and Giuliodori (2011).
2.2.1.2 Neoclassical and New Keynesian Framework
As previously mentioned, the e¤ects of scal shocks on the economic aggregates depend
crucially on whether agents are forward looking. The dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium (DSGE) framework allow for rational forward looking agents, where (i) the represen-
tative household maximizes its expected discounted lifetime utility, subject to its budget
constraint, (ii) the representative rm maximizes prots, taking real wages and capital
services rental rates as given, subject to current technology, and (iii) the economy is sub-
ject to exogenous government purchases and the government is also subject to a budget
constraint. The DSGE literature has evolved along two di¤erent lines in response to the
empirical evidence. The rst branch of literature builds on the assumption that prices
are exible and the market is in perfect competition; the real business cycle (RBC) model
is used in this context. The second and most recent branch of literature, represented by
the New Keynesian (NK) DSGE model, incorporate nominal rigidities and monopolistic
competition. These modelling approaches are discussed below.
In the RBC framework, an exogenous positive spending shock, which will eventually
have to be paid through increased taxation, reduces the representative agents wealth by
increasing their tax liabilities, causing savings to rise, private consumption to decline,
labour supply curve to shift out and real wages to fall. The substitution e¤ect due to
the increase in hours worked is generally not strong enough to o¤set the negative wealth
e¤ect. Edelberg et al. (1999) reported that if the expenditure shock is permanent, private
investment will rise; otherwise, the latter is taken as consumption. Private consumption
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declines, irrespective on whether the scal stimulus is nanced by taxes or debt. Burnside
et al. (2004) also demonstrated that scal shocks nanced by distortionary taxes produce
comparable results to non-distortionary taxes, e.g., lump-sum taxes, but asserted that
overall output rises whether investment is permanent or temporary. In addition to the
previous references, further studies on scal policy using RBC models include Baxter and
King (1993), Eichenbaum and Fisher (2005) and Rebelo (2005).
The e¤ects of scal shocks on macroaggregates under the standard NK DSGE frame-
work are comparable to the neoclassical framework, except for real wages, which are
expected to increase in the former framework following an expansionary spending shock.
This can be explained by the fact that, under nominal rigidities, rms demand more
labour to cope with increased output. The shift in labour demand is su¢ ciently large
to o¤set the negative wealth e¤ect caused by the expenditure shock. Monacelli and Per-
otti (2008) show that, in a standard New Keynesian model with sticky prices and no
habit persistence in consumption, private consumption increases substantially on impact,
and then goes down monotonically to the steady state, following a government spending
shock. Hours worked and real wages also increase following the scal shock. Monacelli
and Perotti (2010) provided evidence that, under a standard NK DSGE model for an
open economy, an expansionary spending shock causes exchange rate to appreciate and
trade balance to depreciate, just as in the Keynesian framework. In an attempt to be
data-consistent with the empirical evidence, in which consumption declines and exchange
rate depreciates following a scal expansion, many authors modied the standard DSGE
models, as detailed below.
Private Consumption Puzzle: Largely, there are ve main modications to the stan-
dard DSGE framework in order to address the private consumption puzzle. Linnemann
(2006) argued that using a neoclassical model with a modied utility function, in which
consumption and hours worked are complements, consumption crowds in following an
expansionary spending shock. In fact, the negative wealth e¤ect, resulted from the rise
in government expenditure, shifts out the labour supply curve by increasing the marginal
utility of consumption, and then consumption. Ravn et al. (2006) showed that, for large
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values of habit persistence parameter, private consumption, real wages and employment
increase in response to a positive spending shock in a NK DSGE model with monopolistic
competition and deep habits. In this setup, the rise in labour demand more than com-
pensates for the rise in labour supply. Ravn et al. (2012) introduce deep habits into a
two-county model and nd that an increase in government spending leads to an increase
in aggregate demand, real wages, and private consumption. Zubairy (2014) nds that an
increase in government spending, causes output, consumption, hours and wages to rise,
whereas investment falls with a delay. Galí et al. (2007), using a standard NK DSGE
framework with nominal rigidities and rule of thumb consumers, concluded that, for a
su¢ cient large proportion of non-Ricardian households, real wages and hours worked in-
crease in response to a positive expenditure shock. Forni et al. (2009) estimated that
the share of rule of thumb consumers in order to achieve positive consumption in the
eurozone should be between 30% and 40%, while Campbell and Mankiw (1989) estimated
this gure to be around 50% in the U.S.. For a more comprehensive discussion on this
issue, refer to Hebous (2011). In addition to the expected increase in taxation to pay
for scal stimulus, Corsetti et al. (2010) claimed that decit-nanced scal shocks also
lead to a reduction in future expenditures. This is known in the literature as spend-
ing reversal, and it is derived by incorporating the stock of public debt into the DSGE
framework featuring nominal rigidities and rule of thumb consumers. Aggregate output
and private consumption increase as a result of an expansionary scal shock under the
spending reversal framework.
Exchange Rate Puzzle: Both the standard IS-LM and DSGE models establish that
real exchange rate appreciates following a scal stimulus, contradicting the empirical
evidence. For Monacelli and Perotti (2010), this must be related to the increase in pri-
vate consumption, but they ruled out that the share of consumption attributed to the
rule of thumb consumers per se would cause the depreciation of the real exchange rate.
Drautzburg and Uhlig (2015) introduce rule of thumb consumers to the New Keynesian
DSGE model à la Smets and Wouters (2007) and nd that government spending increases
output, hours worked, real wages, and aggregate consumption in the short-run, whereas
25
CHAPTER 2. FISCAL POLICY IN AN OPEN ECONOMY
ination moves little. Naraidoo et al. (2017) analyze domestic and cross-border e¤ects
of scal policy in a two-region business cycle model with the presence of rule of thumb
households. They nd output, consumption, aggregate, wage income, hours worked, ina-
tion, and nominal interest rate increase following a positive government spending shock.
Mertens and Ravn (2011) estimated the e¤ects of news anticipation to the exchange rate
and consumption using a NK DSGE model with deep habits, as described previously.
They found consumption to decrease following an anticipated positive expenditure shock,
while exchange rate appreciates, just as in the standard DSGE framework. The opposite
is observed in response to an unanticipated shock. Corsetti et al. (2010) concluded that,
under the spending reversal setup, exchange rate depreciates and private consumption
rises following a positive scal shock. Using a standard two-country business cycle model
with spending reversal, Corsetti and Müeller (2014) nd that government spending shock
increases domestic output and consumption increases, real exchange rate depreciates on
impact and stays below steady state level for an extended period. Table 2.1 summarizes
the expected qualitative results found in the theoretical literature for a positive govern-
ment spending shock.
Table 2.1: The E¤ects of Positive Government Spending Shock using Theoretical Models
Theoretical Framework Output Consumption Hours Worked Real Wage Exchange Rate
Neoclassical RBC +  +  +
DSGE: Nominal Rigidities +  + + +
DSGE: Separable Utility + + +  
DSGE: Deep Habits + + + + 
DSGE: ROT1Consumers + + + + n/a
DSGE: Spending Reversal + + + + 
2.2.2 Empirical Evidence
Before reviewing the empirical scal policy literature, I should note that the reported
ndings of the evaluated empirical studies are not always directly comparable. This is
because of di¤erent identication approaches (recursive, Blanchard-Perotti, sign restric-
tion, narrative) and variables used, dissimilar detrending methods (rst di¤erence, linear,
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quadratic, Hodrick-Prescott lter), sample periods, numbers of lags, denition of scal
variables, and so on. For this reason, I focus this review on the qualitative e¤ects of scal
shocks rather than their quantitative e¤ects.
Irrespective of the chosen identication method in the VAR framework, the majority
of the studies found an increase in aggregate output, with the characteristic hump shape
impulse response curve, following an expansionary government spending shock. Exam-
ples can be found in Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Fatás and Mihov (2001) and Pappa
(2009b). Unexpectedly, Perotti (2005) found that, for certain subsamples, aggregate out-
put declined in Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom. Perotti (2005) also argued
that, after a spending shock, the strength of scal stimulus on output and its constituent
components have weakened in the post-1980s, and suggested that this may be due to the
relaxation of credit constraints and stronger interest rate response. Bilbiie et al. (2008)
corroborated to Perottis views, by attributing this phenomenon to a more responsive
monetary stance after the 1980s. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Mertens and Ravn
(2011) found that anticipated and unanticipated scal shocks a¤ect aggregate output in
similar way, but they claimed that news anticipation may invalidate the estimated VAR
parameters. This result is reinforced by Mertens and Ravn (2010), which fail to nd evi-
dence that anticipation e¤ects invalidate the existing results from the scal policy SVAR
literature. It is important to note that the systematic part of scal policy in the form of
automatic stabilizers. Unanticipated scal shocks a¤ect behavior when the government
spending or tax changes are implemented, while anticipated changes in government spend-
ing or tax changes may a¤ect the economy ahead of their introduction. The idea that
anticipated policy shocks impact on the economy prior to their implementation has been
explored extensively in the literature on scal policy. For tax shocks, see Yang (2005),
and House and Shapiro (2006). For government spending shocks, see Ramey (2011). In
relation to asymmetries of scal shocks, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), and Baum
and Koester (2011) defended that scal stimulus is more e¤ective in periods of downturns
than in periods of economic prosperity. The latter suggested that tting a nonlinear
economy to a linear VAR model is likely to lead to misleading inferences.
In relation to private consumption, Fatás and Mihov (2001), Blanchard and Perotti
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(2002) and Perotti (2005) found that, under the recursive and Blanchard-Perotti identi-
cation approaches, consumption signicantly and persistently increases following a pos-
itive expenditure shock, while Mountford and Uhlig (2009) established that, using the
sign restriction identication approach, the consumptions response is insignicant and
close to zero over the entire impulse response horizon. Despite of not applying the nar-
rative approach in this study, for completeness, I briey summarize its overall empirical
results. Ramey (2011) reported that, under the narrative approach, consumption per-
sistently and signicantly falls following an expansionary expenditure shock. As we can
see, there is no overarching agreement in the empirical literature about the e¤ects of s-
cal shocks on private consumption. Yet, it is possible to summarize that the recursive
and Blanchard-Perotti identication approaches tend to support the Keynesian and NK
DSGE framework with deep habits and rule of thumb consumers, in which consumption
increases. The narrative approach, on the other hand, tends to support the RBC ndings,
in which consumption declines. The sign restriction approach, however, does not provide
any conclusive views since consumptions response is insignicant and close to zero.
As regards to hours worked, there is little disagreement in the empirical literature given
that most studies reported a rise in employment given an expansionary expenditure shock.
On the other hand, the results on the real wages are more controversial. Burnside et al.
(2004) and Euchenbaum and Fisher (2005) found a persistent and signicant decrease in
real wages, whereas Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Pappa (2009b) argued the opposite.
From an open economy viewpoint, the majority of empirical literature documented that a
positive scal stimulus causes exchange rate to depreciate, contrasting with the Keynesian
and the standard DSGE literature, which predicts the opposite. However, the NK DSGE
framework à la Ravn et al. (2006) and Galí et al. (2007) are data consistent, i.e., their
impacts on exchange rate are aligned with the empirical evidence.
As noted earlier, the Keynesian theory advocates that the tax cut multiplier is nor-
mally smaller than the expenditure multiplier since agents tend to save part of their
increased disposable income. A contractionary tax shock diminishes aggregate output
under various identication approaches, as found by Fatás and Mihov (2001) using the re-
cursive approach, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) using the Blanchard-Perotti identication
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method, Mountford and Uhlig (2009) using the sign restriction approach, and Romer and
Romer (2010) using the narrative identication approach. Akin to expenditure shock,
Perotti (2005) showed that the impact of the tax multiplier depends on the evaluated
subsample.
Caldara and Kamps (2017) developed an empirical framework which is used to relate
the sign and size of scal multipliers of mainstream identication approaches, namely
Recursive, Blanchard-Perotti and Sign Restriction. They show how the denition of the
systematic component of scal policy instrument (tax and government spending) inuence
the identication of these scal shocks. The impact scal multipliers for both government
spending and tax cuts found in this study are comparable with the results using the proxy
(Dynamic Fiscal Multipliers) identication approach proposed by Caldara and Kamps
(2017). Chahrour et al. (2012) also nd signicantly di¤erent results of estimated tax
multipliers when using Blanchard-Perotti and narrative identication approaches. The
former yields multipliers of about 1 and the latter of about 3. This paper uses a DSGE
model as a data generating process to estimate the Blanchard-Perotti and Romer-Romer
empirical models. The estimation results suggest that the Blanchard-Perotti and Romer-
Romer models deliver on average remarkably good approximations to the true impulse
response of output to an exogenous innovation in income tax rates. Thus, the observed
di¤erences in estimated multipliers must be due to the models failing to identify the same
tax shock, or to the small-sample uncertainty. Ramey (2016) comprehensively summarizes
the scal policy empirical literature.
It is important to emphasize that the empirical results depend crucially on the adopted
econometric methods and the studied economy, as the interaction between the scal vari-
ables and other economic aggregates di¤er considerably across countries. Therefore, the
analysis of scal shocks in the U.K. is likely to produce di¤erent results than those for
the U.S.. To sum up, while there is consensus amongst most theoretical and empirical
literature on the increase of aggregate output given a scal stimulus, the e¤ects on private
consumption, real wages and real exchange rate are still debatable. Table 2.2 summa-
rizes the expected qualitative results found in the empirical literature for an expansionary
expenditure shock.
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Table 2.2: The E¤ects of Positive Government Spending Shock using Empirical Models
Empirical Models Output Consumption Hours Worked Real Wage Exchange Rate
Recursive +  +  
Blanchard-Perotti + + + + 
Sign Restriction + 0 + + n/a
Narrative or Event Study + + +  n/a
2.3 Data
I use quarterly data over the period of 1955Q1 2007Q4, giving n = 212 observations,
and 1964Q1 2007Q4 (n = 176) for both the baseline and augmented models for the U.S.
and the U.K., respectively. For the open economy variables, I restrict my estimation to
the period of 1970Q1 2007Q4 (n = 152) and 1972Q1 2007Q4 (n = 144) for the U.S.
and the U.K., in the order given. The components of national income and scal series are
in real terms and were transformed from their nominal values by dividing them by the
GDP deator. As the observations of 2008 and 2009 are strongly a¤ected by the Global
Financial Crisis, I restrict the estimation period up to the last quarter of 2007. The series
were seasonally adjusted at the source, except from tax receipts for the U.K., which was
transformed using the X-12 ARIMA Seasonal Adjustment procedure of the U.S. Census
Bureau. The national income and scal series were rst transformed to their per capita
values, and then to their natural logarithm form. The latter transformation is a useful
way to stabilize the variance of the time series, as suggested by Lütkepohl and Krätzig
(2004). Monthly data was aggregated using arithmetic average to obtain quarterly series.
The data used in this study was obtained from ve main sources. For the U.S., the
components of national income, scal variables and price index of GDP were compiled
from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) tables of the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA), while the interest rate, imports and exports series were sourced from the
Federal Research of St. Louis (FRED). Labour market series were sourced from the
Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS) and the CPI-based real e¤ective exchange rate series,
calculated by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
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was obtained from Thomson Reuters DataStream. For the U.K., most variables were
sourced from the O¢ ce for National Statistics (ONS). The interest rate was compiled
from the FRED, while government spending, imports and exports were sourced from the
OECD database. The CPI-based real e¤ective exchange rate series was obtained from
Thomson Reuters DataStream. All series are freely available on public domain, except
for the CPI-based real e¤ective exchange rate2.
The variables used in the baseline model are government spending (EXP), gross do-
mestic product (GDP), ination (INF), tax receipts (REV), and interest rate (INT). All
baseline variables are in logarithm form and per capita, except for ination and inter-
est rate. I augmented the ve-variable baseline VAR model to a six-variable VAR by
adding, in turn3, the following variables: private consumption (CONS), private invest-
ment (INV), non-residential investment (NRINV), residential investment (RINV), hours
worked (HRS), and real wages (WAGE). All augmented variables are in logarithm form
and per capita, except for hours worked and real wages, which are in levels and per capita.
The disaggregated residential and non-residential investment series could not be sourced
for the U.K.. The open economy setup is essentially an extension of the augmented model,
where the trade balance (TRB) and CPI-based real e¤ective exchange rate (REER) are
added in turns. These open economy variables were transformed to their share of GDP.
The trade balanced variable was constructed by taking the di¤erence of the exports (EXP)
and imports (IMP) series.
There is a myriad of combinations in the denition of scal variables of which I follow
Perotti (2005) in the denition of scal variables. In this study, government spending
is dened as the sum of its consumption and investment, while tax receipts are dened
as current receipts less social transfers and interest payments. Interest rate is dened as
the 3-Month Treasury Bill, and ination as the log di¤erence of the GDP deator. The
Data Appendix A.1 provides further details on the denition of variables, their respective
sources, and sample availability. Figure 2.2 depicts the evolution of government spending
2 The Thomson Reuters DataStream is freely available to the research community at University of Surrey.
3 I estimated the additional variables in turns with the objective to minimize the loss of degrees of freedom,
albeit this issue is better addressed by factor-augmented VARs (FAVAR), as studied by Bernanke et al.
(2005).
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and tax revenues as share of GDP for the U.S. and the U.K., using quarterly data since
1955 and with the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)4 and classic dened
recession dates shaded grey. A recurring pattern between scal variables and recessions
can be observed. During recessions, tax revenue tends to decline, while government spend-
ing normally increases. These movements can be attributed to non-discretionary scal
shocks, which are closely related to the dynamics of the automatic stabilizers. This will
be discussed in more detail at later sections.
It is suggested that the issue of parameter proliferation in VARmodels can be mitigated
by using factor models or by imposing Bayesian shrinkage to the parameters. However, in
relation to FAVAR models, for example, it is unclear whether the factors can accurately
capture the information in a large dimensional VAR as the economic relations between
the variables may be lost due to information aggregation. As pointed out by Stock and
Watson (2005), if the factor model is taken as the data generating process, then the
factors contain all the dynamic interaction between the variables. A crucial problem
with using large-scale BVAR models is the choice of the prior, which aim to compensate
for degrees of freedom limitations. As highlighted by Kilian and Lütkepohl (2017), the
classical Litterman or Minnesota priors used in the for the estimation of large-scale VAR
models - such as in Banbura et al. (2010) - may distort the structural impulse response
estimates. Rather than ne-tuning the Minnesota prior subjectively, Giannone et al.
(2015) propose a full Bayes treatment of the natural conjugate version of the Minnesota
prior by estimating its shrinkage hyperparameter from the likelihood. This Bayesian
shrinkage approach is used by Korobilis (2016) in a panel vector autoregression (PVAR)
setting. An additional estimation challenge is related to the information included in
the standard macroeconomic databases. For example, agentsexpectations about future
scal policies from opinion polls are generally too short for inclusion in a VAR model.
Furthermore, credibility issues in relation to scal responsibility cannot be captured by
simply adding a number of supplementary macroeconomic indicators to the VAR model.
In these stances, the FAVAR or large-scale BVAR models will not be able to overcome
4 While recession in the classic sense is dened as two consecutive quarters of negative real output growth, the
NBER recession is dened as a signicant decline in economic activity lasting for more than a few months.
For further details, refer to the NBER website (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html).
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these informational deciencies of the VAR model.
2.4 Econometric Methodology
There are a number of steps to be addressed before the estimation procedure, including,
but not limited to the selection of the variables and deterministic terms to include in
the system, decision on the optimal number of lags and sample period, judgment on
the detrending method to adopt, among others. Clearly, the estimation results can be
sensitive to these choices, which, to some degree, may explain the quantitative, and even
the qualitative, di¤erences found in the empirical literature of scal shocks.
The selection of variables, in the context of scal shocks, is normally decided based on
the economic theory, whereas the optimal lag order is generally determined by multivariate
information criteria combined with a judgment based on the task at hand, i.e., what we
want to achieve with the VAR model. The three most used information criteria are the
Akaike (AIC), the Schwarz-Bayesian (BIC) and Hannan-Quinn (HQ). Table 2.3 exhibits
the optimal lag order for the U.S. and the U.K. using AIC, BIC and HQ under di¤erent
model specications.
Table 2.3: Lag Length Selection of the Baseline Model
U.S. U.K.
Optimal Number of Lags AIC BIC HQ AIC BIC HQ
With Intercept 4 1 2 3 1 2
With Intercept and Trend 4 1 2 2 1 2
As expected, AIC selected a larger model compared to HQ and BIC, whereas the latter
tends to select a smaller model due to its higher penalty function compared to the other
information criteria. For further details on lag selection, refer to Lütkepohl and Krätzig
(2004). As noted by Ravn et al. (2012), large portion of the empirical literature on
scal policy using quarterly data seems to adopt four lags; examples include Sims (1980),
Blanchard and Perotti (2002), and Caldara and Kamps (2008). I follow the literature as
it seems to be the natural choice when studying joint dynamics with quarterly data, but,
in any case, I rely partly on the HQ information criterion to test the robustness of the
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baseline specication. The results show that using two lags, based on the HQ information
criterion, or six lags, as used by Caldara and Kamps (2008) in their sensitivity analysis,
do not di¤er materially from the baseline specication of four lags.
In this study, the e¤ects of scal shocks are estimated from a vector autoregression
(VAR) model, which takes the following reduced form
Yt = 0 + 1t+ A(L)Yt 1 + "t (2.1)
where 0 is a constant, t is a linear trend, A(L) denotes the autoregressive lag order
polynomial and "t is the reduced form errors. I include an intercept and linear trend as
deterministic terms to the baseline model. As reported in the sensitivity analysis section,
the impulse responses when adding quadratic trend to the specication do not signicantly
di¤er from the baseline results.
Given that the reduced form errors are usually correlated, I modify the reduced form
model by multiplying both sides of eq. (2.1) by the (k x k) matrix A0, where k is
the dimension of Yt, i.e., the number of endogenous variables, resulting in the following
structural form
A0Yt = A00 + A01t+ A0A(L)Yt 1 +But (2.2)
where ut denotes the mutually uncorrelated structural error term with mean zero, also
known in the VAR literature as structural innovation or structural shock, and
A0"t = But (2.3)
dene the relationship between the reduced and structural errors. In the VAR liter-
ature, this specication is often called the AB model, where the matrix A0 denes the
contemporaneous association between the variables. The assumption that the structural
innovations are orthogonal implies that the variance-covariance matrix of the structural
innovations (
P
u) is diagonal. Without restricting the parameters in the A0 and B, ma-
trices, eq. (2.2) is not identied5.
5 The variance-covariance matrix of eq. (2.1) has 10 elements, but there are 20 free parameters to be estimated.
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Based on the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier test, no serial correlation was de-
tected for the baseline VAR specication previously described. The test does not rejected
the null hypothesis of no serial correlation for both the U.S. and the U.K. when using two,
four and six lags6. I also carried out non-normality tests by checking whether the third and
fourth moments, skewness and kurtosis, are normally distributed. Using the multivariate
Jarque-Bera residual normality test with Cholesky factorization, the null hypothesis of
normal distribution was rejected for both countries. Although normality is not a required
condition for the validity of hypothesis tests related to VAR models, non-normality may
suggest model misspecication, which can be attributed to nonlinearities or structural
change in the relationship between the model variables, as noted by Lütkepohl (2011).
Indeed, I nd evidence for both these issues, and I will discuss them in further detail later
on.
Alessi et al. (2011) explains that non-fundamentalness in times series econometrics
occurs when the economic variables do not contain su¢ cient information to recover the
economys structural shocks. In this case, the standard techniques used to estimate struc-
tural vector autoregression models cannot be used to accurately recover structural shocks
given that the economic variables do not allow for a vector autoregression representation
where the residuals are linear combinations of the underlying structural shocks. Forni
and Gambetti (2014) have proposed a test for non-fundamentalness. Their proposed test
rst computes the principal components from the number of potentially relevant eco-
nomic variables, and then test whether these principal components are Granger-causal
for the smaller set of variables. If none of the principal components is Granger-causal
for the variables in a given VAR model, it is thus deduced that the VAR model con-
tains enough information for structural analysis. Otherwise, additional variables need to
added to the VAR. As pointed by Kilian and Lütkepohl (2017), an important limitation
of this approach is that it assumes that the factors fully describe the economic agents
information set. Beaudry et al. (2015) show that the non-fundamental representation of
a time series may be very close to its fundamental representation implying that standard
6 The calculated p-values are 0.06, 0.50 and 0.48 for two, four and six lags when using U.S. data, and 0.22,
0.40 and 0.65 for two, four and six lags when using U.K. data
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structural VAR techniques may provide a very good approximation of the e¤ects of struc-
tural shocks even when the non-fundamentalness is formally present. More recently, using
the fundamentalness test, Forni and Gambetti (2016) nd that, despite scal foresight,
their open-economy VAR specication is not a¤ected by non-fundamentalness. In the
remainder of this section, I discuss the identication approaches used in this study.
2.4.1 Recursive Approach
In the recursive approach, the matrix B is restricted to Ik and the matrix A0 to a lower
triangular matrix with unit diagonal. The characteristic feature of orthogonalization using
Cholesky decomposition is that the resulting structural model is recursive, indicating
causal ordering of the model variables rather than the causal relationships embodied in
the data. The recursive ordering of the baseline variables is EXP ! GDP ! INF !
REV ! INT , which implies that eq. (2.3) takes the following matrix form.
266666666664
1 0 0 0 0
GDPEXP 1 0 0 0
INFEXP 
INF
GDP 1 0 0
REVEXP 
REV
GDP 
REV
INF 1 0
INTEXP 
INT
GDP 
INT
INF 
INT
REV 1
377777777775
266666666664
"EXPt
"GDPt
"INFt
"REVt
"INTt
377777777775
=
266666666664
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
377777777775
266666666664
uEXPt
uGDPt
uINFt
uREVt
uINTt
377777777775
(2.4)
This causal ordering infers that: (i) EXP does not respond contemporaneously to dis-
turbances of other model variables, (ii) GDP is a¤ected contemporaneously by EXP, but
it does not respond contemporaneously to the REV, INF and INT innovations, (iii) INF
is a¤ected contemporaneously by EXP and GDP, but it does not respond contempora-
neously to the REV and INT innovations, (iv) REV is a¤ected by EXP, GDP and INF,
but does not respond contemporaneously to the INT innovations, and (v) INT is a¤ected
contemporaneously by all innovations in the system. After the rst period, all variables
in the system interact concurrently.
The rationale for this causal ordering is given as follows. EXP is mostly immune
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from technology shocks7; consequently, it is ordered in a way that it is not simultaneously
a¤ected by other shocks in the system. GDP and INF have a direct and immediate impact
on the tax base and therefore it should be ordered before REV. INT is ordered last for
two reasons: (i) it is normally set by central banks using the Taylor rule, where future
interest rate is a function of current ination and potential output, (ii) EXP and REV
are dened in this study to be excluded of interest payments.
2.4.2 Blanchard-Perotti Approach
Kilian (2011) reasoned that, back in the 1980s, many practitioners failed to realize that the
orthogonalization of the reduced form errors imposes strong identifying assumptions to the
VARmodel, leading to severe criticisms to the recursive VARmodelling approach as being
atheoretical. These criticisms spurred the development of the structural identication
approach that impose non-recursive identifying restrictions.
From the scal policy perspective, this identication approach relies heavily on insti-
tutional information about the tax system and the timing of tax collections, as advocated
by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2005). The key estimation procedure is
based on (i) the derivation of the cyclically adjusted tax revenues and government expen-
ditures, and (ii) estimation of the relationship between scal and model variables, i.e.,
their respective elasticities to the model variables. I refer to Perottis (2005) estimated
elasticities to be used in the matrix.A0. Based on his calculations, the elasticities of tax
revenues to GDP (TAXGDP ) and ination (
TAX
INF ) for the U.S. are 1.85 and 1.25, respectively,
whereas theses estimates for the U.K. are 0.76 and 1.21. It is noted that these are point
estimates and they are now outdated given that these elasticities were last estimated using
data up to 2001, therefore, re-estimating them with more recent data may be warranted
for future research. The elasticities of tax revenues to GDP range from 1.75 to 1.97 for
the U.S., and from 1.09 to 1.40 for the U.K., depending on the considered subsample.
For completeness, I provide the price elasticities of tax revenues, which range from 0.66
to 0.82 for the U.S. and from 1.08 to 1.32 for the U.K.; these elasticities are reported in
7 According to the neoclassical literature, technology shocks are the primary drivers of business cycles; the
standard DSGE literature attributes less weight to it.
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table 2.4.
Table 2.4: Output and Price Elasticities of Tax Revenue
U.S. U.K.
Sample Period TAXGDP 
TAX
INFL 
TAX
GDP 
TAX
INF
1963Q1 2001Q2 1.85 0.76 1.25 1.21
1963Q1 1980Q1 1.97 0.82 1.40 1.32
1979Q4 2001Q2 1.75 0.66 1.09 1.08
Source: Perotti (2005)
Given that government spending is dened net of transfers, thus acyclical, it is then
assumed that the elasticity of government spending to GDP (EXPGDP ) is zero. The elasticity
of government spending to ination (EXPINF ) for the U.S. and the U.K. is set to  0:5 based
on the assumption that wages do not respond instantaneously to ination. Since public
sector salary pay accounts for a large portion of the government spending bill, setting
EXPINF =  0:5 implies that expenditure will decline in real terms, if ination increases.
In relation to elasticity of government spending and tax revenue to interest rate (EXPINT
and TAXINT ), they are set to zero because scal variables are net of interest payments, as
dened in this study. Lastly, the EXPTAX is set to zero, which implies that expenditure
shocks precede tax revenue shocks, just as in the recursive approach. By imposing these
restrictions to the matrices A0 and B, eq. (2.3) for the U.S. data takes the following
matrix form266666666664
1 0  0:5 0 0
GDPEXP 1 0 
GDP
REV 0
INFEXP 
INF
GDP 1 
INF
REV 0
0 1:85 1:25 1 0
INTEXP 
INT
GDP 
INT
INF 
INT
REV 1
377777777775
266666666664
"EXPt
"GDPt
"INFt
"REVt
"INTt
377777777775
=
266666666664
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
REVEXP 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
377777777775
266666666664
uEXPt
uGDPt
uINFt
uREVt
uINTt
377777777775
(2.5)
Comparing matrices (2.4) and (2.5) reveals that the recursive approach relies on impos-
ing zero restrictions to the upper triangular matrix A0 in order to achieve identication,
whereas the Blanchard-Perotti approach relies on the estimated relationships between the
model variables.
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2.4.3 Sign Restriction Approach
There is a number of alternative identication approaches used in the VAR literature,
including the heteroscedasticity identication approach proposed by Rigobon (2003), and
the graphical modelling approach developed by Fragetta and Melina (2011). However,
the sign restriction approach is undoubtedly the most popular alternative identication
method. The sign restriction approach was pioneered by Uhlig (2005) to study monetary
policy, and applied to the scal shock analysis by Mountford and Uhlig (2009). Uhlig
(2005) demonstrated that VAR models identied by sign restrictions may produce dissim-
ilar impulse responses when compared to conventional structural identication methods,
such as the recursive and Blanchard-Perotti approaches. Identication via sign restric-
tion is achieved by restricting the expected responses of the matrix A0 to a unique sign
pattern, based on prior economic believe on how a specic shock should a¤ect certain
macroeconomic variables. I follow Mountford and Uhlig (2009) denition of scal shocks
and I identify three shocks: technology, government spending, and tax revenue shocks.
I have included monetary shock in the evaluation of policy experiments, which will be
discussed in further detail in Section 2.6.
In this study, a positive technology shock is dened as an increase of output and tax
revenues for a minimum period of four quarters following the shock. This shock has the
purpose to lter out technology shocks. This shock denition implicitly rules out that
a tax increase may cause output to grow. The expansionary government spending and
tax revenue shocks are dened as an increase of government spending and tax revenue,
respectively, for a minimum period of four quarters following the shock. The monetary
policy shock is dened as an of increase interest rate and ination for a minimum period
of four quarters following the shock. The monetary policy shock will be used for policy
experiments. Its purpose is akin to the technology shocks, i.e., to lter out monetary
shocks which may distort the pure scal shock analysis. In view to exclude transitory or
short-lived shocks, e.g., tax revenue rises on impact but falls to zero within two or three
periods, Mountford and Uhlig (2009) recommended constraining the sign restriction for a
period of four quarters. Table 2.5 describes the dened sign restriction shocks, where +
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and denotes the proposed response for four periods.
Table 2.5: Denition of Shocks under the Sign Restriction Approach
Shocks / Variables Tax Revenue Government Spending Output Interest Rate Ination
Technology + +
Monetary Policy + -
Tax Revenue +
Government Spending +
Source: Adapted from Mountford and Uhlig (2009)
Following Mountford and Uhlig (2009) approach, I proceed as follows. Recall that eq.
(2.3) denes the relationship between the reduced form and structural errors. As in the
recursive approach, the matrix B is restricted to Ik. The eq. (2.3) can be written as
ut = A0"t. Let the matrix A0 be decomposed into two components, A0 = PQ, where P
denote the lower triangular Cholesky decomposition that satises
P
" = PP
0 = A0A00 for
any orthonormal square matrix Q with dimension k x k, such that QQ0 = Ik. Unlike P ,
PQ is non-recursive, and Q is the rotation matrix. There is a possibility that very few
impulse responses will satisfy the full identifying sign restrictions. The penalty function,
proposed by Uhlig (2005) and implemented by Mountford and Uhlig (2009), addresses
this problem by penalizing impulse responses with the undesirable sign and by rewarding
impulse responses with the desirable sign. I estimate as many draws as required in order
to obtain 250 accepted draws that meet the sign restriction identication criteria.
2.5 Empirical Results
In this section, I describe and interpret the empirical ndings of this study. The national
income and scal variables are shown as monetary unit responses, dollar for the U.S. and
sterling for the U.K., to a monetary unit shock. This is rstly accomplished by normalizing
the original impulse responses in order to get shocks of one percent in size, and secondly
by factoring the normalized impulse responses by the ratio mean between the evaluated
variables and the innovations, the latter being government spending and tax revenue. The
responses to the monetary and open economy variables are given as percentage change
following a change of one percent in the scal variable, apart from the interest rate, which
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can be interpreted as changes in percentage points. Otherwise mentioned, the impulse
responses are reported by their median results with one standard deviation condence
bands, which is approximately equivalent to 68% condence, using 10,000 replications
computed using the Sims and Zha (1999) method. As pointed out by Fry and Pagan
(2011), it is acknowledged that reporting the pointwise medians as a point estimate of
the response function median is misleading because the response functions constructed
from the median responses for each horizon is a composite of di¤erent structural response
functions (from potentially di¤erent models). In other words, there is no guarantee that
the true impulses would coincide with the median, but one may argue that the median
impulses are thought of as most probable.
2.5.1 Government Spending Shock
The impulse responses on the baseline variables following a government spending shock
using the three identication approaches are shown in gure 2.3 for the U.S. and in
gure 2.4 for the U.K. Given that the one of the objectives of this study is to establish
whether the evaluated identication approaches are comparable, I combine these impulse
responses for all identication approaches in the same graph, as illustrated in gure 2.6.
The responses for the augmented and open economy variables for both countries are
presented in the gure 2.5. I rst comment on the U.S. results, and then on the U.K..
2.5.1.1 United States
I start by discussing the e¤ects of a government spending shock on the scal variables,
depicted in gures 2.3 and 2.6. Government spending reacts in a similar way for all
identication approaches. Its response is signicant and highly persistent, with a half-
life of approximately ve years. Tax revenue increases by almost 0.7 dollars on impact,
partially mimicking a balanced-budget government spending shock for all identication
approaches, but for sign restriction. The results of the latter are close to zero for about
ve quarters, resembling a decit-nanced government shock. This is probably due to the
fact that, in the sign restriction specication, technology shock is ltered out from the
system before the government spending shock is applied. Although this is a compelling
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explanation, it cannot be validated at this stage. I would like to be able to compare the
e¤ects of an expenditure shock while keeping tax revenue constant over a given period of
time in order to evaluate the e¤ects of a pure government spending shock. I attempted to
address this issue by undertaking policy experiments, which are discussed in Section 2.6.
Tax revenue responses are statistically signicant for up to three years after the initial
shock.
In relation to national account variables, output grows signicantly and persistently,
with the typical hump shaped curve, irrespective of the identication approach used.
Under the Blanchard-Perotti approach, the output impulse responses peak at 1.90 dollars
is attained at twelve quarters after the shock. The increase of hours worked, demostrated
in gure 2.5, albeit not signicant, can be rationalized by the negative wealth e¤ect;
households react to a negative wealth e¤ect by increasing their labour supply, as advocated
by the neoclassical and New Keynesian theories. The observed rise in real wages can
be justied by the assumption that increased labour demand, resultant from expanded
output, more than o¤sets the negative wealth e¤ect. Theoretical models reconcile with
these empirical ndings by incorporating deep habits and rule of thumb consumers to the
standard DSGE specication, as implemented in Galí et al. (2007) and Ravn et al. (2006).
The small responses in investment and its disaggregated components (residential and non-
residential investment) can be rationalized by the temporary nature of the shock, which
does not change the steady state level of the economy. As a result, investment goes down
as consumption. It must be noted that investment responses are not signicant across the
entire impulse response period. The persistent expansion in private consumption, which
peaks close to 0.5 dollar, can be attributed to the larger household disposable income
and to the incremented temporary investment, which was classed as consumption. While
this nding is in line with many other structural VAR studies, including Blanchard and
Perotti (2002), it does not reconcile with the neoclassical and the standard NK DSGE
literature. However, DSGE models with deep habits and rule of thumb consumers nd
consumption to increase following a government spending shock.
In regards to the nominal variables, ination marginally rises on impact, which can
be easily explained by the increase in aggregate demand. A one percent increase in
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government spending causes ination to reach its peak of 0.05 percent after ve years of
the initial shock. Interest rate also escalates slightly, but with a lag of about two years.
The interest rate increase can be attributed to higher demand for money, assuming money
supply xed. It must be noted that the interest rate responses are not signicant at one
standard deviation throughout the entire impulse response horizon. I have used short
term interest rate (3-Month Treasury bonds) in this analysis, but, perhaps, to capture
the interest rate dynamics more neatly, a simulation run with long-term interest rate,
such as 10-Year Treasury bonds, may be warranted.
Figure 2.5 shows that real exchange rate depreciates by more than one percent in
response to one percent increase in government spending. The peak depreciation occurs
only ten quarters after the initial shock, and it only becomes insignicant after twenty
quarters. Although this result can be validated by other empirical studies, such as Ravn et
al. (2012) and Monacelli and Perotti (2010), the depreciation of real exchange rate follow-
ing a spending shock is at odds with the theoretical literature, which expects the exchange
rate to appreciate. The trade balance surplus can be rationalized by the depreciation of
the real exchange rate, which boosts exports and discourages imports.
In view to provide additional insights into the transmission mechanisms of scal shocks
on the baseline variables, I investigate the contributions of the government spending shock
by means of forecast error variance decomposition. The results are summarized in table
2.7. The contribution of an exogenous government spending shock to its own uctuation
is very high; 87% in 5 years and 81% in 10 years. Most of the variation in output is
driven by government spending and output shocks, which together account for 83% in 5
years and 78% in 10 years, while variations in tax revenue are mostly driven by its own
uctuation, government spending and output; together they account for 81% and 76% of
the variation in tax revenue in 5 and 10 years. Variations in ination and interest rate
are mostly driven by government spending, output and ination.
Summing up, the empirical ndings of a government spending shock using U.S. data
are aligned with most current generation NK DSGE models with deep habits and rule of
thumb consumers.
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2.5.1.2 United Kingdom
In this section, I describe the impulse responses for the U.K. macroaggregates following
a positive government spending shock. As in the U.S., the impulse responses on the
baseline variables for the U.K. are comparable in all identication approaches. In fact,
the impulse responses using the sign restriction approach are much more aligned to the
other evaluated identication methods, probably because technology shocks in the U.K.
are less prevalent than in the U.S.; it should be noted that this hypothesis cannot be
conrmed at this stage. The qualitative dynamics of the estimated impulse responses
using the Blanchard-Perotti approach are very similar to the recursive and sign restriction
approaches, but the quantum is slightly, but not materially, di¤erent. I start by describing
the responses on national account and scal variables. Government spending responses are
very similar under all identication approaches, and are remarkably akin to the Perottis
(2005) estimates. The response of government spending is signicant and persistent,
with half-life of about three years and it becomes insignicant only after ve years. Tax
revenue reacts signicantly and positively on impact, as illustrated in gure 2.4. One
sterling increase in government spending causes tax revenue to increase by twenty pence
on impact, partially o¤setting the government spending shock e¤ect, but it soon turns
negative and insignicant.
In relation to national account variables, output increases on impact with a multiplier
lower than 1, turning negative after three years. Although this result is puzzling, it is
not unusually observed when using U.K. data, as reported by Perotti (2005) and Pappa
(2009a). The impact GDP multiplier in this study is 0.07, compared to 0.13 from Pappa
(2009a). The decline in hours worked after a positive government shock is not consistent
with the negative wealth e¤ect dynamics prescribed by the neoclassical and New Keyne-
sian theories. It is noted that the impulse responses of hours worked are signicant at
one standard deviation from impact up to two years after the shock, then reverting to
zero and turning insignicant across the entire period. Real wages increases slightly on
impact, but then declines after two quarters, turning negative and insignicant straight
after. Similar pattern is observed in Pappa (2009a).
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A reduction in real wages is consistent with the neoclassical theory, but again, I would
expect to see an increase in the labour supply. The decline in investment could be ra-
tionalized by the increase in the interest rate, but the latter only turns positive after six
quarters, and is insignicant throughout the impulse response horizon. Figure 2.5 shows
that private consumption responds as expected according to the neoclassical theory, albeit
with a lag of two years. Interest rate and ination rise following a spending shock, reach-
ing its peak on impact. The plausible explanation for these dynamics can be attributed
to increase in demand for money, but output did not seem to increase enough to justify
such an increase.
The real exchange rate depreciates on impact, as expected in the SVAR literature,
reverting to zero after 3 years. It must be noted that the condence bands are wide,
making the real exchange rate responses insignicant across the entire impulse response
horizon. It is observed a surplus in the trade balance, which can be rationalized by the
depreciation of the exchange rate.
By referring to the forecast error variance decomposition results summarized in table
2.9, the contribution of an exogenous government spending shock to its own uctuation is
moderately high; 61% in 5 years and 35% in 10 years, with interest rate explaining most
of the variation in the last 10 years. Variations in output is mainly driven by interest
rate shocks, which account for 57% in 5 years and 46% in 10 years, while variations in
tax revenue are mostly driven by its own innovations; it accounts for 62% and 57% of the
variation in tax revenue in 5 and 10 years. Variations in ination is mostly driven by the
interest rate, while the latter is are mostly driven by its own shock.
The empirical results found using the U.K. data are challenging and di¢ cult to rec-
oncile with the economic theory. These results signal the need for further analysis.
2.5.2 Tax Revenue Shock
Figures 2.7 and 2.8 illustrate the impulse responses on baseline variables following a tax
revenue shock for the U.S. and the U.K., respectively. Figure 2.10 combines the impulse
responses using all identication approaches in just one graph in order to facilitate their
comparison. The results suggest that the recursive and Blanchard-Perotti approaches are
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almost identical for all baseline variables, while the responses under sign restriction di¤er
from the other approaches, particularly in the short and medium-term. Figure 2.9 depicts
the impulse responses for the augmented and open economy variables using U.S. and U.K.
data. As in the previous section, I start describing my results for the U.S., and then for
the U.K. economy.
2.5.2.1 United States
The impulse response results presented in gure 2.10 show that the recursive and Blanchard-
Perotti approaches yield very similar results, but the sign restriction identication ap-
proach produces slightly di¤erent results, in particular to output and ination. The
condence bands in the gure 2.10 are reported in two standard deviations, which is
equivalent to approximately 95% condence interval.
As regards to scal variables, tax revenue impulse responses reach its peak in the quar-
ter when the tax innovation occurs and then declines gradually, turning insignicant after
two years. These results match against the ones found by Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
The tax revenue response under sign restriction approach is marginally weaker compared
to the other identication approaches for the initial three years, when it converges with
the other identication approachesimpulse responses. Government spending hardly re-
acts to a tax revenue shock, reaching its peak after ve years, but the results are largely
insignicant across the entire horizon. Given that government spending reacts minimally
to a tax revenue shock, the latter can be inferred as a decit reducing tax increase. Again,
the impulse responses computed using the sign restriction approach are slightly weaker
compared to the recursive and Blanchard-Perotti identication approaches.
Turning to the national account variables, there is a large discrepancy between the
output responses estimated using sign restriction compared to the other approaches. Un-
der the sign restriction approach, an unanticipated increase of tax revenue of one dollar
has a large negative e¤ect on output, which reaches its bottom of approximately one
dollar after the rst year from the initial shock. While output impulse responses using
the sign restriction approach are signicant for up to ten quarters, the results under the
recursive and Blanchard-Perotti approaches are mostly insignicant throughout the entire
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horizon of forty quarters. The speculative explanation for these di¤erences are akin to the
explanation provided for the discrepancies found in the government spending shock; the
ltering out of technology shocks. The almost identical impulse responses of the recursive
and Blanchard-Perotti approaches may seem puzzling at the beginning given that output
is restricted to zero in the upper triangular matrix A0 under the recursive approach, but
freely estimated in the Blanchard-Perotti method. A close inspection of table A.2 in the
Mathematical Appendix A.2 elucidates this similarity; the estimated elasticity under the
latter approach is zero and not signicant. In fact, most of the estimated elasticities under
the recursive and Blanchard-Perotti approaches are very similar, which may explain why
the impulse responses for these approaches are almost identical. Perotti (2005) reported
impulse responses for output with similar shape to the ones derived in this study, using
the recursive and Blanchard-Perotti approaches.
In relation to the nominal variables, the impulse responses of ination and interest
rate under the sign restriction identication approach is weaker when compared to the
other identication methods. This can be rationalized by the lower output multiplier
under the sign restriction approach, resulting in less demand for money, which ultimately
result in lower ination and interest rate. Turning to the recursive and Blanchard-Perotti
approaches, the initial increase in interest rate and ination and their subsequent fall
may be explained by the output dynamics, although the impulse responses are mostly
insignicant across the entire impulse response period. The movements of investment,
depicted in gure 2.9, are initially positive, peaking within one year, but it soon turns
negative and insignicant. These results are consistent with the ndings of Caldara and
Kamps (2008) and Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Private consumption and real wages
increase persistently, and are mostly signicant across the impulse response horizon, while
real exchange rate appreciates following an increase in taxation. I would expect to see
a deterioration of the trade balance, given that stronger currency makes exports less
competitive in the global arena, but the described dynamics only happen after four years
from the initial shock. Nonetheless, the impulse responses are mostly insignicant at one
standard deviation for both real exchange rate and trade balance.
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2.5.2.2 United Kingdom
The impulse responses using the U.K. data, which is depicted in gure 2.10, show that
the recursive and Blanchard-Perotti approaches produce almost identical results, but the
sign restriction identication approach yields slightly di¤erent results, akin to the pattern
observed when using U.S. data. The tax revenue shock dynamics on the baseline line
variables are very similar for both the U.S. and U.K. economies, which is surprising
considering that the government spending dynamics between these countries appear to
be remarkably dissimilar. This nding may shed some light on whether the denition of
government spending adopted in this study is appropriate for the U.K. economy. I will
undertake further robustness tests using di¤erent government spending denitions.
Commenting on the scal variables, tax revenue reaches its peak in the quarter of the
shock and then it declines gradually to zero, turning insignicant after ve years. The
tax revenue responses are almost identical for all identication approaches. In regards
to government spending, the e¤ects of a tax revenue shock are immaterial and largely
insignicant at two standard deviations. Similarly to the U.S. ndings, these results can
be interpreted as a decit reducing tax increase policy. The e¤ects of a tax revenue shock
on government spending using the sign restriction approach are considerably weaker,
albeit insignicant, compared to the other evaluated identication approaches.
In regards to the national account variables, there is a sharp dissimilarity between
the output impulse responses estimated under the sign restriction approach; again the
speculative explanation may be attributed to the ltering out of technology shocks. The
short-run e¤ects on this variable for the U.S. and the U.K. economies are comparable.
A closer look at the estimated elasticities in table A.2 shows that the elasticities in the
matrix A0 for the recursive and Blanchard-Perotti approaches are similar, which may
explain why the impulse responses are similar.
Turning to the nominal variables, the responses of ination under the sign restriction
identication method is weaker when compared to the other identication methods eval-
uated in this study. As in the U.S. economy, this can be explained by the lower output
multiplier under the sign restriction approach, resulting in less demand for money, which
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ultimately yield in lower ination.
In relation to the augmented variables, which are depicted in gure 2.9, private invest-
ment react persistently and signicantly to an increase in taxation. Private consumption
declines in the rst four quarters, which can be explained by the reduced disposable in-
come caused by increased taxation, whereas hours worked increase in the short-term, but
it reverts to zero in the medium and long-term; it must be noted that their responses
are not signicant at one standard deviation. Akin to the U.S. data, it is observed an
appreciation of the real exchange rate, followed by a decline in the trade balance.
2.6 Policy Experiments
In response to large levels of sovereign debt, policymakers are looking at alternative ways
to nance expansionary scal policies, such as balanced-budget government spending.
However, there is a large debate among academics and practitioners on whether balanced-
budget government spending is more e¤ective in terms of wealth generation compared to
other types of scal policy, including the decit-nanced government spending and the
decit-nanced tax cut. The government spending and tax revenue shocks investigated in
previous sections do not constraint the impulse responses of other scal variables constant
for a given period of time, thus, not allowing for a precise policy investigation of their
e¤ects, which would be helpful in the policymaking process.
I refer to Mountford and Uhlig (2009) approach in the preparation of policy exper-
iments for the U.S. economy. It is reasonable to assume that the policy experiments
ndings for the U.S. economy can be also applied for the U.K.. Di¤erently from previous
analysis, the policy experiments are reported as multipliers, i.e., 1% shock results in x%
change in the other variable. The technology, monetary policy and scal policy shocks
are simultaneously identied. As mentioned in Section 2.4, technology shock is dened as
tax revenues and output responses to be positive for at least four periods, while monetary
policy shock is dened as positive interest rate and negative ination for a minimum of
four periods.
49
CHAPTER 2. FISCAL POLICY IN AN OPEN ECONOMY
2.6.1 Decit-Financed Government Spending
Figure 2.17 illustrates the impulse responses on baseline variables following a decit-
nanced spending shock, which is dened as an increase in government spending for four
periods after the initial shock, while keeping the tax revenue impulse responses unchanged
at zero level for four periods.
2.6.2 Balanced-Budget Government Spending
The budget-balanced government spending policy is probably the most discussed policy
experiment as it aims to stimulate the economy, but, at the same time, minimizing the
worsening of public nances. Figure 2.17 illustrates the impulse responses on baseline
variables following a budget-balanced government spending shock, which is dened as
an increase in government spending and tax revenue for four periods after the initial
shock. Output pointedly falls for about two years following a budget-balanced government
spending shock, probably because of the negative e¤ects of the contractionary tax revenue
shock.
2.6.3 Decit-Financed Tax Cut
Figure 2.17 shows the impulse responses on baseline variables following a decit-nanced
tax cut. This policy scenario is dened as the reduction in tax revenues over the period
of four quarters, while keeping government spending constant and equal to zero during
the initial four periods after the shock. The results are remarkably similar to the pure
tax revenue shock, and this may be explained by the fact government spending hardly
reacts. All in all, the decit-nanced tax cut closely resembles a contractionary tax
revenue shock. The exclusion of transitory monetary shocks does not alter the results
signicantly, in particular to scal variables.
2.7 Robustness Tests
As discussed in Section 2.4, the empirical results of scal shocks are sensitive to the
choices of lag length, sample period, detrending techniques, identication methods, and
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so on. In view to check the sensitivity of my results against di¤erent model specications, I
undertake a number of robustness checks to the baseline model. In particular, I investigate
the sensitivity of my empirical results to: (i) alternative lag orders of the VAR model,
(ii) detrending methods, (iii) identication method for open economy variables, and (iv)
subsample stability.
2.7.1 Lag Order
The selection of lags in the VAR model is normally decided based on the purpose of
the study, what the economy theory suggests and also the formal information criteria
tests, such as the AIC, BIC and HQ. Since there is no overarching agreement on what
route to proceed, I test the baseline model of four lags against two lags, as suggested by
the HQ information criteria. I also test the baseline model against the lag order of six,
as implemented by Caldara and Kamps (2008) in their robustness checks. The impulse
responses of the baseline model of fourth-order depicted in gure 2.12 are robust against
alternative lag specications.
2.7.2 Detrending Method
As reported in Section 2.4, no serial autocorrelation was detected in the baseline model
in levels, based on the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier test. The null hypothesis
is that there is no serial autocorrelation up to p lags. The calculated p values are 0.06,
0.50 and 0.48 for two, four and six lags when using U.S. data, and 0.22, 0.40 and 0.65 for
two, four and six lags when using U.K. data. I do not undertake the Portmanteau test
for autocorrelation given that this test is more suited to high order VARs (see Lütkepohl
(2011)). I also tested the baseline model against the non-normality of the third and
fourth moments using the multivariate Jarque-Bera method with Cholesky factorization.
The null hypothesis of normal distribution was rejected for both the U.S. and the U.K.,
which may suggest model misspecication such as nonlinearities, structural change, and
non-stationarity of the VAR model.
In view to address the non-stationarity issue, I also estimate8 the VAR model using
8 Including an intercept and without a linear trend.
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the rst di¤erence of the logs of the endogenous variables, as they are in line with a
stationary data generation process. The log di¤erences are roughly the growth rates of
the endogenous variables. The results of the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillips
Perron (PP) unit root tests are reported in table 2.12, and the log-di¤erenced variables
are depicted in gure 2.1.
In business cycle analysis, it is desirable to extract the trend from a series to get a better
understanding of the business cycle uctuations. I therefore apply the Hodrick-Prescott
(HP) lter to the baseline series (in logs) with the standard smoothing parameter of
1,600, usual for quarterly data. I estimate the cyclical component by taking the di¤erence
between the observed and HP ltered data.
Finally, I include the quadratic trend to the VAR specication to test against the
baseline model with linear trend. Figure 2.13 indicates that the baseline model is robust
against the quadratic trend. On the other hand, the impulse responses of the HP ltered
and rst-di¤erenced series are very di¤erent from the baseline model on the medium and
long-term. However, their impact responses are very similar; refer to tables 2.6 and 2.8
for government spending shocks using U.S. and U.K. data, respectively, and tables 2.10
and 2.11 for tax revenue shocks in the U.S. and the U.K., in that order. It must be
noted that the interpretation of the results when using HP ltered and log-di¤erenced
series is dissimilar from when using data in levels. Therefore, these discrepancies must be
evaluated with care.
2.7.3 Ordering of Recursive Identication
I have strengthen the robustness of the baseline results by exploring an alternative spec-
ication (ordering) for the Recursive identication approach (Cholesky decomposition).
The baseline results are robust when using di¤erent ordering of the variables, as follows:
(a) Baseline Specication: EXP ! GDP ! INF ! REV ! INT;
(b) Alternative Specication: EXP ! INF ! REV ! INT ! GDP.
where EXP is government spending, GDP is output, INF is ination, REV is tax revenues,
and INT is interest rate. Figure 2.14 shows the the impulse responses of the alternative
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Recursive specication.
2.7.4 Identication of Open Economy Variables
I propose a novel identication specication to evaluate the e¤ects of government spend-
ing shocks on open economy variable, namely real exchange rate and trade balance. I
estimate the impulse responses to these variables given a government spending shock by
estimating a six-variable VAR model9 using Blanchard-Perotti identication. The results
to real exchange rate and trade balance are comparable to the results of other empirical
studies using di¤erent identication methods. I refer to the work of Ravn et al. (2012),
who employed a ve-variable VAR model10 using recursive approach, and Beetsma and
Giuliodori (2011), who estimated a seven-variable VAR model11 using recursive approach.
The impulse responses for real exchange rate and trade balance under the identication
specications described above are depicted in gure 2.15. The results undoubtedly show
that the identication specication proposed in this study is robust compared to the
published literature. Digressing from the identication specication, the spillovers of gov-
ernment spending shocks for an open economy, as shown in gure 2.16, strengthens the
argument of a concerted scal expansion with the trade partners since part of the stimulus
is leaked via the trade channel.
2.7.5 Subsample Stability
Perotti (2005) argues that the e¤ects of scal shocks have weakened in the post-1980s.
In view to empirically verify this claim and to check whether the baseline results are
robust, I split the sample into two parts as follows: (i) 1955Q1 1979Q4 (n = 100) and
1964Q1 1979Q4 (n = 64) for the U.S. and the U.K., respectively, and (ii) 1980Q1 
2007Q4 (n = 112) for the U.S. and the U.K.. The gure 2.11 shows the impulse responses
on baseline variables of the evaluated subsamples following a government spending shock.
The results suggest that the e¤ects of government spending shocks on output, tax revenues
and interest rate in the U.S. have indeed weakened and less persistent in the post-1980s.
9 The model variables are EXP; GDP; INF; REV; INT; RER
10 The model variables and their ordering are EXP ! GDP ! CONS ! TRB ! RER
11 The model variables and their ordering are EXP ! REV ! EXP ! CONS ! INT ! IMP ! RER
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Based on the Chow sample split test suggested by Lütkepohl (2005), it appears that there
was indeed a structural change in the eighties. This test compares the maximum likelihood
of the two models, and the likelihood ratio (LR) statistic follows the 2 distribution with
degree of freedoms equal to the number of imposed restrictions. The null hypothesis of
time invariant parameters12 for the period 1980Q1 2007Q4 against the period 1955Q1 
2007Q4 using U.S. data is rejected with p value= 0:00 or 2(110) = 166:44. It is noted
that the null hypothesis for the period 1955Q1 1979Q4 against the period 1955Q1 
2007Q4 could not be rejected with p value= 0:61 or 2(110) = 105:41.
The presence of non-normality in the baseline model, as established by the multivariate
Jarque-Bera tests in Section 2.4, may be explained by structural changes in the relation-
ship between the model variables, as signalized by the Chow test statistics. In addition
to structural changes in the economy, there are various reasons to believe the dynamics
of scal shocks to be asymmetric and nonlinear. For example, scal multipliers in times
of boom are likely to be much lower than in times of recession, when production factors
are underutilized, as evidenced by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), and Baum and
Koester (2011). Trying to model a nonlinear relationship using a linear framework can
lead to misleading conclusions, but surprisingly the bulk of the current literature assumes
these relationships to be linear. Overall, the subsample stability results indicate the need
to use models that can account for regime changes and nonlinearities in the economy.
2.8 Conclusions
This study provides a comprehensive empirical evaluation of the transmission mechanisms
of scal shocks to macroeconomic aggregates for two industrialized economies, the United
States and United Kingdom. The basis of this analysis is to understand what drives the
lack of consensus in the empirical and theoretical literature.
The review of the empirical literature made it clear that the multitude of estimation
12 I use the baseline specication of four lags, linear trend and variables in log-levels. Similar conclusions
can be found when using two lags instead of four. The resulting test statistics are: (i) H0: time invariant
parameters for the subsamples 1980Q1-2007Q4 and 1955Q1-2007Q4 (p value= 0:00 or 2(60) = 119:51), and
(ii) H0: time invariant parameters for the subsamples 1955Q1-1979Q4 and 1955Q1-2007Q4 (p value= 0:09
or 2(60) = 75:13).
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techniques and specications coupled with country-specic economic dynamics make it
almost impossible to reconcile, at least quantitatively, the e¤ects of scal stimulus on
economic variables of interest. This study demonstrates that, when using the same VAR
specication (lag length, choice of variables, and deterministic terms), the recursive and
Blanchard-Perotti identication approaches yield comparable qualitative and quantitative
responses for both economies analyzed in this study and for both shocks, government
spending and tax revenue shocks. This is an important nding as it strongly implies
that the disagreement found in the empirical literature is not caused by how the model
is identied, but by the dissimilar estimation specications adopted. However, the use of
sign restriction identication approach is likely to yield di¤erent responses, mainly in the
short-run, when compared to the recursive and Blanchard-Perotti approaches. Further
understanding is needed to rationalize these di¤erences, but, by construction, the sign
restriction approach lters out transitory shocks (e.g., technology shocks), and this may
be the key to understand why the sign restriction di¤ers from the recursive and Blanchard-
Perotti approaches, particularly in the short-term.
When using U.S. data, the empirical results of this study support NK DSGE mod-
els featuring rule of thumb consumers and deep habits, where private consumption and
real wage increase in response to an expansionary government spending shock. The in-
terpretation of the U.K. results is less clear, given that we see a small and short-lived
increase in output and a decline in hours worked after a government spending shock,
which contradicts with both neoclassical and NK DSGE theories.
I follow Perotti (2005) in the denition of scal variables, but his denition of gov-
ernment spending, which seems ne for the U.S., may not be appropriate for the U.K.
economy. On the other hand, the responses of tax revenue shocks are comparable for both
economies. Further robustness tests on the denition of scal variables may be warranted.
In addition, the point estimates of elasticities of tax revenue with respect to output
and price used in this study and borrowed from Perotti (2005) are now outdated for
more than a decade. Re-estimating these elasticities with more recent data may help in
the analysis of the scal dynamics for the U.K. economy.
By comparing the reaction of output in response to a government spending shock
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and tax revenue shock, it is clear that the former yields a higher multiplier13 for both
economies, which suggests that policymakers should prioritize government spending over
tax revenue cuts, when the objective is to stimulate the economy. This notion is supported
by the theoretical argument that households will normally save part of the increased
disposable income due to a tax cut. When considering the U.S. data, the increase in
tax revenues following a government spending shock partially o¤sets government decit.
This would be a strong argument in favour to government spending vis-à-vis tax cuts
if we believe that the recursive and the Blanchard-Perotti identication approaches to
be superior to the sign restriction method. The U.K. data does not support this view,
although the tax revenue impulse responses for the U.K. are not signicant.
Another important contribution of this study is related to the scal stimulus leakages in
an open economy framework. This study empirically substantiates the call for a concerted
scal stimulus amongst trade partners in times of economic downturn in view to equalize
or balance out the spillovers via the trade channel and to minimize the scal free-riding
problem. Unilateral scal stimulus for a small open economy is likely to result in lower
multiplier compared to a concerted stimulus programme with its trading partners.
In this study, I propose a novel identication specication for open economy variables,
namely real exchange rate and trade balance. In response to a government spending shock,
I compute the responses of the open economy variables by estimating a six-variable VAR
model using the Blanchard-Perotti identication. The results to real exchange rate and
trade balance are robust when compared to other two recent empirical studies. I refer to
the work of Ravn et al. (2012), who employed a ve-variable VAR model using recursive
approach, and Beetsma and Giuliodori (2011), who estimated a seven-variable VARmodel
using recursive approach.
Finally, the subsample stability tests provide hard evidence to support the view that
the e¤ects of scal shocks in the U.S. have weakened14 in the post-1980s. In addition to the
structural changes mentioned previously, there is compelling evidence to suggest that the
13 Note that the econometric setup in this study assumes impulse responses to be symmetrical, so an expan-
sionary or contractionary shock yields the same absolute values.
14 According to Bilbiie et al. (2008) the reasons are the relaxation of credit constraints and more active monetary
policy. Based on my empirical results, this evidence is not so clear when using U.K. data.
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relationship between scal and economic variables to be asymmetric and nonlinear. Baum
and Koester (2011) demonstrated that scal multipliers in times of economic prosperity
are likely to be much lower than in times of recession. Hence, future empirical research on
the transmission mechanisms of scal shocks should be underpinned by models that can
incorporate regime changes and nonlinearities, such as Markov Switching and Threshold
VAR.
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Tables and Figures
Table 2.6: Impulse Responses to a Government Spending Shock (U.S.)
Baseline - Linear Trend Impact E¤ect 1 Year 3 Years 5 Years 10 Years Peak
Government Spending 1.00* 1.12* 0.87* 0.63* 0.23 1.12* (4)
Output 1.12* 1.39* 1.90* 1.63* 0.52 1.90* (12)
Ination 0.02* 0.01 0.03* 0.05* 0.03* 0.05* (25)
Tax Revenue 0.69* 0.66* 0.61* 0.39 -0.24 0.69* (1)
Interest Rate 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.16 0.16 (35)
Baseline - Quadratic Trend
Government Spending 1.00* 1.13* 0.88* 0.60* 0.17 1.13* (4)
Output 1.16* 1.29* 1.27* 1.07 0.08 1.53* (3)
Ination 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02* 0.01 0.03* (25)
Tax Revenue 0.63* 0.68* 0.45 0.37 -0.08 0.68* (4)
Interest Rate -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.01 0.03 0.03 (36)
Baseline - First Di¤erence
Government Spending 1.00* 0.11* 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00* (1)
Output 1.08* -0.19 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.08* (1)
Ination 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 (4)
Tax Revenue 0.56* 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.56* (1)
Interest Rate -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.00 (3)
Baseline - HP Filter
Government Spending 1.00* 0.55* -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 1.00* (1)
Output 1.05* 0.11 0.04 -0.12 -0.04 1.05* (1)
Ination -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 (17)
Tax Revenue 0.51* 0.14 0.11 -0.07 -0.02 0.51* (1)
Interest Rate -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.03 (13)
Note: The impulse responses of GDP, its constituent components and scal variables are scaled in a way
to represent one dollar or sterling increase in the scal variable (government spending and tax revenue).
Ination is scaled to represent its percentage change given a one percentage shock, while interest rate
represents change in percentage points. The values in parenthesis in column 7 represent the peak response
period, in quarters. * Indicates that the impulse response is signicant at one standard deviation or
approximately 68% condence level. I have used the Blanchard-Perotti Identication approach to derive
these impulse responses.
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Table 2.7: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition - Government Spending Shock (U.S.)
Decomposition of Variance for Government Spending 1 Year 3 Years 5 Years 10 Years
Std. Deviation 1.53 4.60 5.75 6.61
Government Spending 99 94 87 81
Output 0 2 6 7
Ination 1 2 2 1
Tax Revenue 0 1 4 9
Interest Rate 0 0 1 1
Decomposition of Variance for Output
Std. Deviation 1.28 2.94 3.34 3.63
Government Spending 3 20 30 33
Output 95 66 53 45
Ination 1 1 3 5
Tax Revenue 0 1 4 9
Interest Rate 0 12 10 9
Decomposition of Variance for Ination
Std. Deviation 0.27 0.47 0.55 0.68
Government Spending 1 3 13 31
Output 0 22 24 20
Ination 95 66 51 35
Tax Revenue 3 2 1 5
Interest Rate 0 7 11 8
Decomposition of Variance for Tax Revenue
Std. Deviation 4.52 9.83 10.97 12.47
Government Spending 3 16 16 18
Output 26 25 21 22
Ination 1 4 12 17
Tax Revenue 70 46 44 36
Interest Rate 0 9 8 7
Decomposition of Variance for Interest Rate
Std. Deviation 0.95 2.16 2.50 3.14
Government Spending 0 0 3 23
Output 14 31 29 27
Ination 6 42 48 33
Tax Revenue 5 5 3 4
Interest Rate 75 21 17 14
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Table 2.8: Impulse Responses to a Government Spending Shock (U.K.)
Baseline - Linear Trend Impact E¤ect 1 Year 3 Years 5 Years 10 Years Peak
Government Spending 1.00* 0.77* 0.45* 0.29* -0.05 1.00* (1)
Output 0.32* 0.28 -0.20 -0.71 -0.81 0.32* (1)
Ination 0.20* 0.07 0.10* 0.06* -0.01 0.20 (1)
Tax Revenue 0.20* -0.27 -0.16 -0.27 -0.45 0.20* (1)
Interest Rate -0.04 -0.05 0.14 0.16 0.08 0.16 (19)
Baseline - Quadratic Trend
Government Spending 1.00* 0.69* 0.43* 0.30* 0.01 1.00* (1)
Output 0.57* 0.48* -0.08 -0.59 -0.26 0.57 (1)
Ination -0.09* 0.03 0.08* 0.03 -0.02 0.14 (2)
Tax Revenue 0.17 -0.14 0.00 -0.07 -0.06 0.17 (1)
Interest Rate -0.08 -0.07 0.09 0.07 0.00 0.09 (13)
Baseline - First Di¤erence
Government Spending 1.00* 0.09* -0.01 0.00 0.00 1 (1)
Output 0.44* 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.44 (1)
Ination -0.11* -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 (1)
Tax Revenue 0.14 0.22 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.22 (4)
Interest Rate -0.08* -0.15 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.00 (40)
Baseline - HP Filter
Government Spending 1.00* 0.33* 0.04 0.00 0.00 1.00* (1)
Output 0.49* -0.04 -0.13 0.06 0.01 0.49* (1)
Ination -0.12* 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.03 (10)
Tax Revenue 0.10 -0.01 -0.11 -0.01 0.00 0.10 (1)
Interest Rate -0.05 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.05 (6)
Note: The impulse responses of GDP, its constituent components and scal variables are scaled in a way
to represent one dollar or sterling increase in the scal variable (government spending and tax revenue).
Ination is scaled to represent its percentage change given a one percentage shock, while interest rate
represents change in percentage points. The values in parenthesis in column 7 represent the peak response
period, in quarters. * indicates that the impulse response is signicant at one standard deviation or
approximately 68% condence level. I have used the Blanchard-Perotti Identication approach to derive
these impulse responses.
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Table 2.9: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition - Government Spending Shock (U.K.)
Decomposition of Variance for Government Spending 1 Year 3 Years 5 Years 10 Years
Std. Deviation 1.41 2.49 3.04 4.25
Government Spending 78 76 61 35
Output 9 13 16 13
Ination 11 6 8 5
Tax Revenue 1 3 4 5
Interest Rate 1 1 10 41
Decomposition of Variance for Output
Std. Deviation 1.10 2.67 3.32 3.99
Government Spending 3 2 8 17
Output 92 40 27 19
Ination 1 5 3 4
Tax Revenue 5 3 5 14
Interest Rate 0 50 57 46
Decomposition of Variance for Ination
Std. Deviation 0.85 1.14 1.19 1.28
Government Spending 11 16 17 16
Output 4 13 12 12
Ination 82 57 53 46
Tax Revenue 3 6 7 7
Interest Rate 0 8 10 19
Decomposition of Variance for Tax Revenue
Std. Deviation 3.91 7.12 8.38 10.20
Government Spending 1 1 2 6
Output 11 20 17 13
Ination 5 3 3 2
Tax Revenue 81 67 62 57
Interest Rate 2 8 17 21
Decomposition of Variance for Interest Rate
Std. Deviation 1.41 2.52 2.82 3.11
Government Spending 0 8 14 18
Output 0 1 1 1
Ination 4 2 2 3
Tax Revenue 2 3 7 12
Interest Rate 94 86 76 65
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Table 2.10: Impulse Responses to a Tax Revenue Shock Shock (U.S.)
Baseline - Linear Trend Impact E¤ect 1 Year 3 Years 5 Years 10 Years Peak
Government Spending 0.00 -0.05 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.06 (20)
Output 0.00 -0.05 -0.15 0.05 0.11 0.13 (31)
Ination 0.01* 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01* (1)
Tax Revenue 1.00* 0.69* 0.19 0.13 0.08 1.00* (1)
Interest Rate 0.04* 0.06* -0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.06* (4)
Baseline - Quadratic Trend
Government Spending 0.00 -0.05 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.07 (20)
Output 0.02 0.04 -0.04 0.09 0.09 0.18 (3)
Ination 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 (1)
Tax Revenue 1.00* 0.72* 0.22* 0.11 0.04 1.00 (1)
Interest Rate 0.04* 0.07* 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.07 (1)
Baseline - First Di¤erence
Government Spending 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 (4)
Output 0.01 -0.19 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.08 (2)
Ination 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 (1)
Tax Revenue 1.00* -0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00* (1)
Interest Rate 0.04* 0.07* 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.09 (5)
Baseline - HP Filter
Government Spending -0.02* -0.18* 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 (14)
Output 0.06* 0.14* -0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.21* (3)
Ination 0.03* 0.02 0.05* -0.01 0.00 0.06* (2)
Tax Revenue 3.04* 1.59* 0.02 0.01 -0.04 3.04* (1)
Interest Rate 0.12* 0.20* 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.20* (5)
Note: The impulse responses of GDP, its constituent components and scal variables are scaled in a way
to represent one dollar or sterling increase in the scal variable (government spending and tax revenue).
Ination is scaled to represent its percentage change given a one percentage shock, while interest rate
represents change in percentage points. The values in parenthesis in column 7 represent the peak response
period, in quarters. * indicates that the impulse response is signicant at one standard deviation or
approximately 68% condence level. I have used the Blanchard-Perotti Identication approach to derive
these impulse responses.
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Table 2.11: Impulse Responses to a Tax Revenue Shock (U.K.)
Baseline - Linear Trend Impact E¤ect 1 Year 3 Years 5 Years 10 Years Peak
Government Spending 0.03* -0.03 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.06 (40)
Output 0.03 -0.11 0.14 0.24 0.15 0.25 (24)
Ination -0.05* 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 (4)
Tax Revenue 1.00* 0.71* 0.38* 0.29* 0.16 1.00* (1)
Interest Rate 0.04* 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.06 (3)
Baseline - Quadratic Trend
Government Spending 0.03* -0.04 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 (32)
Output 0.05 -0.04 0.14 0.18 -0.01 0.18 (18)
Ination -0.05 0.04* 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04* (4)
Tax Revenue 1.00* 0.70* 0.35* 0.22* 0.05 1.00 (1)
Interest Rate 0.05* 0.05* 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07* (3)
Baseline - First Di¤erence
Government Spending 0.03* 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 (1)
Output 0.03 -0.17* 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 (1)
Ination -0.05 0.04* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 (4)
Tax Revenue 1.00* 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00* (1)
Interest Rate 0.05* 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.07* (3)
Baseline - HP Filter
Government Spending 0.02* -0.04* -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.02* (1)
Output 0.09 0.03 -0.03 0.05 0.01 0.15* (3)
Ination -0.04 0.06* 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.08* (7)
Tax Revenue 1.00* 0.39* 0.04 0.02 0.00 1.00* (1)
Interest Rate 0.06* 0.04* -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.07 (3)
Note: The impulse responses of GDP, its constituent components and scal variables are scaled in a way
to represent one dollar or sterling increase in the scal variable (government spending and tax revenue).
Ination is scaled to represent its percentage change given a one percentage shock, while interest rate
represents change in percentage points. The values in brackets in column 7 represent the period, in
quarters, when the peak responses occurred. I have used the Blanchard-Perotti Identication approach
to derive these impulse responses.
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Table 2.12: Unit Root Tests
ADF PP
United States Level First Di¤erence Level First Di¤erence
Baseline Variables
Output -3.29 [0.07] -10.50 [0.00] -2.68 [0.24] -10.42 [0.00]
Government Spending -2.41 [0.37] -5.79 [0.00] -1.96 [0.61] -14.08 [0.00]
Tax Revenue -3.57 [0.03] -8.41 [0.00] 3.34 [0.06] -14.51 [0.00]
Ination -2.65 [0.25] -7.55 [0.00] -3.50 [0.04] -20.34 [0.00]
Interest Rate -2.06 [0.56] -6.75 [0.00] -2.48 [0.33] -11.34 [0.00]
Augmented Variables
Private Consumption -0.44 [0.98] -4.94 [0.00] -0.36 [0.98] -13.20 [0.00]
Private Investment -4.23 [0.00] -12.46 [0.00] -3.46 [0.04] -12.38 [0.00]
Wages -2.61 [0.27] -14.02 [0.00] -2.59 [0.28] -14.15 [0.00]
Hours Worked -3.56 [0.03] -9.35 [0.00] -2.96 [0.14] -9.24 [0.00]
Open Economy Variables
Exchange Rate -3.03 [0.12] -9.25 [0.00] -2.45 [0.34] -9.68 [0.00]
Trade Balance -1.04 [0.93] -10.66 [0.00] -1.31 [0.88] -10.82 [0.00]
United Kingdom
Baseline Variables
Output -1.64 [0.76] -6.31 [0.00] -1.82 [0.69] -13.65 [0.00]
Government Spending -1.91 [0.64] -17.38 [0.00] -2.12 [0.52] -16.99 [0.00]
Tax Revenue -1.88 [0.65] -19.63 [0.00] -2.47 [0.33] -18.69 [0.00]
Ination -3.15 [0.09] -16.12 [0.00] -7.33 [0.00] -26.98 [0.00]
Interest Rate -2.99 [0.13] -10.07 [0.00] -2.45 [0.35] -9.87 [0.00]
Augmented Variables
Private Consumption -2.17 [0.49] -5.95 [0.00] -1.75 [0.72] -14.33 [0.00]
Private Investment -1.64 [0.77] -14.12 [0.00] -1.57 [0.80] -14.09 [0.00]
Wages -1.36 [0.86] -8.45 [0.00] -1.36 [0.86] -8.45 [0.00]
Hours Worked -2.46 [0.34] -3.86 [0.00] -1.70 [0.74] -7.07 [0.00]
Open Economy Variables
Exchange Rate -2.98 [0.14] -9.57 [0.00] -2.81 [0.19] -9.55 [0.00]
Trade Balance -2.73 [0.22] -13.00 [0.00] -2.79 [0.20] -13.00 [0.00]
Note: H0 : series has unit root, i.e., non-stationary time series. The MacKinnon p values are provided
in brackets. Tests in level include trend and intercept, while tests in rst di¤erence include an intercept
only. Lag length for the ADF test is determined by HQ. I use Newey-West bandwidth for the PP test.
The sample length for the tests are dened in the data description section.
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Figure 2.1: Stationarity of Baseline Variables (U.S. and U.K.)
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Figure 2.2: Government Spending and Tax Revenue as Share of GDP
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Figure 2.3: IRFs for Government Spending Shock - Baseline Variables (U.S.)
United States
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Note: Impulse responses calculated using the Blanchard-Perotti Identication Approach. The solid lines
plot the median, the dotted lines the one standard deviation condence bands.
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Figure 2.4: IRFs to Government Spending Shock - Baseline Variables (U.K.)
United Kingdom
Recursive Blanchard-Perotti Sign Restriction
0 10 20 30 40
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Govnmt. Spending
U
SD
 C
ha
ng
e
0 10 20 30 40
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Govnmt. Spending
U
SD
 C
ha
ng
e
0 10 20 30 40
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Govnmt. Spending
U
SD
 C
ha
ng
e
0 10 20 30 40
-2
-1
0
1
2
GDP
U
SD
 C
ha
ng
e
0 10 20 30 40
-2
-1
0
1
2
GDP
U
SD
 C
ha
ng
e
0 10 20 30 40
-2
-1
0
1
2
GDP
U
SD
 C
ha
ng
e
0 10 20 30 40
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Inflation
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
0 10 20 30 40
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Inflation
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
0 10 20 30 40
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Inflation
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
0 10 20 30 40
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Net Taxes
U
SD
 C
ha
ng
e
0 10 20 30 40
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Net Taxes
U
SD
 C
ha
ng
e
0 10 20 30 40
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Net Taxes
U
SD
 C
ha
ng
e
0 10 20 30 40
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
Interest Rate
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 P
oi
nt
s
0 10 20 30 40
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
Interest Rate
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 P
oi
nt
s
0 10 20 30 40
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
Interest Rate
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 P
oi
nt
s
Note: Impulse responses calculated using the Blanchard-Perotti Identication Approach. The solid lines
plot the median, the dotted lines the one standard deviation condence bands.
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Figure 2.5: IRFs to Government Spending Shock - Augmented and Open Economy Variables
(U.S. and U.K.)
United States
0 10 20 30 40
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Private Consumption
U
SD
 C
ha
ng
e
0 10 20 30 40
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
Hours Worked
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 C
ha
ng
e
0 10 20 30 40
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
Wages
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 C
ha
ng
e
0 10 20 30 40
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Private Investment
U
SD
 C
ha
ng
e
0 10 20 30 40
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Non-Residential Investment
U
SD
 C
ha
ng
e
0 10 20 30 40
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
Residential Investment
U
SD
 C
ha
ng
e
0 10 20 30 40
-2
-1
0
1
2
Real Exchange Rate
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 C
ha
ng
e
0 10 20 30 40
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
Trade Balance
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 S
ha
re
 o
f G
D
P
United Kingdom
0 10 20 30 40
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Private Consumption
U
SD
 C
ha
ng
e
0 10 20 30 40
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
Hours Worked
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
0 10 20 30 40
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Wages
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
0 10 20 30 40
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
Private Investment
U
SD
 C
ha
ng
e
0 10 20 30 40
-4
-2
0
2
4
Real Exchange Rate
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 C
ha
ng
e
0 10 20 30 40
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
Trade Balance
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 S
ha
re
 o
f G
D
P
Note: Impulse responses calculated using the Blanchard-Perotti Identication Approach. The solid lines
plot the median, the dotted lines the one standard deviation condence bands.
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Figure 2.6: IRFs to Government Spending Shock - Baseline Variables using All Identication
Approaches (U.S. and U.K.)
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Note: Impulse responses calculated using Recursive (RE), Blanchard-Perotti (BP) and Sign Restriction
(SR) Identication Approaches. The solid lines plot the median, the dotted lines the two standard
deviation condence bands for the baseline model estimated using the Blanchard-Perotti identication
approach.
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Figure 2.7: IRFs to Tax Revenue Shock - Baseline Variables (U.S.)
United States
Recursive Blanchard-Perotti Sign Restriction
0 10 20 30 40
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Tax Revenue
U
SD
 C
ha
ng
e
0 10 20 30 40
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Tax Revenue
U
SD
 C
ha
ng
e
0 10 20 30 40
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Tax Revenue
U
SD
 C
ha
ng
e
0 10 20 30 40
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
GDP
U
SD
 C
ha
ng
e
0 10 20 30 40
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
GDP
U
SD
 C
ha
ng
e
0 10 20 30 40
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
GDP
U
SD
 C
ha
ng
e
0 10 20 30 40
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Govnmt. Spending
U
SD
 C
ha
ng
e
0 10 20 30 40
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Govnmt. Spending
U
SD
 C
ha
ng
e
0 10 20 30 40
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Govnmt. Spending
U
SD
 C
ha
ng
e
0 10 20 30 40
-0.05
0
0.05
Inflation
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
0 10 20 30 40
-0.05
0
0.05
Inflation
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
0 10 20 30 40
-0.05
0
0.05
Inflation
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
0 10 20 30 40
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
Interest Rate
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 P
oi
nt
s
0 10 20 30 40
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
Interest Rate
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 P
oi
nt
s
0 10 20 30 40
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
Interest Rate
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 P
oi
nt
s
Note: Impulse responses calculated using the Blanchard-Perotti Identication Approach. The solid lines
plot the median, the dotted lines the one standard deviation condence bands.
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Figure 2.8: IRFs to Tax Revenue Shock - Baseline Variables (U.K.)
United Kingdom
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Note: Impulse responses calculated using the Blanchard-Perotti Identication Approach. The solid lines
plot the median, the dotted lines the one standard deviation condence bands.
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Figure 2.9: IRFs to Tax Revenue Shock - Augmented and Open Economy Variables (U.S. and
U.K.)
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Note: Impulse responses calculated using the Blanchard-Perotti Identication Approach. The solid lines
plot the median, the dotted lines the one standard deviation condence bands.
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Figure 2.10: IRFs to Tax Revenue Shock - Baseline Variables using All Identication Approaches
(U.S. and U.K.)
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Note: Impulse responses calculated using Recursive (RE), Blanchard-Perotti (BP) and Sign Restriction
(SR) Identication Approaches. The solid lines plot the median, the dotted lines the two standard
deviation condence bands for the baseline model estimated using the Blanchard-Perotti identication
approach.
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Figure 2.11: Subsample Stability of Baseline Variables - IRFs for Government Spending Shock
(U.S. and U.K.)
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Note: Impulse responses calculated using the Blanchard-Perotti Identication Approach. The subsamples
are: 1955Q1 2007Q4 (FS), 1955Q1 1979Q4 (SS1), and 1980Q1 2007Q4 (SS2). The solid lines plot
the median, the dotted lines the two standard deviation condence bands for the baseline model estimated
using the FS subsample.
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Figure 2.12: Lag Order Robubstness Test of Baseline Variables - IRFs Government Spending
Shock (U.S. and U.K.)
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Note: Impulse responses calculated using the Blanchard-Perotti Identication Approach. Estimations
using lag orders L = 2, L = 4 and L = 6. The solid lines plot the median, the dotted lines the two
standard deviation condence bands for the baseline model estimated using L = 4.
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Figure 2.13: Detrending Method Robustness Test of Baseline Variables - IRFs Government
Spending Shock (U.S. and U.K.)
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Note: Impulse responses calculated using the Blanchard-Perotti Identication Approach. The detrend
methods are: Linear Trend (LT), Quadratic Trend (QT), HP Filter (HP), and First Di¤erence (FD) The
solid lines plot the median, the dotted lines the two standard deviation condence bands for the baseline
model estimated using LT.
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Figure 2.14: Alternative Ordering of Variables of the Recursive Identication Approach - IRFs
Government Spending Shock
Baseline Specication: EXP ! GDP ! INF ! REV ! INT
Alternative Specication: EXP ! INF ! REV ! INT! GDP
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Note: Estimated impulse responses following an expansionary government spending shock of one stan-
dard deviation under alternative recursive ordering. Impulse responses calculated using the Recursive
Identication Approach. The dotted blue lines plot the one standard deviation condence bands.
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Figure 2.15: Alternative Identication on Open Economy Variables - IRFs Government Spending
Shock
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Note: Impulse responses calculated using: (i) Baseline (Base) model using Blanchard-Perotti Identica-
tion Approach, (ii) Ravn et al. (2012) (RV) using Recursive Approach, and (iii) Beetsma and Giuliodori
(2011) (BG) using Recursive Approach.
Figure 2.16: Spillover E¤ects on GDP - IRFs Government Spending Shock (U.S. and U.K.)
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Note: Impulse responses calculated using Blanchard-Perotti Identication Approach for Closed Economy
(CE) and Open Economy (OE).
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Figure 2.17: Policy Experiments on Baseline Variables (U.S.)
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Note: Policy Experiments with and without Monetary Policy Shocks. The policy experiments are Decit-
Financed Government Spending (DFGS), Decit-Financed Tax Cut (DFTC) and Budget-Balanced Gov-
ernment Spending (BBGS) IRFs using Sign Restriction (SR) Identication Approach.
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Chapter 3
The E¤ects of Monetary Policy on
Exchange Rate
3.1 Introduction
Understanding what drives exchange rates dynamics is very important for both academics
and policymakers as they signicantly a¤ect a countrys trade competitiveness, inuence
exports, imports, and overall output growth. The exchange rate a¤ects the prices of
imported goods and services, which feeds through domestic consumer prices, ultimately
determining consumers purchasing power. Movements in the exchange rate can make it
costly (or cheaper) to service foreign denominated debt and can have a substantial impact
on foreign investments earnings.
The magnitude of recent exchange rate variations has exposed the signicance of these
uctuations for open economies and rms to compete in the international arena. For
example, since the beginning of 2010, the U.S. Dollar and the British Pound e¤ective
exchange rate have appreciated by 12% and 15%, respectively, while the Euro and the
Japanese Yen have depreciated by 14% and 33%. With the exception of China, whose
currency strengthened by 32%, the majority of the emerging economies has su¤ered large
depreciations of their currencies since 2010. The Brazilian Real, the Russian Ruble, the
Turkish Lira, and the Mexican Peso e¤ective exchange rate depreciate by 33%, 18%, 21%
and 10%, respectively. These exchange rate movements are illustrated in gure 3.1.
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Volatility in exchange rates is not extraordinary or unfamiliar, but they still generate
large shocks to the global economy. As depicted in the middle panel of gure 3.2, real
exchange rate volatility for Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan and the United King-
dom in relation to the United States has increased over the last fty years. The large
uctuations of real exchange rate for these countries are shown in the left panel of gure
3.2. This gure also shows a well-documented disconnect between exchange rate and its
correlation with real output growth and ination (right panel). Despite the large e¤ects
of exchange uctuations on macroeconomic aggregates, as previously discussed, we still
have a remarkably low grasp on what drives exchange rate movements and how it a¤ects
ination. There is a large body of academic literature that examines the drivers of ex-
change rate uctuations, but it tends to disregard the potential temporal changes in the
joint dynamics of exchange rates, macroeconomic variables and structural shocks. For
example, Engel and Hamilton (1990), and Taylor et al. (2001) examine the univariate
movements of the exchange rate, while Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), Kim (2001), and
Scholl and Uhlig (2008) use xed-coe¢ cient models to examine the causes of real exchange
rate uctuations.
There are compelling reasons to contemplate an econometric modeling approach which
allows for temporal drifts in the coe¢ cients of the endogenous variables. First, the last ve
decades were characterized by di¤erent exchange rate regimes and monetary policy stance,
with the most recent period associated to sluggish economic growth, large movements in
the exchange rates and zero lower bound nominal interest rates. It is, therefore, unlikely
that time-invariant models can properly capture these structural changes in the world
economy. Second, the relationship between macroeconomic variables, such as output,
ination, and interest rate, are also likely to have changed over time, as suggested by
Stock and Watson (1996) using U.S. data. Lastly, there is extensive empirical evidence
that volatility of structural shocks in the U.S. and other large economies has changed
over time, as documented by McConnell and Pérez-Quirós (2000), and Benati (2008).
The use of time-varying parameter vector autoregression model is particularly relevant in
the current setting as it is able to capture any potential changes in the inter-relationship
between the model variables, allows for stochastic volatility of the structural shocks,
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and deals with structural breaks in the data, as noted by Benati and Mumtaz (2007).
In addition, the TVP-BVAR framework has been widely used to evaluate the temporal
movements of ination and output following monetary policy shocks. See Primiceri (2005),
Benati (2008), Canova and Gambetti (2009), Koop et al. (2009), and Baumeister et al.
(2013).
This study aims to examine what drives exchange rate movements and how it af-
fects ination by evaluating the temporal inter-relations between real exchange rate and
key macroeconomic variables, namely output, interest rate, and prices, using a TVP-
BVAR model with stochastic volatility, which allows for time-varying coe¢ cients and
heteroscedastic shocks. Monetary policy innovations are identied using sign restrictions.
I nd compelling empirical evidence that the e¤ect of monetary policy innovations on the
real exchange rate has greatly increased over time. The reaction of real exchange rate to
monetary policy has increased from the mid-1980s, with real exchange rate movements
being more closely related with the movements in output and ination after the early
2000s. While the TVP-BVAR model adopted in this study can provide robust evidence
of time variation in the real exchange rate dynamics, this class of models is silent on the
drivers of such changes.
Thus, I employ a two-country New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) model to investigate, in a structural fashion, what drives exchange rate dynamics
and how exchange rate a¤ects ination. I simulate the e¤ects of real exchange rate, output,
and ination to a contractionary monetary policy shock under di¤erent parametrization
of the monetary policy rule, nominal rigidities, trade openness, and exchange rate pass-
through (ERPT) to import prices. The simulations of the theoretical model reveal that
nominal rigidities, exchange rate pass-through, and trade openness account for most of the
simulated exchange rate movements. These are due to the inability of the relative prices
of domestic and foreign economies to adjust for changes in the nominal exchange rate. It
is also observed that monetary policy rule parameters do not fundamentally change the
real exchange rate dynamics; they simply cause the model variables to uctuate less at a
given level of interest rate. The simulations derived from the DSGE model also suggest
that most of the exchange rate volatility can be attributed to feasible parameterizations of
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nominal rigidities and trade openness. This study also nds exchange rate pass-through
to be positively correlated to ination, which is in line with the Taylors hypothesis.
Although this study may help us to better understand what drives exchange rate
dynamics and how appreciations or depreciations of exchange rate feed into domestic
prices, it is not meant to be exhaustive. There are a number of other potential drivers
which are not considered in this study, including currency of invoicing and share of debt
in foreign currency. Nonetheless, a greater understanding of exchange rate dynamics may
help us to better appreciate its e¤ects on output, improve on our ability to make more
informed predictions of its impact on ination, and ultimately understand how monetary
policy should respond.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 3.2 outlines the empirical
methodology. Section 3.3 provides a summary of the empirical results. Section 3.4 denes
the theoretical model. Section 3.5 describes the ndings of the DSGE model simulations
and the potential drivers of the empirical results. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Empirical Methodology
The potential temporal changes in the relationship between exchange rate and key macro-
economics variables, exchange rate regimes and monetary policy stance suggest that the
transmission of monetary policy shock requires a modelling framework that allows for
time-varying coe¢ cients with stochastic volatility, as previously discussed in Section 3.1.
The TVP-BVAR with heteroscedastic volatility in the structural shocks seems an appro-
priate modelling approach for the current setting.
3.2.1 Bayesian Time-Varying Parameter VAR Model
I estimate a four-variable TVP-BVAR with stochastic volatility in the spirit of Cogley
and Sargent (2005) and Primiceri (2005). The endogenous variables are output, interest
rate, ination, and real exchange rate in quarterly frequency and in relative terms, i.e.,
domestic relative to foreign variables, covering the sample period from 1960Q1 to 2013Q3.
Further details on the data sources and on the construction of the relative variables can
84
CHAPTER 3. THE EFFECTS OF MONETARY POLICY ON EXCHANGE RATE
be found in Appendix B.1. As standard practice in the literature, the TVP-BVAR model
is estimated using two lags (p = 2). The reduced form representation of the model is
given as follows:
yt = ct +B1;tyt 1 + :::+Bp;tyt p + ut  X 0tt + ut (3.1)
where yt = [yt; rt;pt; st]0 is a vector of endogenous variables and  denotes the rst
di¤erence operator. The variables are relative output in log di¤erences (y), relative
interest rate in log level (r), relative CPI in log di¤erences (p) and real exchange rate
(REER) in log level (st). The variables used in the estimation are in log di¤erences, except
for interest rate and REER which is provide in log-level. The variables are in quarterly
frequency and in relative terms (domestic minus foreign variables). All data is constructed
as U.S. data relative to a foreign country, with the latter constructed as a weighted average
of ve countries: Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom. The rst
step was to construct the output-weighted aggregates for foreign country comprised of
Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom. The quarterly output-
weights were constructed by summing the real GDP in U.S. dollars (xed PPPs) of the ve
foreign countries and then taking their respective shares. The second step was to cancel
out any national base e¤ects by taking the log di¤erence of all series, except for the nominal
interest rate and REER which are kept in levels, and multiply them by their respective
output-weights. The next step was to construct the foreign country equivalent growth
rate by aggregating each countrys output-weighted series described above. Finally, I
constructed the relative variables by taking the log di¤erence - where appropriate - of
the ratio of the indexed U.S. series (in levels) by the foreign country series. The relative
interest rate series is constructed by taking the di¤erence of the U.S. and foreign interest
rate.
The time-varying intercepts ct and the time-varying coe¢ cients B1;t:::p;t are stored in
t, and the lags of yt are collected in Xt. The rst of ten years of data are used as a
training sample used to produce the priors of the estimation, which starts in 1970Q1.
This is the earliest possible estimation date given that before 1970, the exchange rate
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regime for the examined countries was xed. The heteroscedastic reduced-form inno-
vation ut is postulated to be normally distributed, with zero mean and a time-varying
variance-covariance matrix 
t, which, following established practice in the literature, can
be decomposed according to the following equation:
V ar (ut)  
t = A 1t Ht
 
A 1t
0
(3.2)
The lower triangular matrix At models the impact interrelations between the endoge-
nous model variables, while the diagonal matrix Ht collects the stochastic volatilities that
capture variations in the size of structural shocks. As it is standard in the literature, the
time-varying matrices At and Ht are dened as follows:
At 
26666664
1 0 0 0
21;t 1 0 0
31;t 32;t 1 0
41;t 42;t 43;t 1
37777775 ; Ht 
26666664
h1;t 0 0 0
0 h2;t 0 0
0 0 h3;t 0
0 0 0 h4;t
37777775 (3.3)
Following Primiceri (2005), I dene t  [21;t; 31;t; 32;t; 41;t; 42;t; 43;t]0 to be the
elements of the matrix At, while the vector of volatilities ht  [h1;t; h2;t; h3;t; h4;t]0 collects
the diagonal elements of Ht. The time-varying parameters t and t are modelled as
driftless random walks, while the vector of volatilities ht are postulated to evolve as
geometric random walks independent of each other. As in Cogley and Sargent (2005) and
Primiceri (2005), the time-varying parameters t are assumed to evolve according to:
p(tjt 1; Q) = I(t)f(tjt 1; Q) (3.4)
with I(t) being an indicator function that rejects unstable draws, thus imposing station-
arity to the VAR model. Specically, if the roots are inside the unit circle, then I(t) = 0
and the draw is accepted. Otherwise, the draw is discarded. Following Benati and Mum-
taz (2007), f(tjt 1; Q) is given by eq. (3.5). The three driving processes of the system
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are assumed to change according to:
t = t 1 + t t  N(0; Q) (3.5)
t = t 1 + t t  N(0; S) (3.6)
lnhi;t = lnhi;t 1 + i i;t  N(0; 1) (3.7)
In summary, the vector ["0t; 
0
t; 
0
t; 
0
t] can be represented as follows:26666664
"t
t
t
t
37777775  N (0;M) ; with M =
26666664
I4 0 0 0
0 Q 0 0
0 0 S 0
0 0 0 Z
37777775 and Z =
26666664
21 0 0 0
0 22 0 0
0 0 23 0
0 0 0 24
37777775 (3.8)
where "t is such that ut = A 1t H
1
2
t "t, and the block-diagonal structure for S is dened
below:
S  V ar (t) =
26664
S1 012 013
021 S2 023
031 032 S3
37775 (3.9)
with S1  V ar(21;t); S2  V ar([31;t; 32;t]0) and S3  V ar([41;t; 42;t; 43;t]0). This de-
nition implies that di¤erent rows of the matrix At evolve independently to each other.
This structure allows for correlation of endogenous variables within equations, but un-
correlation of the variables across equations. As discussed in Primiceri (2005), this block
diagonal structure simplies inference and increase the e¢ ciency of the estimation algo-
rithm, as it allows to do Gibbs sampling on the elements of At equation by equation.
The eqs. (3.1) (3.9) are estimated using Bayesian methods outlined in Kim and Nel-
son (1999). Appendix B.2 provides further details on the prior specications and on the
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) estimation algorithm.
3.2.2 Identication of the Monetary Policy Shock
Given that the objective of this study is to reveal the e¤ects of asymmetric domestic
monetary policy shocks on the real exchange rate, the empirical model is specied in
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relative variables. This setup also leads to a more parsimonious TVP-BVAR model since
domestic and foreign variables are jointly estimated as one variable. This is a desirable
feature as it helps to mitigate the curse of dimensionality problem, which is typical of
this class of models, as observed by Del Negro (2003). Monetary policy is identied using
sign restrictions in the spirit of Uhlig (2005) and Arias et al. (2014). I assume that a
contractionary monetary policy shock decreases relative output and relative prices for a
period of four quarters after the structural shock, just as in Clarida and Galí (1994) and
Farrant and Peersman (2006). The real exchange rate is left unrestricted to allow the
data to speak freely about the underlying mechanisms driving its dynamics and its inter-
relationship with other model variables. The sign restrictions are summarized in table
3.1.
Table 3.1: Identifying Sign Restrictions
Relative Output Relative Prices Relative Interest Rate Real Exchange Rate
Contractionary
Monetary Policy   + unrestricted
Note: An increase in the exchange rate is an appreciation. Relative variables are dened as the U.S.
minus a foreign aggregate.
The sign restriction approach has a number of advantages compared to other identi-
cation schemes since it is consistent with the ndings of micro-founded structural models,
and the sign restriction method is relatively agnostic and less restrictive compared to
other identication approaches. It is noted that Canova and Paustian (2011) and Kilian
and Murphy (2012) argue that to properly identify the shock of interest, all theoretically
credible restrictions should be imposed. Thus, a good extension to this study would be
to identify, by means of sign restrictions, further structural shocks, including demand and
supply shocks, so to strengthen the identication of monetary policy. Due to time and
computing resources constraints1, this has not been done in this study. Nonetheless, the
empirical results suggest that the model is well identied, as discussed in the next section.
1 The estimation of reduced-form coe¢ cients and structural impulse responses for one shock takes between
three and four weeks when using a standard computer with Intel Core i7 processor and 8GB memory. The
identication of additional shocks would dramatically increase the processing time and computing power
requirements.
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3.3 Empirical Results
In this study, the real exchange rate dynamics following a monetary policy shock is eval-
uated using impulse responses. In the spirit of Primiceri (2005) and Benati and Mumtaz
(2007), I undertake formal convergence diagnostics to check convergence of the Markov
chain to the ergodic distribution. To assess how well the chain mixes, it is standard
practice in the literature to evaluate the autocorrelation function of the draws. More
specically, low autocorrelations indicate that the draws are nearly independent, which
increases the e¢ ciency of the Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm. Table 3.2 summa-
rizes the distribution of the ine¢ ciency factors for the posterior estimates of all di¤erent
sets of parameters. Ine¢ ciency factors (IFs) is dened as the inverse of the relative nu-
merical e¢ ciency (RNE) measure of Geweke (1992), and details of this diagnostic test can
be found in Appendix B.2.3. In all other cases, 90% of the IFs are well below 1, which
suggests very low autocorrelations given that values of the IFs below or around 20 are
considered satisfactory.
Table 3.2: Summary of the Distribution of the Ine¢ ciency Factors
Parameters Median Mean Minimum Maximum 10th Percentile 90th Percentile
T 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0064 0.0004 0.0027
AT 0.0011 0.0014 0.0001 0.0059 0.0004 0.0029
HT 0.0072 0.0087 0.0001 0.0359 0.0010 0.0203
Q 0.0041 0.0052 0.0003 0.0397 0.0014 0.0106
S 0.0049 0.0089 0.0022 0.0276 0.0025 0.0242
Z 0.0181 0.0258 0.0053 0.0617 0.0080 0.0498
Note: The di¤erent sets of parameters are: (i) the time-varying coe¢ cients

T

, (ii) the time-varying
simultaneous relations
 
AT

, (iii) the time-varying volatilities
 
HT

, and (iv) the hyperparameters Q,
S, and Z.
Figure 3.3 illustrates that the ine¢ ciency factors draws for the models states and
hyperparameters2 are well below the threshold of 20, as pointed out by Primiceri (2005).
In addition to formal convergence checks, the trustworthiness of the empirical results
2 The states are: (i) time-varying coe¢ cients (t), (ii) the stochastic volatilities (Ht), and (iii) the contem-
poraneous interrelations (At). The hyperparameters are the elements of the matrices Q, S, and 2i for
i = 1; : : : ; 4.
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ultimately depends on the models ability to capture well-known fundamental relationships
in the data. It is, therefore, informative to compare the results of this studys model
with comparable drifting-coe¢ cient models used to evaluate the e¤ects and transmission
mechanisms of monetary policy on key macroeconomic aggregates. Figure 3.4 depicts
the non-normalized posterior median responses of the model variables namely relative
prices, relative output, relative interest rate and real exchange rate  to an exogenous
increase in the relative interest rate, which can be interpreted as an increase of the policy
rate in the U.S., keeping the policy rate in the foreign economy unchanged, for a period of
twenty-eight quarters after the structural shock. As one would expect, monetary policy
shocks were quite large during the Volcker chairmanship and lower during the Great
Moderation. These temporal interest rate dynamics are captured by the time-varying
model, which suggest that the model is properly capturing the dynamics in the data.
A closer examination of the impulse responses suggests that there is signicant time
variation of real exchange rate after a contractionary monetary policy shock, which, to
recap, is identied as an increase in interest rates, a decline in relative prices and relative
output for a period of four quarters after the innovation. An increase in the real exchange
rate is an appreciation. These large variations of the real exchange rate are consistent
with what one would expect, but even after the mid-1980s, the response of the real
exchange rate varies substantially, and even uctuates between an appreciation and a
depreciation. This is an interesting nding, which can have large consequences for the
transmission of monetary policy shocks. The importance of monetary policy shocks in
explaining movements in the real exchange rate varies substantially over time, as depicted
in gure 3.5, and it is highest at the beginning of the sample, which is consistent with the
traditional monetary theory view that loose monetary policy stance creates instability in
both the exchange rate and price level, as noted by Mishkin (2008).
It is acknowledged that in this chapter, I assume a TVP-VAR model with two lags,
four variables (output, ination, exchange rate, and interest rate) in log di¤erences of
their relative variables indices, excepted for the interest rate, while in Chapter 4 of this
Ph.D. thesis, I estimate a TVP-VAR model with one lag (in view to minimize the curse of
dimensionality), ve variables (output, ination, interest rate, trade balance and exchange
90
CHAPTER 3. THE EFFECTS OF MONETARY POLICY ON EXCHANGE RATE
rate) in log levels. In relation to the identication approach, I identify both models with
sign-restriction. In this Chapter 3, I assume that a contractionary monetary policy shock
increase interest rate, and decreases output and ination for a period of four quarters
after the structural shock. The exchange rate is left unrestricted to allow the data to
speak freely about the underlying mechanisms driving its dynamics with the other model
variables. This allows exchange rate to appreciate and depreciate over time following
monetary policy shock. In Chapter 4, I assume that a contractionary monetary policy
shock increase interest rate, and decreases output and ination, and cause exchange rate
to appreciate for a period of one quarter (impact) after the structural shock. The trade
balance is left unrestricted as it is key spillover variable in the model. The exchange rate
sign is restricted so to match the dynamics of the DSGE model, since its estimation is
based on the impulse response matching between the empirical and theoretical model.
Thus, the impact impulse responses of the exchange rate in this chapter and in Chapter
4 are somewhat di¤erent.
In order to better understand the transmission channels of monetary policy innova-
tions to the model variables, in particular to the real exchange rate, it is necessary to
abstract from volatility in the structural shocks. Thus, I normalize the time-varying im-
pulse responses so that the size of the contractionary monetary policy shock is set as
an increase of relative interest rate by 25 basis points in the initial period at each point
in time. Figure 3.6 shows the median, as well as the 16th and 84th percentiles, of the
posterior distributions of contemporaneous time-varying e¤ects of a tightening monetary
policy, normalized to increase the relative interest rate by 25 basis points on impact, on
relative prices, relative output, and real exchange rate. This normalization reveals the
economic e¤ects of monetary policy in the U.S. have generally become stronger over time,
and this is particularly true for the exchange rate response, which has been subject to
substantial time variation. After being largely insignicant until the mid-1980s, a more
aggressive monetary policy stance in the U.S. has caused considerably stronger and more
volatile appreciations of the real exchange rate over time. Figure 3.7 shows that mon-
etary policy shocks proxied by non-normalized contemporaneous relative interest rate
responses peaked during the Volcker period and declined over time, which is consistent
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with the view that smaller shocks drove lower macroeconomic volatile during the Great
Moderation. However, it seems unlikely that smaller shocks alone were su¢ cient to drive
such movements in the real exchange rate dynamics. If so, the impulse response of the
other model variables should display similar dynamics.
As the TVP-BVAR is silent about the causes of time variation in the model variables,
I use an open economy DSGE model, which is outlined in the next section, to evaluate
the potential structural drivers of time variation in the exchange rate dynamics.
3.4 Theoretical Model
The empirical ndings outlined in the previous section suggest that the U.S. real exchange
rate reacts more to monetary policy shocks mainly from the mid-1980s, and the real
exchange rate is more volatile compared to output and prices after the early 2000s. To
explore the potential drivers of these results, I make use of a standard nominal two-country
NK DSGE model with staggered prices and incomplete exchange rate pass-through à
la Monacelli (2005). The DSGE model is used to investigate ve distinct settings and
their likely consequences for the movements of the real exchange rate. First, I allow for
changes in the degree of exchange rate pass-through. There are several studies, including
Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2007), which nd a reduction of the exchange
rate pass-through to ination. Second, I also allow for variation in the degree of domestic
price rigidities, as per Calvo (1983). There is some indication that prices were more
exible during periods of high ination, such as the Great Ination, and that prices were
more rigid during the Great Moderation. Thirdly, I consider the e¤ects of openness to
trade, which has signicantly increased over time. Lastly, I allow for the possibility that
monetary policy stance may have changed over time, by examining the e¤ects of di¤erent
Taylor rule responses to ination and output growth.
3.4.1 Two-Country New Keynesian DSGE Model
In this section, I present a two-country NK DSGE model with staggered prices, incom-
plete exchange rate pass-through, complete markets, investment adjustment costs, and
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standard Taylor rule, specied in terms of annual consumer price ination and quarterly
output growth. The world economy consists of two symmetric economies, and I index the
intermediate good rms in both home and foreign countries by j 2 [0; 1].
3.4.1.1 The Household
There exists a continuum of identical households that allocates consumption expenditures
on nal goods, Ct, and sell labor, Nt, to domestic intermediate goods rms in a competitive
market. The preferences of the representative household are described by the following
intertemporal Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function:
Et
" 1X
t=0
t
 

1=
C;t
C
1 1=
t+j
1  1=  
 
1 + 
 H;tN
1+
t
!#
(3.10)
where Et is the conditional expectation operator, 0 <  < 1 is the intertemporal discount
factor, Ct denotes consumption, Nt denotes labor supplied by the household, 
1=
C;t and
 N;t are preference weights of consumption and leisure, respectively. The parameter  is
the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption, and  is the
elasticity of labour supply disutility with respect to hours worked (also known the Frisch
elasticity of labour supply).
Capital stock owned by households is denoted by Kt =
R 1
0
Kt(j)dj, and it accumulates
according to the following law of motion
Kt+1 = It   'K
2

It
Kt
  
2
Kt + (1  )Kt (3.11)
where  2 [0; 1] denotes the rate of capital depreciation. Capital accumulation is subject
to an increasing and convex capital adjustment costs, where 'k is a scale parameter of
capital adjustment cost. In period t, the representative household faces the following
budget constraint
Wt +R
K
t Kt +t +BH;t 1 + StBF;t 1 = PtCt + PtIt +BH;t + StBF;t (3.12)
where Wt and RKt denotes the nominal wage rate and the rental rate of capital, respec-
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tively. BH and BF are the riskless home and foreign bonds held by the household, St is
the nominal exchange rate, Pt is the price of nal good, and t are claims on nominal
prots earned by rms and transferred to households.
3.4.1.2 Firms
The world economy under consideration consists of two countries: Home and Foreign.
There are three types of rms in this economy: (i) a continuum of monopolistically
competitive intermediate goods sector rms, each of which produces a single tradable
di¤erentiated intermediate good, (ii) a monopolistically competitive import sector, which
buys foreign produced intermediate goods at the dock, and (iii) a set of representative
nal goods sector rms, which combine domestically and imported intermediate goods
into a non-tradable nal good.
Final Good Firms: As it is standard in the DSGE literature, I assume that the domestic
non-tradable good Yt is produced by perfectly competitive domestic rms by combining
domestic and foreign intermediate goods composites. Final good production function is
described by the following Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function
Yt =
"
!
Z 1
0
YH;t(j)
" 1
" dj
 1

+ (1  !)
Z 1
0
YF;t(j)
" 1
" dj
 1

# 
 1
(3.13)
where ! is the weight of home intermediate composite required for producing the nal
consumption goods,  denoted the elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic
goods, " measures the elasticity between the goods produced by each rm within the same
country. The price index of the nal good Pt is given by
Pt =

!P 1 H;t + (1  !)P 1 F;t
 1
1  (3.14)
where the price indices of intermediate goods PH;t (j) and PF;t (j) are given as follows:
PH;t =
Z 1
0
YH;t(j)
1 "dj
 1
1 "
(3.15)
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and
PF;t =
Z 1
0
YF;t(j)
1 "dj
 1
1 "
(3.16)
The nal good rm determines its optimal production plans by minimizing expendi-
tures in assembling intermediate goods given their production function and the constraint
Yt = Ct + It. The total demand for an intermediate good is determined by
YH;t = !

PH;t
Pt
 
Yt (3.17)
and
YF;t = (1  !)

PF;t
Pt
 
Yt (3.18)
The total demand for a generic good j produced in the home country is given by
YH;t (j) =

PH;t (j)
PH;t
 " 
YH;t + Y

H;t

(3.19)
and the real exchange rate of the home country is dened as
Qt =

StP

t
Pt

(3.20)
where St is the nominal exchange rate.
Intermediate Goods Sector: Each monopolistic domestic intermediate goods rm, j,
produces an intermediate good YH;t(j) according to the following Cobb-Douglas technol-
ogy:
YH;t(j) = AtKt(j)
Nt(j)
1  (3.21)
where Kt (j), Nt(j) and At denote respectively capital, that are rented from households
in fully competitive markets, labour and an exogenous stationary stochastic technological
shock, which is assumed to follow an autoregressive process. The parameter  denotes
the labour/capital share in the constant returns to scale production function.
The intermediate goods rms are monopolistic competitive, so they can set prices
95
CHAPTER 3. THE EFFECTS OF MONETARY POLICY ON EXCHANGE RATE
for their goods. Following Calvo (1983), I assume that rms can set their prices for
a stochastic number of periods, i.e., a rm has the opportunity to update its price with
probability 1 . When the rm does not reset its price, it just applies the price it charged
in the last period. In setting the new prices PH;t(j), the domestic generic intermediate
good rm j will maximize its expected discount prot that the updated price will generate.
This is formalized below
max
1X
k=0
kEtFt;t+kt+k (j) (3.22)
where t (j) = PH;t (j)YH;t (j) MCtYH;t (j) are period t nominal prot and MCt is the
marginal cost given the optimal choice of factor inputs. As rms are owned by households,
I have that Ft;t+k =
t+kUC(Ct+k;Nt+k)
tUC(Ct;Nt)
. Firms maximize the discounted value of prots given
the production function.
Imported Goods Sector: In this section, I outline the optimization problem of the
representative importer, which buys intermediate foreign goods under the assumption that
the law of one price holds at the dock, which implies that exchange rate pass-through to
import prices is complete. Following Monacelli (2005), incomplete ERPT is implemented
using staggered pricing for the imported goods. This adopted specication is in line with
empirical evidence that ERPT is incomplete in the short-run, but complete in the long-
run, as showns in Campa and Goldberg (2005). The optimal price setting in the importer
sector also follows Calvo (1983). I consider a local importer buying good j at the dock :
PF;t(j) = StP

F;t(j); PH;t(j) = StP

H;t(j) (3.23)
Similar to domestic intermediate good rms, the local importer chooses a price P IMH;t (j),
expressed in units of domestic currency, to maximize:
Et
1X
k=0
IMt+k

P IMH;t (j)  StP F;t+k(j)

IMH;t+k)(j) (3.24)
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subject to the demand faced by each single importer, dened as
IMH;t =

PIM;t(j)
PIM;t
 "IM
IMt (3.25)
where P F;t(j) is the price of the imported intermediate goods at the dock, the parameter
"IM is the elasticity of substitution between di¤erent types of imported goods, 
IM is the
Calvo parameter, and t is the relevant stochastic discount factor. The resulting log-linear
aggregate imports price at home country evolves according to:
pF;t  pIM;t = IM (pIM;t 1   t 1) +
 
1  IM ~pIM;t (3.26)
where ~pIM;t is the optimal updated price of the imported goods in the home country.
The Calvo parameter for imported goods, IM , can be interpreted as the degree of
exchange rate pass-through in the model. As IM ! 0, import prices become perfectly
exible and exchange rate pass-through becomes complete. On the other hand, values of
IM closer to 1 suggest the case of incomplete exchange rate pass-through.
3.4.1.3 Monetary Policy Rule
I close the model using the following standard Taylor type monetary policy rule, specied
in terms of annual consumer price ination and quarterly output growth,
Rt = RRt 1 + (1  R)



Pt
Pt 1

+ Y

Yt
Yt 1

+ "R;t (3.27)
where R denotes the interest rate smoothing parameter, while  and Y measure the
long-run ination and output growth responses, while the term "R;t represents a serially
uncorrelated monetary policy shock. The foreign economy has an analogous representa-
tion. Thus, foreign country consumers choose consumption, capital, and hours worked
in similar fashion as in home economy. The foreign nal good rms utilize the same
production function and adjust prices in the same way as described previously.
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3.4.1.4 Equilibrium
Given the shock process and initial conditions for the state variables, the equilibrium is a
set of prices and quantities for all t  0 such that: (i) households maximize utility subject
to the capital accumulation equation and to the budget constraint, (ii) intermediate good
rms maximize prot subject by its demand function, and (iii) all markets clear - asset
market clears by Walras law. To solve the model, we derive the rst order conditions
of households and rms, determine conditions for the steady state of the model and
then linearize the rst order conditions around the steady state. The resulting system of
expectational di¤erence equations is solved numerically as discussed in Klein (2000). An
equilibrium of the economy is a sequence of prices and quantities such that given initial
conditions for the state variables and the appropriate transversality conditions as well as
an exogenous process are satised.
3.4.2 Parameterization
I parameterize the DSGE model using quarterly U.S. data for the period 1970Q1 to
2013Q4 and the baseline parameterized parameters are reported in table 3.3. I use pref-
erence parameters at values that are commonly found in the Business Cycle literature.
The annual real interest rate is set at 4%, which gives a quarterly subjective discount
factor () of 0.99. The home bias (!) is calculated at 0.8 to match the historical import
to output shares of 20% in the United States relative to the Rest of the World (RoW). It
is assumed that the size of the home and foreign economy is the same. The inverse of the
Frisch labor supply elasticity3 (v) is set to 1, and it is assumed that households devote
30% of their time to productive activities ( ) in the steady state. On the supply side, I
set the labor share () at 0.60 in the steady state. The elasticity of substitution between
home and foreign goods () is yet not very well established in the literature. Fratzscher
and Straub (2013) and Corsetti et al. (2008a) set this parameter between 0.5 and 1.5. I
follow Christo¤el et al. (2008) and Adolfson et al. (2007) to set this parameter at 1.5.
For nominal rigidities, the Calvo probabilities in the domestic intermediate goods () is
3 The inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity measures how much labor supply changes when the wage
changes while keeping consumption constant.
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set to 0.75, which implies that nal goods rms reset their prices, on average, every four
quarters. The Calvo parameter for import goods (IM) is set at 0, which implies that the
Law of One Price holds for the baseline model. This assumption of complete ERPT is
relaxed for the simulation exercises. It is assumed that the annual capital depreciation
rate is 10%, so the quarterly depreciation rate () is set at 0.025. The capital adjustment
cost parameter ('k) is set to 1 so to roughly match the investment/capital ratio elasticity
of the capital adjustment costs specication reported in Boldrin et al. (2001) for the U.S.
economy. In relation to the Taylor rule parameters, the ination response coe¢ cient ()
is parameterized at 1.5, the output growth response (Y ) is set at 0.2, and the interest rate
smoothing (R) is equal to 0.6. I parameterize both the domestic and foreign economies
using the same values.
Table 3.3: Parameterization of the DSGE Model
Parameter Description Value
 Discount factor 0.99
v Inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply 0.1
 Elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods 1
 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1
 Depreciation rate 0.025
'k Capital adjustment cost 1
 Calvo parameter - domestic goods 0.75
IM Exchange rate pass-through 0
 Hours in the steady state 0.33
 Labor share in the steady state 0.6
! Home bias 0.8
Y Output growth response - Taylor rule 0.2
R Interest rate smoothing - Taylor rule 0.6
 Ination response coe¢ cient - Taylor rule 1.5
3.5 Theoretical Results
I investigate the potential drivers of exchange rate movements and volatility by simulat-
ing the impact of policy rate increase within the DSGE framework under ve di¤erence
scenarios. First, I simulate the theoretical e¤ects of nominal rigidities in the domestic and
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imported goods on output, exchange rate and prices following a contractionary monetary
policy shock. I allow the values of price rigidities in the domestic () and import goods or
ERPT (IM) to vary from 0 to 1, with lower values representing higher exible prices and
more ERPT, and higher values suggesting more price rigidities and lower ERPT. Second,
I vary the degree of openness or home bias (!) to feasible values from 0.51 to 1. Lastly,
I allow for changes in the reaction of the Taylor rule stance to ination () between 1
and 3 and output growth (Y ) from 0 to 1, with lower values suggesting a less aggres-
sive monetary policy stance. Figure 3.8 shows the theoretical impulse responses of real
exchange rate, ination and output growth for the home country following a monetary
policy shock under various parameterizations of the degree of exchange rate pass-through,
nominal rigidities, degree of openness, and monetary policy rules to ination and output
growth. The y-axis of each plot characterizes the size of the impulse responses whereas
the x-axis represents the impulse response horizon. Overall, a contractionary monetary
policy shock causes real exchange rate to appreciate, and output and prices to decline.
An increase of real exchange rate is an appreciation.
3.5.1 Exchange Rate Pass-Through
The rst row of gure 3.8 reveals that real exchange rate reacts more to monetary pol-
icy shock when exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) declines. Recall that import prices
become more rigid as IM ! 1. The chart also shows that response of exchange rate to
monetary policy shock is not linear as, the larger the value of the ERPT parameter, the
larger will be the response of real exchange rate. In other words, a lower pass-through
implies a stronger and more persistent real exchange rate appreciation following a con-
tractionary monetary policy shock, and introduce higher volatility of the exchange rate,
as depicted in gure 3.9. The explanation for these results is as follows. The real exchange
rate is dened in the DSGE model as nominal exchange rate deated by the relative con-
sumer prices of the domestic and foreign economies. A lower pass-through of exchange
rate to import prices is achieved by imposing a higher degree of price stickiness of im-
ported goods, which implies that importers are allowed to re-optimize their prices less
often. As import prices become more rigid, uctuations in the nominal exchange rate
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are not fully o¤set by movements in the domestic prices and this leads to higher real
exchange rate response. The advantage of using a two-country DSGE framework instead
of a small open economy is that the former allows for spillovers (spillbacks) to (from) the
foreign economy. In a small open economy model, the world price is not a¤ected by the
economic decisions of the small domestic economy and therefore the world price is con-
sidered constant. Thus, all movements in the relative price come only from movements
in the domestic prices. As expected, output reacts more when prices are more rigid.
There are a number of macro and micro studies that found that ERPT has declined over
time, including Marazzi and Sheets (2007), Campa and Goldberg (2008), and Ihrig et al.
(2006). The temporal reduction in ERPT found in the literature is consistent with the
increase of real exchange rate movements over time, as suggested by my empirical results.
3.5.2 Domestic Price Rigidities
The second row of gure 3.8 shows that the real exchange rate reaction to monetary policy
shock is larger as domestic prices are more rigid ( ! 1). Although the magnitude of
real exchange rate reaction for di¤erent parametrizations of the Calvo parameter is not
as large as in the case of ERPT, its volatility is much more accentuated when compared
to the ERPT simulation, as it can be observed in the gure 3.9. A similar intuition of
the ERPT applies when considering the e¤ects of nominal rigidities to exchange rate,
output and ination movements. As domestic prices are stickier, domestic ination reacts
less strongly, which causes uctuations in the nominal exchange rate not to be o¤set by
movements in the relative prices, therefore increasing the response of real exchange rate.
Recent empirical studies, including Ball et al. (1988) and Gagnon (2009), show that the
frequency in which rms update their prices di¤ers between episodes of low ination, such
as the Great Moderation period, and periods of high ination, such as the Great Ination.
Their results follow a simple intuition: increases in ination related costs lead rms to
adjust prices more frequently. These imply that nominal rigidities were lower during the
Great Ination and higher during the Great Moderation. These ndings are aligned with
the results of the theoretical simulations of this study in which higher price rigidities leads
to lower levels of ination, and also with my empirical ndings that real exchange rate
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movements increased around the onset of the Great Moderation period.
3.5.3 Openness to Trade
The third row of gure 3.8 shows the impulse response of real exchange rate for di¤erent
degrees of trade openness (!). Recall that openness to trade is dened as exports plus
imports divided by output, and the economy becomes more closed to trade as ! ! 1.
When the economy is closed to trade, all movements in the relative price of domestic
and foreign economy come from the movements in domestic prices, which is not su¢ cient
to compensate for changes in the nominal exchange rate uctuations, thus magnifying
the response of real exchange rate. These results are consistent with the so-called New
Open Economy Macroeconomics, which argues that openness to trade may play a role in
smoothing out the impact of both nominal and real shocks on the volatility of real ex-
change uctuations (see Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995, 1996), Hau (2000, 2002), and Cooke
(2010)). The simulation results illustrated in gure 3.9 suggest that real exchange rate
volatility can be largely attributed to feasible parameterizations of the degree of trade
openness. From a theoretical perspective, the degree of trade openness is another im-
portant determining factor of the ERPT. The relationship between the two structural
parameters is generally positive the more open a country is, the more movements in
exchange rates are transmitted into ination changes via the import prices.
3.5.4 Taylor Rule Response to Ination
The fourth row of the gure 3.8 shows that, as the ination reaction coe¢ cient in the
Taylor rule () becomes larger, the response of the real exchange rate to monetary
policy shock is dampened, e.g., under a more aggressive policy stance, the variables in
the model uctuate less at a given level of the interest rate, as observed in gure 3.9.
These ndings are aligned with the conclusions of Mumtaz and Sunder-Plassmann (2013).
There is also a view that monetary policy has played a signicant role in the reduction
of ERPT to ination. Taylor (2000) and Mishkin (2007) argue that the presence of
a strong commitment to a nominal anchor over the past three decades by monetary
authorities in many countries by the use of a more aggressive monetary policy stance
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and announcements aimed to maintain low and stable ination has led to a decline in
the exchange rate pass-through to domestic ination that is observed in the data. Gagnon
and Ihrig (2004) estimated pass-through to consumer prices to be roughly 0.2 for a broad
set of industrial countries using data over the 1971 2002. However, when they split
their sample to account for a more stable monetary policy regime, they found a marked
decline in the exchange rate pass-through to be 0.05. McCarthy (2007) reached similar
conclusion; nding a decline in exchange rate pass-through for the period from 1983 to
1998 relative to the earlier period from 1976 to 1982. Other studies based on DSGE
models by Bouakez and Rebei (2008) and Murchison (2009) also suggest that short-run
ERPT has declined as a result of the move to ination targeting. This studys empirical
results suggest that real exchange rate reacts more to monetary policy shock after the
Volcker period, which corroborates to the argument that a more aggressive monetary
policy stance has led to the decline of ERPT to ination. The ERPT in this model is
set exogenously, so I cannot test whether a higher ination reaction in the Taylor rule
() leads to higher ERPT (
IM), but, based on my model simulations, changes in real
exchange rate is more muted for di¤erent parameterizations of  compared to 
IM .
3.5.5 Taylor Rule Response to Output Growth
The output response in the Taylor rule (Y ) plays an important role in policymaking as
it is a key determinant of ination pressure, and for many central banks, including the
U.S. Federal Reserve, maintaining full employment is also a policy goal. The last row of
the gure 3.8 shows that as response to output in the Taylor rule (Y ) becomes larger,
the response of the real exchange rate to a monetary policy shock is dampened, causing
the model variables to uctuate less.
3.6 Conclusions
This study provides compelling empirical evidence that real exchange rate movements
and volatility increased over time following a monetary policy shock. The simulation
results from the two-country NKDSGEmodel suggest that price rigidities, in particular to
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exchange rate pass-through, degree of openness, and monetary policy response to ination
and output growth drive most of the movements in real exchange rate. It has been
established that exchange rate pass-through is positively correlated to ination, which
is in line with the Taylors hypothesis. Changes in real exchange rate volatility can
be mainly attributed to feasible parameterizations of nominal rigidities and degree of
openness. The estimation of these structural parameters may provide further insights on
how the exchange rate dynamics have evolved over time. This is left for further research.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 3.1: E¤ective Real Exchange Rate (CPI-based) Broad Indices
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Note: The real e¤ective exchange rate indices (2010=100) were sourced from the Bank for International
Settlements. The series are based on monthly averages and are the same weighted averages of bilateral
exchange rates adjusted by relative consumer prices. The weighting pattern is time-varying. An increase
in the index indicates an appreciation
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Figure 3.2: Exchange Rate Statistics
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Note: Left panel: Indices of real exchange rate (2010=100) with the United States as the base year. An
increase in the index indicates an appreciation. Middle panel: Measure of exchange rate volatility. Right
panel: Correlation coe¢ cient between log di¤erence of real exchange rate and real output growth (blue
bars), and ination (red bars).
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Figure 3.3: Convergence of the Markov Chain
Unobservable States
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
Time-Varying Coefficients: qT
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
Contemporaneous Relations: AT
100 200 300 400 500 600
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
Stochastic volatilities: H T
Hyperparameters
200 400 600
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
Elements of Q
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
Elements of S
1 2 3 4
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
Elements of s2
Note: This chart shows the drawsine¢ ciency factors and it is observed that the autocorrelation of the
draws is low, being in all cases well below 1. According to Primiceri (2005), values of the ine¢ ciency
factors around or below twenty are regarded as satisfactory.
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Figure 3.4: Time-Varying IRFs to a Monetary Policy Shock
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Note: The gure shows the estimated impulse responses following a one standard deviation increase in
the relative interest rate for every quarter over the period 1970Q1  2013Q4. The relative variables
are dened as the U.S. minus the foreign economy. An increase in the real e¤ective exchange rate is an
appreciation of the U.S. dollar. Units are in percentage points, the horizon is in quarters, and all variables
are in quarterly terms except for the interest rate which is annualized.
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Figure 3.5: Time-Varying Variance Decomposition to a Monetary Policy Shock
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Note: The variance decomposition assesses the importance of the monetary policy shock by determining
the relative share of variance that the structural shock contribution to the total variance of each model
variable.
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Figure 3.6: Normalized Contemporaneous Time-Varying Impulse Responses
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Note: Normalized impact time-varying impulse responses following a monetary policy shock of 25 basis
points. The condence bands are constructed with 16th and 84th percentiles of the posterior distribution
for each period
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Figure 3.7: Time-Varying Stochastic Volatility of Monetary Policy Shock
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
Relative Interest Rate
median
16th and 84th percentiles
Note: The gure shows volatility of monetary policy shocks which is proxied by non-normalized con-
temporaneous relative interest rate responses was, on average, higher in the pre-Volcker period, peaked
during the Volcker period and then declined in the post-Volcker period, which is consistent with the view
that smaller shocks drove lower macroeconomic volatile during the Great Moderation.
111
CHAPTER 3. THE EFFECTS OF MONETARY POLICY ON EXCHANGE RATE
Figure 3.8: Simulated Theoretical Impulse Responses
Price Rigidities
0 1 2 3 4 5
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
x 10
-3
D
eg
re
e 
of
 N
om
in
al
 R
ig
id
itie
s Inflation
x=0.01
x=0.33
x=0.66
x=0.99
0 1 2 3 4 5
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
x 10
-3 Real Exchange Rate
0 1 2 3 4 5
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
x 10
-3 GDP
0 1 2 3 4 5
-10
-5
0
5
D
eg
re
e 
of
 E
R
P
T
10 -4
IM =0.01
IM =0.33
IM =0.66
IM =0.99
0 1 2 3 4 5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
10 -3
0 1 2 3 4 5
-10
-5
0
5
10 -3
Openness
0 1 2 3 4 5
-15
-10
-5
0
5
x 10
-4
D
eg
re
e 
of
 O
pe
nn
es
s
Inflation
w=0.51
w=0.70
w=0.85
w=0.99
0 1 2 3 4 5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
x 10
-3 Real Exchange Rate
0 1 2 3 4 5
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
x 10
-3 GDP
Monetary Policy Stance
0 1 2 3 4 5
-10
-5
0
5
Ta
yl
or
 R
ul
e:
 In
fla
tio
n
10 -4 Inflation
=1.0
=1.5
=2.0
=2.5
0 1 2 3 4 5
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
10 -3 Real Exchange Rate
0 1 2 3 4 5
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
10 -3 GDP
0 1 2 3 4 5
-15
-10
-5
0
5
Ta
yl
or
 R
ul
e:
 G
DP
10 -4
Y =0.01
Y =0.33
Y =0.66
Y =0.99
0 1 2 3 4 5
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
10 -3
0 1 2 3 4 5
-10
-5
0
5
10 -3
Note: IRFs to monetary policy contraction for di¤erent degrees of: (i) nominal rigidities  (top row),
(ii) ERPT IM (second row), (iii) trade openness ! (third row), (iv) Taylor rule: ination  (fourth
row), and (v) Taylor rule: output Y (last row). The y axis of each panel represents the magnitude of
the IRFs. The x axis is the IRF horizon.
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Figure 3.9: Exchange Rate Volatility to Changes in Structual Parameters
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Note: Volatility of real exchange rate for di¤erent degrees of: (i) nominal rigidities , (ii) exchange rate
pass-through IM , (iii) trade openness (or home bias) !, (iv) Taylor rule: Ination , and (v) Taylor
rule: Output Y using a two-country NK DSGE model.
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Chapter 4
Time Variation in U.S. Monetary
Policy Spillovers
4.1 Introduction
The question of how U.S. monetary policy shocks a¤ect the trade balance and spill over to
foreign GDP remains subject to debate. From a theoretical point of view, as reported by
Kim (2001), the ambiguity in the international e¤ects of monetary policy shocks is related
to the fact that theoretical models provide di¤erent perspectives on how monetary policy
shocks a¤ect the global economy, and through which channels this occurs. The basic
Mundell-Flemming-Dornbusch model predicts that a monetary tightening will lead to a
real exchange rate appreciation that worsens the domestic trade balance and increases
foreign output. This happens via the expenditure switching e¤ect, i.e., the exchange
rate appreciation causes domestic demand for foreign goods to increase as these become
cheaper, leading to positive trade spillovers for the foreign economy. At the same time,
however, the domestic trade balance might also improve due to the income absorption
e¤ect, i.e., lower domestic income following the monetary tightening reduces domestic
demand for imported goods. Models including intertemporal decisions, as popularized by
Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995), have emphasized the forward-looking behavior of economic
agents and introduced additional dimensions through which a monetary policy shock can
propagate internationally. For example, following a monetary tightening, the temporary
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decline in income might worsen the trade balance through consumption smoothing, but
also improve the current account if investments decline substantially due to higher real
interest rates. This ambiguity in the e¤ects on the trade balance translates into a similar
ambiguity in the predicted e¤ects on foreign GDP. Depending on whether the expenditure
switching or the income absorption e¤ect is dominant, foreign GDP spillovers following
a U.S. monetary policy tightening can either be positive or negative. We refer to Kim
(2001) for a more detailed discussion on this and the references to the relevant literature.
Accordingly, the key to understanding the international transmission of monetary
policy shocks is rst, to know whether the expenditure switching or income absorption
e¤ect is dominant in dening the nal reaction of the trade balance and foreign GDP, and
second, to know which are the main determinants of these e¤ects. The strength of the
expenditure switching e¤ect will depend on the exchange rate reaction, the pass-through
of exchange rates to import prices and the elasticity of substitution between domestic and
foreign goods, i.e., the trade elasticity. On the other hand, the income absorption e¤ect
is a function of the domestic demand response and the reaction in foreign interest rates.
Moreover, the importance of the expenditure switching vs. income absorption ef-
fect might change over time for the reason that the trade elasticity, the exchange rate
pass-through or other determining factors are subject to time variation1. Betts and De-
vereux (2000) for example demonstrate that lower exchange rate pass-through reduces
the expenditure switching role of exchange rate changes, and there is evidence that this
pass-through is subject to time variation. Hjortsoe et al. (2016) show that the impact of
monetary policy shocks on the current account depends on the degree of economic reg-
ulation in di¤erent markets which changes over time. Time variation in the importance
of the expenditure switching vs. the income absorption e¤ect will be reected in time
variation in the international spillovers and spillbacks of monetary policy shocks.
In this study, we rst document some stylized facts on the empirical e¤ects of a U.S.
monetary policy tightening on the trade balance, allowing these to change over time.
After that, based on the empirical estimates, we determine the key parameters that drive
1 On time variation in the exchange rate pass-through to import prices, see for example Campa and Goldberg
(2005), Marazzi et al. (2005) and Forbes (2016) and the references herein.
115
CHAPTER 4. TIME VARIATION IN U.S. MONETARY POLICY SPILLOVERS
international trade spillovers and as such, get informed about the direction and magnitude
of the spillovers and spillbacks of U.S. monetary policy. In all of this  due to the
methodological setup we will mainly focus on spillovers and spillbacks via the trade
channel.
This study is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the econometric model and
the adopted identication approach. Section 4.3 provides an interpretation of the em-
pirical results and time-varying international spillovers of monetary policy. Section 4.4
outlines the theoretical model and its parameterization. Section 4.5 presents the estima-
tion approach and the priors used for the estimation of the dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model. Section 4.6 presents the DSGE model estimation results.
Section 4.7 reports and explains the counterfactual results. Section 4.8 concludes.
4.2 Empirical Model
To evaluate how U.S. monetary policy shocks are transmitted globally and whether this
transmission changes over time, we estimate the time-varying e¤ects of a U.S. monetary
policy shock on the U.S. trade balance and the U.S. real e¤ective exchange rate as key
indicators of international transmission.
4.2.1 Bayesian Time-Varying Parameter VAR Model
More specically, we estimate a ve-variable Bayesian time-varying parameter vector
autoregression model (TVP-BVAR) with stochastic volatility in the spirit of Primiceri
(2005). Similar to Corsetti et al. (2008b), all data is constructed as U.S. data relative
to a foreign economy, with the latter constructed as a weighted average of ve countries:
Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom. The endogenous variables
are relative GDP, relative CPI, relative interest rate, the U.S. trade balance (as percent-
age of GDP), and the U.S. dollar real e¤ective exchange rate. All data is at quarterly
frequency covering the sample period from 1960Q1 to 2013Q3, of which the rst ten years
are used as a training sample. GDP has been detrended, and all variables enter the model
in log levels. Further details on the data sources and construction of the relative variables
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can be found in the Appendix C.1. The reduced form representation of the model is as
follows:
yt = ct +B1;tyt 1 + :::+Bp;tyt p + ut  X 0tt + ut (4.1)
where yt is a vector of observed endogenous variables. The time-varying intercepts ct,
the time-varying coe¢ cients Bp;tyt p are stored in t, and the lags of yt are collected in
Xt. Given that we have ve endogenous variables, the TVP-BVAR model is estimated
using one lag (p = 1). The term ut is the heteroscedastic reduced-form innovation that
is postulated to be normally distributed with zero mean and a time-varying variance-
covariance matrix 
t, which can be decomposed according to the following equation:

t = A
 1
t Ht
 
A 1t
0
(4.2)
The lower triangular matrix At models the contemporaneous interactions between the
endogenous variables, while the diagonal matrix Ht contains the stochastic volatilities
that capture variations in the size of structural shocks. These are dened as follows:
At 
266666666664
1 0 0 0 0
21;t 1 0 0 0
31;t 32;t 1 0 0
41;t 42;t 43;t 1 0
51;t 52;t 53;t 54;t 1
377777777775
; Ht 
266666666664
h1;t 0 0 0 0
0 h2;t 0 0 0
0 0 h3;t 0 0
0 0 0 h4;t 0
0 0 0 0 h5;t
377777777775
(4.3)
As in Primiceri (2005), we assume t  [21;t; : : : ; 54;t]0 to be the elements of the
matrix At, and it is modelled as a driftless random walk according to:
t = t 1 + t t  N(0; S) (4.4)
The vector of volatilities ht  [h1;t; h2;t; h3;t; h4;t; h5;t]0 contains the diagonal elements
of Ht, which are postulated to evolve as geometric random walks independent of each
other:
lnhi;t = lnhi;t 1 + ii;t i;t  N(0; 1) (4.5)
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As in Cogley and Sargent (2005) and Primiceri (2005), the time-varying parameters
t are assumed to change according to:
p(tjt 1; Q) = I(t)f(tjt 1; Q) (4.6)
with I(t) being an indicator function that rejects unstable draws, thus imposing station-
arity to the model. More specically, if the roots are inside the unit circle, then I(t) = 0
and the draw is accepted. Otherwise, the draw is discarded. The term f(tjt 1; Q) is
given by:
t = t 1 + t t  N(0; Q) (4.7)
which evolves as a driftless random walk. As in Primiceri (2005), the block-diagonal
structure for S is dened to have the following form:
S  V ar ( t) =
26666664
S1 012 013 014
021 S2 023 024
031 032 S3 034
041 042 043 S4
37777775 (4.8)
with S1  V ar(21;t); S2  V ar([31;t; 32;t]0); S3  V ar([41;t; 42;t; 43;t]0) and S4 
V ar([51;t; 52;t; 53;t; 54;t]
0). This denition implies that di¤erent rows of the matrix At
evolve independently of each other. This structure allows for correlation of endogenous
variables within equations, but assumes that the variables across equations are uncorre-
lated. The equations above are estimated using Bayesian methods (Markov Chain Monte
Carlo estimation algorithm) as outlined in Kim and Nelson (1999).
The priors for the initial states of the time-varying coe¢ cients (p(t)), the covariances
(p(t)), and the log volatilities (p(lnh0)) are assumed to be normally distributed, indepen-
dent of each other and independent of the hyperparameters, which are the elements of Q,
S and 2i for i = f1; : : : ; 5g. Particularly, the priors are calibrated on the point estimates
of a xed-coe¢ cient VAR model estimated over the training sample period from 1960Q1
to 1970Q1.
The posterior distribution is simulated by sequentially drawing from the conditional
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posterior of four blocks of parameters: the coe¢ cients (T ), the simultaneous relations
(AT ), the variances (HT ), and the hyperparameters the elements of Q, S and 2i for
i = f1; : : : ; 5g, which are collectively referred to as M . The superscript T refers to the
entire sample. Posteriors for each block of the Gibbs sampler are conditional on the
observed data (Y T ). Further details of the implementation and MCMC algorithm can
be found in Primiceri (2005), Benati and Mumtaz (2007) and Baumeister and Peersman
(2013). In total, we perform 100,000 iterations of the Bayesian Gibbs sampler, but keep
only every 10th draw in order to mitigate the autocorrelation among the draws. After a
burn-in period of 50,000 iterations, the sequence of draws from the conditional posteriors
of the four blocks form a sample from the joint posterior distribution p(T ; AT ; HT ;M jY T ).
In total, we collect 2,000 simulated values from the Gibbs chain on which the structural
analysis is based.
4.2.2 Identication Approach
Since the objective of this study is to uncover the international transmission of a U.S.
specic monetary policy shock, the empirical model is specied in relative variables (the
U.S. minus a foreign aggregate) which should help in better identifying a U.S. specic
shock. This choice also leads to a more parsimonious setup which is desirable in TVP-
BVAR models.
The U.S. monetary policy shock is identied using sign restrictions, which has a number
of advantages compared to other identication schemes since it is consistent with the
ndings of micro-founded structural models, and the sign restriction method is relatively
agnostic and less restrictive compared to other identication approaches, see for example
Peersman and Straub (2009) and Baumeister and Hamilton (2015). In line with Mumtaz
and Sunder-Plassmann (2013) among others, we assume that a contractionary monetary
policy shock increases the interest rate di¤erence, decreases relative output and relative
prices and causes an appreciation of the U.S. dollar real e¤ective exchange rate. The sign
restrictions are implemented as weak inequality signs and are only imposed on impact.
As this is our most important spillover variable of interest, the U.S. trade balance is left
unrestricted. The sign restrictions are summarized in table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Sign Restriction Identication of the TVP-BVAR
Relative Relative Di¤erence Trade Real
Output Prices Interest Rate Balance Exchange Rate
Restrictive Monetary
Policy Shock  0  0  0 unrestricted  0
Note: An increase in the exchange rate is an appreciation. Relative variables are dened as the U.S.
minus a foreign aggregate.
4.3 Empirical Results
4.3.1 Time-Varying Impulse Responses
Figure 4.1 shows the estimated time-varying impact responses on impact following a re-
strictive U.S. monetary policy shock that is normalized to increase the annualized interest
rate di¤erence with 10 basis points (b.p.) on impact.
As imposed by the sign restrictions, a restrictive U.S. monetary policy shock increases
the interest rate di¤erence, lowers relative CPI and GDP and leads to an appreciation of
the U.S. dollar. On average, the impact e¤ect of a U.S. monetary policy tightening on the
domestic trade balance tends to be negative, although there are noticeable exceptions.
Interestingly, this average negative impact implies that most of the time, a U.S. monetary
policy tightening generates positive trade spillovers to the foreign economy as the domes-
tic trade balance deteriorates due to the U.S. dollar appreciation which makes imports
cheaper and exports more expensive, i.e., the expenditure switching e¤ect dominates.
These results are in line with Lee and Chinn (2006) for example. However, it is clear that
this is only true on average. Figure 4.1 shows that there is substantial time variation in
the e¤ects of U.S. monetary policy, particularly on the trade balance, which might have
important implications for the international transmission of U.S. monetary policy. First,
looking beyond shorter-run changes2, the impact of a monetary policy shock on the U.S.
dollar exchange rate has substantially grown over time. Similar time-varying exchange
2 As GDP and CPI are expressed in relative terms (U.S. relative to a foreign aggregate), the time variation
found in these responses is di¢ cult to interpret as it could come from variation in the U.S. response, foreign
response or in both.
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Figure 4.1: Time-Varying E¤ects of a Normalized U.S. Monetary Policy Shock Tightening
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Note: The responses are the impact responses following a normalized 10 b.p. impact increase in the
annualized interest rate di¤erence. The units are in percentage points. The relative variables are dened
as the U.S. minus the foreign economy. An increase in the real e¤ective exchange rate is an appreciation
of the U.S. dollar.
rate dynamics are found in Mumtaz and Sunder-Plassmann (2013) following a monetary
policy shock in Canada, the euro area and the U.K.. Also, the e¤ect on the U.S. trade
balance has become slightly more negative over time amid substantial short-run varia-
tion indicating that the expenditure switching e¤ect might have gradually increased in
importance over time.
Second and perhaps more importantly, there is considerable shorter-run time variation
in the e¤ects of a U.S. monetary policy tightening. This applies in particular to the
e¤ects on the trade balance. Remarkably, during various periods over the past decades,
the sign of the U.S. trade balance response switched from being negative to positive.
During these times, the income absorption e¤ect seems to dominate the expenditure
switching e¤ect as the domestic trade balance increases despite the appreciation of the
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U.S. dollar. In turn, this should cause the trade spillovers to the foreign economy to
become negative, as the foreign trade balance worsens rather than improves after a U.S.
monetary policy tightening. Liu et al. (2011) have documented similar dynamics for the
U.K. economy by showing that the spillovers of a global monetary contraction to U.K.
real activity (being the foreign economy) switched over time from being positive and
signicant (consistent with expenditure switching e¤ect) to negative and insignicant
(consistent with the income absorption e¤ect).
Importantly, most of the literature estimating the e¤ects of U.S. monetary policy
on the trade balance and/or foreign GDP has been using constant parameter structural
VARmodels, not taking into account that the e¤ects might change over time3. Our results
imply that their ndings might average out signicant changes in spillovers dynamics. Kim
(2001), for example, shows that a U.S. monetary policy tightening causes the U.S. trade
balance rst to improve4 (dominance income absorption e¤ect) before it worsens after
about one year (dominance expenditure switching e¤ect) using data over the period 1974
1996. Interestingly, our time-varying estimates show that over that period although
a similar result might be found on average the ndings of Kim (2001) are likely to be
biased by the trade balance reaction in the middle part of the sample used (1981 1992).
In the years before and after that, we nd that the impact reaction of the trade balance
had the opposite sign. See gures 4.1 and 4.2. The latter illustrates the non-normalized
impulse responses following a one standard deviation shock over the full impulse response
horizon of 50 quarters.
4.3.2 Time-Varying Spillovers and U.S. Recessions
Looking more closely at the periods in which the switch in sign of the trade balance occurs,
it is noticeable that these tend to coincide with U.S. recessions. The bottom right chart in
gure 4.1 plots the estimated time-varying e¤ects of the U.S. trade balance together with
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) recessions and demonstrates that when
3 For further details, see Kim (2001), Canova 2005, Mackowiak (2007), Bluedorn and Bowdler (2011), and
Georgiadis (2016).
4 Kim (2001) estimates the e¤ects following a monetary policy expansion, but as the VAR framework used is
linear, the results also apply to a monetary policy tightening which is looked at in this paper.
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Figure 4.2: Time-Varying E¤ects of One Std. Dev. U.S. Monetary Policy Tightening
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Note: The charts show the estimated impulse responses following a one standard deviation increase in
the relative interest rate for every quarter over the period 1970Q1  2013Q3. The relative variables
are dened as the U.S. minus the foreign economy. An increase in the real e¤ective exchange rate is an
appreciation of the U.S. dollar. Units are in percentage points, the horizon is in quarters, and all variables
are in quarterly terms except for the interest rate which is annualized.
the U.S. economy was in a recession, a U.S. monetary policy tightening (expansion) was
mostly associated with an increase (decline) in the U.S. trade balance and hence unfa-
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vorable (favorable) international trade spillovers. The exceptions are the 1970s recessions
such as the 1973 1975 one which was partially linked to the collapse of Bretton Woods,
and which we will exclude from our analysis given the specic international monetary
conditions of that time.
To illustrate this link more clearly, table 4.2 shows the estimated average impact of a
10 basis point monetary policy tightening on the trade balance and the U.S. dollar real
e¤ective exchange rate during NBER recessions and compares these to the impact three
years before the onset of the recession. In line with above, it is remarkable that when
entering a recession, the average trade balance e¤ect switches sign from being negative
to positive (from -0.009 to 0.012 on average over the NBER recessions) following a U.S.
monetary policy tightening. More generally said, in each of the recessions, a restrictive
monetary policy shock was associated with a trade balance e¤ect that was more favorable
for the U.S. economy compared to the years before, and less favorable for the foreign
economy. Reversely, as the model is linear, a monetary policy expansion during recessions
lead to a trade balance e¤ect that was less favorable for the U.S. economy compared to
the time before the economic downturn and more favorable for the foreign economy. Also,
during these recessions, the impact of a U.S. monetary policy tightening on the U.S. real
e¤ective exchange rate was typically stronger5 (increasing from 1.04 to 1.17 on average
over the NBER recessions). We will explain why this is the case in the next section.
4.4 Theoretical Model
The time-varying VAR framework is silent about the causes of time variation in the e¤ects.
For that reason, following the approach of Hofmann et al. (2012), we use the time-varying
impulse response functions to estimate a two-country open economy dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) model using minimum distance estimation at selected points
in time. In this, we focus on the di¤erences between recessions (bad) and normal (good)
times. Estimation of the DSGE model at di¤erent points in time will generate time-
5 This pattern is also found when looking at a xed horizon of the impulse response functions after the shock
(e.g., on impact and after 4, 8 and 12 quarters) instead of the maximum responses, and when looking at a
di¤erent period before the onset of the recessions.
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Table 4.2: Trade Balance and U.S. Exchange Rate E¤ects during and prior to Recessions
U.S. Trade Balance U.S. Real E¤ective
(as % of GDP) Exchange Rate
NBER Recession: 1981Q1 1982Q4 -0.010 0.39
3 years prior -0.013 0.50
NBER Recession: 1990Q3 1991Q1 0.013 0.93
3 years prior 0.004 0.81
NBER Recession: 2001Q1 2001Q4 0.004 1.46
3 years prior -0.018 1.20
NBER Recession: 2007Q4 2009Q2 0.039 1.91
3 years prior -0.008 1.66
Average NBER recessions 0.012 1.17
Average 3 years prior -0.009 1.04
Note: The impact is calculated as the maximum estimated median impact over a horizon of 29 quarters
following a normalized 10 b.p. impact increase in the annualized relative interest rate (the U.S. minus
foreign) using the TVP-BVAR. The impact is calculated as an average over the indicated period, with 3
years taken as the 12 quarters before the onset of the recession. The recession over the period 1981Q1 
1980Q3 and 1981Q3 1982Q4 are grouped together given the little time in between.
varying estimates of structural model spillover parameters that will inform us on why the
international transmission of U.S. monetary policy changes over time.
4.4.1 Two-Country New Keynesian DSGE Model
In this section, we briey outline the quantitative business cycle model which is used to
estimate the structural parameters and generate the counterfactuals. The model is a two-
country New Keynesian DSGE model with capital and sticky prices, frequently employed
in previous studies including Chari et al. (2002) and Enders et al. (2011), to which we
add incomplete exchange rate pass-through to import prices. The world economy consists
of two symmetric economies, and we index the intermediate good rms in both home and
foreign countries by j 2 [0; 1].
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4.4.1.1 Households
In the home country, a representative household allocates consumption expenditures on
nal goods, Ct, and supplies labour, Nt, to monopolistic rms given the following prefer-
ences:
Et
1X
t=0
t

Ct (1 Nt)1 
1 
1   ;  < 1; 0 = 1;
t+1 =
 
1 +  

Ct (1 Nt)1 
 1
; t  0: (4.9)
i;t is an endogenous discount factor such that discounting is higher if average consumption
and leisure are above their steady state values6. The parameter  determines the elasticity
of the discount factor to the level of consumption and leisure, and it also pins down the
discount factor value in the steady state. We assume that the representative household
does not internalize the e¤ect of consumption and labor on the discount factor. The
parameter  measures the degree of risk aversion, and the parameter  measures the
weight of consumption in the utility function relative to leisure.
We assume that labour and capital are internationally immobile. Households in the
home country own the domestic capital stock denoted by Kt =
R 1
0
Kt(j)dj, and rent it to
intermediate good rms. We assume that it is costly to adjust the level of investment, It,
as in Christiano et al. (2005). The law of motion for capital is therefore given by
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + [1 G(It=It 1)]It (4.10)
where  measures the depreciation rate. By restricting G(1) = G0(1) = 0 and G00(1) =
 > 0, we impose that capital stock at the steady state is independent of investment
adjustment cost, which is captured by the parameter . We assume complete nancial
markets which implies that only nominal non-contingent bonds, Bt, denominated in lo-
cal currency, are traded across countries. The budget constraint of the representative
6 See Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) for a detailed examination of this setup.
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household in nominal terms reads as follows:
Wt +R
K
t Kt +t   PtCt   PtIt =
Bt+1
1 +Rt
 Bt (4.11)
where Wt and RKt denotes the nominal wage rate and the rental rate of capital, respec-
tively. Rt is the gross nominal interest rate denominated in domestic currency. Pt is the
price of nal good, and t are claims on nominal prots earned by rms and transferred
to households.
4.4.1.2 Final Good Firms
In the home country, there is a continuum of rms that produce di¤erentiated intermediate
goods YH;t(j). These producers of the composite good YH;t =
R 1
0
YH;t(j)
" 1
" dj are subject
to perfect competition and buy intermediate goods from the continuum of monopolistic
competitive rms indexed by j. The composite goods are assembled using domestic and
foreign tradable goods, denoted YF;t =
R 1
0
YF;t(j)
" 1
" dj, to a nal good that is used for
private consumption, and private investment. The nal goods are produced using the
following technology:
Yt =
"
!
Z 1
0
YH;t(j)
" 1
" dj
 1

+ (1  !)
Z 1
0
YF;t(j)
" 1
" dj
 1

# 
 1
(4.12)
where  denoted the elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic goods (also
referred as trade elasticity), " measures the elasticity between the goods produced by
each rm within the same country. The parameter ! > 0:5 measures the home bias in
the composition of nal goods for private consumption, and investment. Let PH;t(j) be
the price of an intermediate tradable good j produced in the home country. The price
index of the nal good Pt is given by:
Pt =

!P 1 H;t + (1  !)P 1 F;t
 1
1  (4.13)
where
PH;t =
Z 1
0
YH;t(j)
1 "dj
 1
1 "
(4.14)
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and
PF;t =
Z 1
0
YF;t(j)
1 "dj
 1
1 "
(4.15)
denote the price indices of intermediate goods PH;t (j) and PF;t (j), respectively. The
nal good rmsproblem in the home country is to minimize expenditures in assembling
intermediate goods subject to their production function and the constraint that Yt = Ct+
It. The resulting rst order condition denes the total demand for a generic intermediate
good as follows:
YH;t = !

PH;t
Pt
 
Yt (4.16)
YF;t = (1  !)

PF;t
Pt
 
Yt (4.17)
The total demand for a generic good j produced in the home country is given by
YH;t (j) =

PH;t (j)
PH;t
 " 
YH;t + Y

H;t

(4.18)
The real exchange rate of the home country is dened as
Qt =

StP

t
Pt

(4.19)
such that an increase corresponds to depreciation, and where St is the nominal exchange
rate. The terms of trade is dened as the price of imports relative to the price of exports:
ToTt =
PH;t
PF;t
(4.20)
To conclude, the ratio of trade balance as share of output is dened as
NXt =
PH;tY

H;T   PF;tYF;t
PH;tYH;t
(4.21)
4.4.1.3 Intermediate Good Firms
Intermediate good rms specialize in the production of di¤erentiated goods. A generic
rm j in the home country operates under monopolistic competition facing imperfectly-
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elastic demand from domestic and foreign nal goods producers. The Intermediate good
rmsproduction function is determined by the following Cobb-Douglas technology:
YH;t(j) = AtKt(j)
Nt(j)
1  (4.22)
where At denotes the level of technology common to all rms, which follows the log-linear
exogenous process below
At = AAt 1 + "A;t (4.23)
where A captures the degree of autocorrelation and "A;t is the total factor productivity
shock at period t.
Labour and capital inputs are assumed to adjust freely in each period, but prices are
assumed to be sticky. Price setting is constraint exogenously by a discrete time version
of the mechanism suggested by Calvo (1983). Each rm has the opportunity to change
its price with a given probability 1   . When a rm has the opportunity to update its
price, it sets the new price in order to maximize the expected discounted value of net
prots, otherwise prices are indexed to past ination. In setting the new prices PH;t(j),
the problem of a domestic generic intermediate good rm j is given by
max
1X
k=0
kEtFt;t+kt+k (j) (4.24)
where t (j) = PH;t (j)YH;t (j) MCtYH;t (j) are period t nominal prot andMCt is the
marginal cost given the optimal choice of factor inputs. In this setup, we assume that
demand is met by actual production at all times. As rms are owned by households, we
have that Ft;t+k =
t+kUC(Ct+k;Nt+k)
tUC(Ct;Nt)
. Firms maximize the discounted value of prots given
the production function.
4.4.1.4 Importers
In this section, we outline the optimization problem of the representative local importer,
which buys intermediate foreign goods under the assumption that the law of one price
holds at the dock, which implies that exchange rate pass-through to import prices is com-
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plete. Following Monacelli (2005), incomplete exchange rate pass-through is implemented
in our model setup using staggered pricing à la Calvo (1983) for the imported goods.
This generates deviations from the law of one price in the short run, while complete pass-
through is achieved on the long-run. We consider a local importer buying good j at the
dock :
PF;t(j) = StP

F;t(j); PH;t(j) = StP

H;t(j) (4.25)
Similar to domestic intermediate good rms, the local importer chooses a price P IMH;t (j),
expressed in units of domestic currency, to maximize:
Et
1X
k=0
IMt+k

P IMH;t (j)  StP F;t+k(j)

IMH;t+k)(j) (4.26)
subject to the demand faced by each single importer, dened as
IMH;t =

PIM;t(j)
PIM;t
 "IM
IMt (4.27)
where P F;t(j) is the price of the imported intermediate goods at the dock, the parameter
"IM is the elasticity of substitution between di¤erent types of imported goods, 
IM is the
Calvo parameter, and t is the relevant stochastic discount factor. The resulting log-linear
aggregate imports price at home country evolves according to:
pF;t  pIM;t = IM (pIM;t 1   t 1) +
 
1  IM ~pIM;t (4.28)
where ~pIM;t is the optimal updated price of the imported goods in the home country. The
Calvo parameter for imported goods, IM , can be interpreted as the degree of exchange
rate pass-through in the model. As IM ! 0, import prices become perfectly exible and
exchange rate pass-through becomes complete. Conversely, values of IM ! 1 suggest the
case of incomplete exchange rate pass-through.
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4.4.1.5 Monetary Authorities
The monetary policy is characterized by a standard Taylor-type interest rate rule specied
in terms of domestic consumer price ination and output growth,
Rt = RRt 1 + (1  R)



Pt
Pt 1

+ Y

Yt
Yt 1

+ "R;tMP;t (4.29)
where R denotes the interest rate smoothing parameter, while  and Y measure the
long-run ination and output growth responses, while the term "R;t represents a serially in-
dependently and identically distributed exogenous monetary policy innovation, and MP;t
denotes the shock size. The foreign economy has an analogous representation. Thus, for-
eign country consumers choose consumption, capital, and hours worked in similar fashion
as in home economy. The foreign nal good rms utilize the same production function
and adjust prices in the same way as described previously.
4.4.1.6 Equilibrium
Given the shock process and initial conditions for the state variables, the equilibrium is a
set of prices and quantities for all t  0 such that: (i) households maximize utility subject
to the capital accumulation equation and to the budget constraint, (ii) intermediate good
rms maximize prot subject by its demand function, and (iii) all markets clear - asset
market clears by Walras law. To solve the model, we derive the rst order conditions
of households and rms, determine conditions for the steady state of the model and
then linearize the rst order conditions around the steady state. The resulting system of
expectational di¤erence equations is solved numerically as discussed in Klein (2000). An
equilibrium of the economy is a sequence of prices and quantities such that given initial
conditions for the state variables and the appropriate transversality conditions as well as
an exogenous process are satised.
4.4.2 Parameterization
We parameterize the DSGE model using quarterly U.S. data for the period 1970Q1 to
2013Q4, and the baseline parameterized parameters are reported in table 4.3. We use
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parameters at values that are commonly found in the business cycle literature. The
annual real interest rate is set at 6%, which gives a quarterly subjective discount factor
() of 0.985. The home bias (!) is calculated at 0.9 to match the historical import
to output shares of 10% in the U.S. relative to the foreign economy. The parameters
 = 0:34 and  = 2 are the weight of leisure in the utility function and degree of risk
aversion, respectively. These parameters jointly determine the Frisch elasticity and the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. On the supply side, the elasticity of substitution
between di¤erent types of intermediate goods (") is set at 6 so that there is a 20% price
markup over marginal costs for intermediate goods rms in the steady state. We set the
capital share in the economy () at 0.36 in the steady state. It is assumed that the annual
capital depreciation rate is 10%, so the quarterly depreciation rate () is set at 0.025. The
investment adjustment cost parameter () is set to 3.
Table 4.3: Parameterization
Structural Parameter Values Value
 Discount Factor (Steady State) 0.985
! Home Bias in Final Goods 0.9
 Leisure Weight in Utility Function 0.34
 Degree of Risk Aversion 2
" Elasticity of Substitution of Intermediate Goods 6
 Investment Adjustment Costs 3
 Quarterly Depreciation Rate 0.025
 Capital Share (Steady State) 0.36
We parameterize both the domestic and foreign economies using the same values and
it is assumed that the size of the home and foreign economy is the same.
4.5 Bayesian Estimation of DSGE Model
We estimate the main structural spillover parameters of the two-country New Keynesian
DSGE model using Bayesian minimum distance techniques. The advantage of this esti-
mation method compared with full information maximum likelihood estimators of DSGE
models is based on its transparency and its focus. The transparency reects that the
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estimation strategy has a simple graphical representation, impulse response functions,
thus very intuitive. The other advantage of this estimation approach lies on its ability
to evaluate the empirical properties of a model without having to specify a full set of
shocks. This estimation approach has been used in many studies, including Christiano et
al. (2005), Iacoviello (2005), Christiano et al. (2010), Hofmann et al. (2012), Christiano
et al. (2013), Kormilitsina and Nekipelov (2013), and Guerron-Quintana et al. (2017).
4.5.1 Minimum Distance Estimation
We follow the Bayesian estimation approach of Hofmann et al. (2012). Their approach
consists in minimizing the distance between the impulse response functions as generated
by the TVP-BVAR and the DSGE model following a U.S. monetary policy shock, and it
di¤ers from Christiano et al. (2010) mainly in relation to the way the empirical model is
estimated and identied. In this study, the empirical impulse response functions are gen-
erated using Bayesian methods and identication is achieved using sign restrictions. Con-
sequently, there is no point estimate in which the minimum distance estimation method
can be examined. Following Hofmann et al. (2012), we estimate the posterior mode of
the structural parameters for each of the 500 impulse response functions that meet the
imposed sign restrictions in the TVP-BVAR, as summarized in table 4.1, and then cal-
culate the corresponding distribution of the posterior modes for each of the structural
parameters.
We choose to focus on estimating the key structural spillover parameters of the DSGE
model; the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods, i.e., the trade
elasticity (), the exchange rate pass-through parameter to import prices
 
IM

, the
domestic price stickiness () and the parameters of the Taylor rule, i.e., the interest rate
smoothing coe¢ cient (R), the output (Y ) and ination () stabilization coe¢ cient and
the size of the monetary policy shock (MP ). As we identify the monetary policy shock
in the TVP-BVAR model using relative variables, we impose symmetry on the estimated
parameters across the two economies in the model.
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4.5.2 Priors
The imposed priors are given in table 4.9. The prior mean and density distribution for
the Taylor rule, price stickiness and exchange rate pass-through parameters mainly follow
Smets and Wouters (2007), Adolfson et al. (2007) and Justiniano and Primiceri (2008),
but generally with looser priors to allow for su¢ cient dynamics in the parameters over
time. For the trade elasticity, we follow Christo¤el et al. (2008), again with a very loose
prior.
Table 4.4: Prior Distributions of the Estimated Parameters
Parameter Density Mean Standard Deviation
 Trade Elasticity Gamma 2.00 0.75
IM Exchange Rate Pass-Through Beta 0.70 0.10
 Domestic Price Stickiness Beta 0.80 0.10
R Taylor Rule: Interest Rate Smoothing Beta 0.80 0.15
 Taylor Rule: Ination Normal 1.50 0.25
Y Taylor Rule: Output Normal 0.40 0.05
MP Size Monetary Policy Shock Inverted Gamma 1.00 2.00
Although it is possible to estimate the structural parameters for each quarter in our
sample running from 1970Q1 2013Q3, we focus the DSGE estimation on selected points
in time: the rst quarter of 1982, 1991, 1999, 2005 and 2009. This choice is motivated by
the empirical estimates of the trade balance e¤ect following a monetary policy shock. In
the years 1982, 1991 and 2009 (referred to as the bad times), the U.S. was in a recession,
and there was a clear positive impact e¤ect on the U.S. trade balance of a U.S. monetary
policy tightening7, see gure 4.1. In 1999 and 2005 (referred to as the good times), on the
other hand, the estimated impact was signicantly negative. As such, we choose to focus
on those time periods that provide us with a clear di¤erence in the e¤ects in which we
are mostly interested in. Nevertheless, the main conclusions also hold when estimating
the DSGE model over all quarters in our sample as we show later on.
Concerning the DSGE estimation, the Bayesian minimum distance estimator consists
7 During the U.S. recession of 2001, the trade balance e¤ect of a U.S. monetary tightening became smaller in
absolute magnitude compared to the years before (see table 4.2) but was still negative on impact. In order
to make a more clear distinction between good and bad times, we therefore choose to focus on estimating the
other recession periods in which also the median impact e¤ect on the trade balance was positive.
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of two steps; a TVP-BVAR impulse response step and an impulse response matching step,
described as follows:
4.5.2.1 TVP-BVAR Impulse Responses
For each time period, the estimated impulse response functions are stacked into a vector
 ^, which corresponds to the number of estimated impulse responses; 20 impulse response
horizons times 5 variables for each of the draws so that the vector  ^ has 100 elements.
According to the standard asymptotic theory, when the number of observations, T , is
large, we then have
p
T

 ^    (0)

 N (0;W (0; 0)) (4.30)
where 0 represents the true values of the parameters which are estimated, while 0 denotes
the true values of the parameters of the shocks that are in the model.
As a result, the asymptotic distribution of can be written in the following form:
 ^  N ( (0) ; V (0; 0; T )) (4.31)
where
V (0; 0; T ) 
W (0; 0)
T
(4.32)
4.5.2.2 Impulse Response Matching
In the second step,  ^ is treated as data and the value of  is chosen so to minimize the
distance between  (0) and  ^. Thus, we dene the approximate likelihood of the data,
 ^, is dened as function of :
f

 ^j; V (0; 0; T )

=

1
2
N
2
jV (0; 0; T )j 
1
2 
exp

 1
2

 ^    (0)
0
V (0; 0; T )
 1

 ^    (0)

(4.33)
where V (0; 0; T ) is treated as a known object and N is the number of elements in
 . Thus, the value of  that maximizes the equation above represents an approximate
maximum likelihood estimator of .
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Dening the function f as the likelihood of  ^, it follows that the Bayesian posterior
of  conditional on  ^ and V (0; 0; T ) can be written as:
f

j ^; V (0; 0; T )

=
f

 ^j; V (0; 0; T )

p ()
f

 ^jV (0; 0; T )
 (4.34)
where p () denotes the priors on  and f

 ^jV (0; 0; T )

denotes the marginal density
of  ^. As standard practice, the mode of the posterior distribution of  can be computed
by simply maximizing the value of the numerator, since the denominator is not a function
of .
A vital component of the adopted methodology is the weight matrix V (0; 0; T )
which depends on the second moments of the conditional impulse response function in
each period. In other words, the wider the posterior distribution of the empirical impulse
responses at a point in time, the less weight is given to the corresponding observation.
There is a relatively good matching between the two-country DSGE model and the
empirical TVP-BVAR impulse response functions. The results of the minimum distance
estimation are given in gure 4.6. First and most importantly, the estimated DSGE
model manages to capture the shift in the sign of the trade balance between the good and
the bad times. Second, the DSGE also matches the relative GDP, CPI and interest rate
responses well. Another way to see this is to look at the close correspondence between the
estimated responses of the DSGE and the TVP-BVAR as shown in gure 4.7. One aspect
the DSGE model does not succeed in capturing well is the substantial strengthening of
the real e¤ective exchange rate response found in the empirical setup (see bottom chart
in gure 4.7), which is consistent with the well known challenge of matching empirically
observed exchange rate dynamics in DSGEmodels8. For that reason, we will avoid making
inferences concerning the real exchange rate behavior over longer periods of time within
the DSGE framework in this study.
However, importantly, the DSGE model does capture the empirical nding that when
entering a recession, the response of the U.S. real e¤ective exchange rate tends to be
8 See Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2008a).
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stronger than in the years before (cfr. table 4.2) and the trade balance e¤ect shifts sign
(see gure 4.7). In other words, although the estimated structural parameters of the
DSGE will not be very helpful in explaining why we nd that the response of the U.S.
real exchange rate following a U.S. monetary policy shock strengthened over time more
generally, they will be useful for understanding why in recessions, exchange rate volatility
tends to be higher and the trade balance e¤ect switches sign and this is the focus of
this study.
4.6 Estimation Results
Estimating the two-country DSGE model provides us with time-varying estimates of the
key spillover parameters. These estimates, which should give us insight on why the
international transmission of U.S. monetary policy changes over time, are shown in gure
4.3. The priors and the estimated posteriors for the selected years can be found in table
4.9. In general, the posterior means of the estimated structural parameters are largely
in line with the estimates found in the literature9. See Justiniano and Primiceri (2008),
Adolfson et al. (2007), and Lama and Rabanal (2014)
First, focusing on the broader trends over time10, the trade elasticity parameter has
increased over time in line with increased global trade. A higher substitution between
domestic and foreign goods as captured by this parameter might be one reason why the
e¤ect of a U.S. monetary policy tightening on the trade balance is found to have become
slightly more negative when looking beyond shorter-term uctuations, see gure 4.1. A
higher trade elasticity stimulates the expenditure switching e¤ect which eventually should
lead to more favorable foreign GDP spillovers of a U.S. monetary policy tightening via
trade. The exchange rate pass-through parameter is estimated to have slightly declined
over time, meaning that the pass-through of exchange rate changes to import prices
has slightly increased. This might also support the strengthening of the expenditure
9 The output growth response in the Taylor rule mean prior estimate is relatively high compared to values
normally found in the literature. For example, Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) estimated this parameter at
0.17 and 0.30 in the pre and post-Volcker periods, respectively, while Bilbiie and Straub (2013) found this
parameter to range from 0.40 in the pre-Volcker period to 0.33 after 1984.
10 As we do not capture the increase in the e¤ect on the U.S. real e¤ective exchange rate over time, as detailed
in the previous subsection, these results over the longer time period should be treated with some caution.
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switching e¤ect over time, although the broader change in the estimated parameter is
not very signicant in line with Campa and Goldberg (2005). As is well known in the
literature, monetary policy has become more active in stabilizing the economy with a
higher estimated ination stabilization coe¢ cient and lower interest rate smoothing11. At
the same time, the size of the monetary policy shock has declined substantially. Finally,
we also nd that domestic prices have become more exible over time. These results
are also found when estimating the structural parameters for all quarters starting in the
1980s, see table 4.5, which shows the average median estimated parameters in the 1980s,
1990s and the 2000s.
Table 4.5: Median Estimated Structural Parameters (Broader Trends)
Structural Parameters 1980s 1990s 2000s
Trade Elasticity 0.50 1.61 1.93
Exchange Rate Pass-Through 0.80 0.69 0.68
Domestic Price Stickiness 0.91 0.88 0.80
Taylor Rule: Interest Rate Smoothing 0.88 0.84 0.80
Taylor Rule: Output 0.400 0.400 0.403
Taylor Rule: Ination 1.56 1.66 1.75
Taylor Rule: Shock Size 0.18 0.12 0.12
Note: The averages are based on the estimation of the DGSE model as outlined in section 4.5 for each
quarter over the period 1980Q1 2013Q3.
Second, focusing on the changes in the estimated structural parameters between good
and bad times, it is worth noting that the trade elasticity becomes smaller in recessions12
(see table 4.6 and gure 4.3). Intuitively, this implies that international trade responds
less to a U.S. monetary policy shock in times of an economic downturn which is consistent
with the collapse in international trade observed during the Global Financial Crisis, for
example. For details, see Levchenko et al. (2010) and Chor and Manova (2012). A lower
trade elasticity in recessions might reduce the strength of the expenditure switching e¤ect
11 See Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000), Cogley and Sargent (2002), Primiceri (2005), and Boivin and Giannoni
(2006).
12 Although the average estimated parameters in recessions vs. normal times  shown at the bottom of the
table 4.6 are biased by the broader time variation found in the estimated structural parameters over time
(such as a general increase in the trade elasticity parameter since the 1980s), we nd the same patterns when
focussing on smaller time intervals like 2005 compared to 2009.
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and make the spillovers of a U.S. monetary policy tightening to the foreign economy
less favorable  something that we will analyze in the next section. Interestingly, also
the exchange rate pass-through parameter is estimated to be higher during recessions,
meaning that exchange rate changes triggered by a monetary policy shock a¤ect import
prices less during economic downturns. Similar as with a lower trade elasticity, a lower
exchange rate pass-through could reduce the expenditure switching e¤ect and make the
international spillovers of a U.S. monetary policy tightening more adverse in recessions.
In contrast, there does not seem to be a strong change in the estimated domestic price
stickiness parameter, the Taylor rule parameters and the monetary policy shock size in
good vs. bad times. Again, similar patterns are found when looking at the structural
parameters that result from the DSGE estimation over all quarters in our sample starting
from the 1980s, see table 4.8.
Table 4.6: Median Estimated Parameters
Trade ERPT Calvo: Taylor Rule: Taylor Rule: Taylor Rule: Taylor Rule
Elasticty Domestic I.R. Smooth Output Ination Shock Size
1982 0.48 0.83 0.93 0.91 0.400 1.52 0.24
1991 0.47 0.72 0.87 0.87 0.401 1.63 0.13
1999 2.30 0.68 0.89 0.80 0.404 1.68 0.12
2005 2.10 0.64 0.84 0.82 0.402 1.71 0.12
2009 1.72 0.72 0.76 0.84 0.399 1.77 0.12
Recession 0.89 0.76 0.85 0.87 0.400 1.64 0.16
Normal 2.20 0.66 0.86 0.81 0.403 1.69 0.12
Note: In relation to nominal rigidities parameters: (i) a higher value of the exchange rate pass-through
parameter indicates a lower pass-through of exchange rate movements to import prices, and (ii) a lower
value for the domestic price stickiness indicates higher price exibility. These structural parameters
are estimated through minimum distance estimation using the structural TVP-BVAR impulse response
functions discussed in section 4.5.
4.7 Counterfactuals
Having the estimated posterior values of the structural parameters, we can now evaluate
within the DGSE framework: (i) what the e¤ects are of a U.S. monetary policy tightening
on the domestic and foreign economy, (ii) how these e¤ects change in recessions compared
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to normal times, and (iii) what the main determinants of this time variation are. In
the analysis below, we focus on comparing the estimates of 2005 with 2009, taken as
representative of good and bad times respectively. This relatively narrow time window
should minimize the possibility that the results are a¤ected by the fact that we do not
capture well the broader strengthening in the real e¤ective exchange rate over time (cfr.
the discussion in Section 4.5) which might bias the results when looking over longer time
periods. Also, as shown below, the U.S. monetary policy shock as reected in the interest
rate is identical in magnitude and shape in these two years which makes the results more
easily comparable.
4.7.1 Posterior Simulations
In contrast to the TVP-BVAR which is estimated on relative variables that are di¢ cult
to interpret the DGSE model allows us to better understand the spillovers and spillbacks
of a U.S. monetary policy shock based on simulating the e¤ects of these shocks at di¤erent
points in time, using the posterior estimates of the structural parameters together with
the baseline parameterization of the model. Figure 4.4 shows these simulated impulse
responses following a normalized increase in the U.S. quarterly interest rate of 10 b.p. on
impact triggered by a monetary policy shock using the posterior estimates of the structural
parameters as detailed in gure 4.3 for the years 2005 and 2009.
First, focusing on the year 2005 (good times), a U.S. monetary policy tightening leads
to a decline in domestic GDP and CPI and an appreciation of the U.S. dollar e¤ective
exchange rate. This appreciation causes the U.S. terms of trade to appreciate as import
prices are lower and export prices higher. Despite the U.S. dollar appreciation, U.S.
imports drop in the rst quarters after the monetary policy tightening. This implies
that the income absorption e¤ect dominates the expenditure switching e¤ect, as U.S.
imports fall due to a negative demand e¤ect triggered by higher U.S. interest rates (income
absorption e¤ect), rather than increasing due to cheaper imports (expenditure switching
e¤ect). At the same time, U.S. exports fall. As the decline in exports is more pronounced
than that in imports, U.S. net exports decrease and the U.S. trade balance becomes
negative, which is in line with the empirical estimates (see gure 4.1). For the foreign
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economy, this means that its trade balance improves, supporting an increase in foreign
GDP following a U.S. monetary policy tightening. In other words, we nd that a U.S.
monetary policy tightening spills over positively to the foreign economy via trade in good
times. Key to understanding why U.S. exports fall more than U.S. imports  which
seems crucial for the nal e¤ects on foreign GDP is that for imports, the expenditure
switching and the income absorption e¤ect o¤set each other, while they reinforce each
other for exports13. Interestingly, this implies that the degree of spillbacks from the
foreign economy, i.e., the degree in which initial negative GDP e¤ects spill back to the
U.S. economy via a decline in the demand for U.S. exports, are crucial in understanding
the domestic e¤ects of a monetary policy shock as well as its international transmission.
Second, looking at what changes in the spillovers and spillbacks of U.S. monetary
policy when entering a recession (year 2009; bad times), it is interesting to see that the
trade dynamics change considerably. During a recession, despite a stronger appreciation
of real e¤ective exchange rate on impact, import and export prices vary by less which leads
to a less pronounced appreciation of the U.S. terms of trade. Due to a lower decline in
import prices, imports fall by more as the expenditure switching e¤ect weakens (causing
the income absorption e¤ect which pulls down imports to dominate more). At the same
time, due to a smaller increase in U.S. export prices, U.S. exports decline by less. Taken
together, in contrast to what happens in normal times, U.S. net exports increase which
causes the U.S. trade balance to become positive. Again, this is in line with what we
nd in the empirical estimates (see gure 4.1). For the foreign economy, this implies that
its trade balance worsens which pulls foreign GDP downwards via trade. In sum, when
entering a recession, we nd that the trade spillovers of a U.S. monetary policy tightening
become more favorable for the domestic economy at the cost of the foreign economy.
Finally, it might be interesting to note that in this specic case, the decline in U.S. GDP
is very similar in both years, suggesting that the positive e¤ect on the U.S. trade balance
13 That is, for imports, cheaper import prices due to the U.S. dollar appreciation should lead to increased
demand for foreign goods and therefore more imports (expenditure switching e¤ect), but imports decline due
to the negative demand e¤ect triggered by lower domestic GDP following the increase in domestic interest
rates (income absorption e¤ect). For exports, in contrast, due to the U.S. dollar appreciation, U.S. export
prices become more expensive which causes U.S. exports to fall (expenditure switching e¤ect) and at the
same time, U.S. exports decline further due to a negative demand e¤ect coming from the foreign economy
of which GDP declines on impact following the U.S. monetary policy shock (income absorption e¤ect).
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in the recession probably o¤sets a larger decline in domestic GDP.
4.7.2 Spillovers and Spillbacks during Recessions
In order to understand why the international transmission of U.S. monetary policy changes
in good vs. bad times, as just demonstrated using the posterior DSGE simulations, we
rely on a counterfactual exercise. We again focus on comparing years 2005 and 2009,
although the results also generalize for other points in time as discussed below. More
specically, we start with the DGSE model parameterized based on the estimated 2005
posterior means of the structural parameters and simulate the e¤ects of a normalized
U.S. monetary policy shock forwards into a recession (year 2009), each time changing
the value of one specic parameter to its estimated value from 2005 to 2009. Based on
the DGSE model estimation, we know that in a recession the trade elasticity tends to be
lower and the pass-through from exchange rates to import prices declines, while in the
specic case we look at (2005 vs. 2009) domestic prices become more exible, and there is
no substantial change in the monetary policy parameters nor in the size of the monetary
policy shock (see table 4.6 and gure 4.3). The counterfactual exercise will enable us to
determine the relative importance of these changes in explaining the changed transmission
of monetary policy. The results are given in gure 4.5.
Interestingly, the change in the sign of the trade balance response over time which
is key in understanding the international transmission of U.S. monetary policy shocks 
seems to be mainly driven by a combination of a lower trade elasticity and a lower pass-
through of exchange rates in times of economic downturns. First, as can be seen in gure
4.5, a lower exchange rate pass-through makes import prices less sensitive to a monetary
policy tightening which in turn causes a stronger decline in U.S. imports. That is, a lower
exchange rate pass-through reduces the degree of expenditure switching which leads to
a more pronounced decline in imports as the income absorption e¤ect is counteracted to
a lesser extent. This pushes the trade balance into positive territory. At the same time,
a lower exchange rate pass-through in recessions reinforces the exchange rate reaction
following monetary policy shocks in bad times, as there is less adjustment through the
quantity side, as noted by Betts and Devereux (2000).
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Second, a lower trade elasticity  consistent with a collapse in international trade
during recessions such as the Global Financial Crisis further reduces the degree of ex-
penditure switching which in turn provides additional support for the U.S. trade balance
to increase. In our counterfactual exercise, a decline in the trade elasticity mainly works
through lowering the spillbacks from a U.S. monetary policy tightening via reduced ex-
ports, as it reduces the extent to which the foreign economy lowers its import demand for
U.S. goods. In sum, while a lower pass-through of exchange rates to import prices in bad
times strengthens the fall in U.S. imports following a U.S. monetary policy tightening,
a lower trade elasticity reduces the fall in U.S. exports which taken together causes the
U.S. trade balance to increase. The dynamics of the trade balance are reected into the
dynamics of foreign GDP; a lower exchange rate pass-through combined with reduced in-
ternational trade turns the spillovers of a U.S. monetary policy tightening from favorable
in good times into unfavorable in bad times.
The main result that the trade spillovers change considerably when entering an eco-
nomic downturn due to lower trade and a reduced pass-through of exchange rate move-
ments to import prices also holds when looking at other years. In order to see this, table
4.7 shows the average estimated trade elasticity and exchange rate pass-through para-
meter during NBER recessions and compares these to the estimates three years before
the onset of the recessions. That is, it replicates table 4.2 which shows the same for the
estimated trade balance and the U.S. dollar e¤ect following a monetary policy tightening
based on the TVP-BVAR. In line with the empirical results, the trade elasticity is lower
during all NBER recessions since the 1980s and also the exchange rate pass-through to
import prices tends to be mostly lower (reected in a higher parameter). This implies
more generally that when entering a recession as illustrated above for the years 2005
vs. 2009 a collapse in international trade and/or a lower pass-through of exchange rates
to prices will likely render the international trade spillovers and spillbacks of monetary
policy tightening less favorable for the foreign economy.
Third, although when comparing years 2005 and 2009, the degree of domestic price
stickiness plays a major role in explaining changes in the international transmission of
U.S. monetary policy shocks (see gure 4.5), this does not seem to be a nding which will
143
CHAPTER 4. TIME VARIATION IN U.S. MONETARY POLICY SPILLOVERS
Table 4.7: Estimated Trade Elasticity and ERPT Parameters during and prior to Recessions
Trade Elasticity ERPT
Parameter Value Parameter Value
NBER Recession: 1981Q1 1982Q4 0.750 0.83
3 years prior 1.447 0.76
NBER Recession: 1990Q3 1991Q1 0.471 0.72
3 years prior 0.473 0.79
NBER Recession: 2001Q1 2001Q4 1.981 0.67
3 years prior 2.279 0.65
NBER Recession: 2007Q4 2009Q2 1.449 0.71
3 years prior 1.920 0.66
Average NBER recessions 1.163 0.73
Average 3 years prior 1.530 0.72
Note: The structural DGSE parameters are estimated through minimum distance estimation using the
structural TVP-BVAR impulse response functions discussed in Section 4.5 for each quarter over the
period 1980Q1 2013Q3. A higher value of the exchange rate pass-through parameter indicates a lower
pass-through of exchange rate movements to import prices. The parameters are calculated as averages
over the shown period, with 3 years taken as the 12 quarters before the onset of the recession. The NBER
recessions over the period 1981Q1 1980Q3 and 1981Q3 1982Q4 are grouped together given the little
time in between.
apply more generally to explaining why spillovers di¤er in good vs. bad times. For this, see
also gure 4.3 and table 4.8, which do not show a meaningful di¤erence in the magnitude
of this estimated parameter on average in a recession vs. normal times. Finally, as the
monetary policy parameters (also containing the size of the shock) do no change much
over the smaller time periods we look at, the contribution of these in explaining changed
international spillovers and spillbacks of monetary policy is limited.
4.7.3 Counterfactual Results
Two points are important to stress. First, it is important to emphasize that this spe-
cic counterfactual exercise does not necessarily present general results on the relative
importance of all di¤erent structural parameters in explaining time variation in monetary
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policy spillovers, as these will depend to some degree on the specic time period looked
at. For example, as we only focus on a smaller time interval of four years in the coun-
terfactual exercise, there is only a limited role for changed monetary policy stabilization
or a changed size of the monetary policy shock in altering the international transmission
of monetary policy, as the estimated parameters are similar in both years. Undertaking
the counterfactual exercise over a wider time span (over which we nd that monetary
policy has become more active, see gure 4.3) would likely show that also an increased re-
sponsiveness of the central bank alters the spillovers and spillbacks of its monetary policy
actions. However, as explained before, as the DSGE fails to capture the strengthening of
the U.S. dollar response over time that we observe in the data, we choose to refrain from
taking a too long horizon in the counterfactual exercises as they could be biased for that
reason.
Nevertheless, the counterfactual exercise clearly shows the more general and important
nding that the international transmission of U.S. monetary policy crucially depends on
the extent to which countries trade (trade elasticity) and the degree in which exchange
rate movements triggered by a monetary policy shock are transmitted into import prices
(exchange rate pass-through). As also reected in the empirical results, these two pa-
rameters tend to decline in recessions compared to normal times, turning international
spillovers of a U.S. monetary shock less favorable. The di¤erent transmission in good vs.
bad times more generally can explain why we nd that the international transmission of
U.S. monetary policy changes over time, as shown in gure 4.1.
Second, although we focus on recessions as periods in which trade spillovers become un-
favorable (bad times), it is important to stress that the nding of changed trade spillovers
more generally will also apply to periods in which global trade is su¢ ciently low (e.g.,
when it takes time for international trade to recover) and/or exchange rate pass-through
to import prices is su¢ ciently limited. This study shows more generally that time varia-
tion in these two key spillovers parameters can alter the spillovers and spillbacks from a
U.S. monetary policy shock considerably. For example, it is evident from gure 4.1 that
when leaving the recession triggered by the Global Financial Crisis, the sign of the trade
balance reaction did not switch back immediately to being negative again, probably as
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world trade has been taking a long time to recover and exchange rate pass-through to
import prices is still reduced. As such, also in these periods, a tightening of U.S. monetary
policy might trigger adverse global trade spillovers even though the U.S. economy is no
longer in a recession.
4.8 Conclusions
This study documents time variation in the international transmission of U.S. monetary
policy actions and analyses the reasons behind it. Beyond some broader changes in the
e¤ects, we document substantial shorter-run time variation in the domestic impact and
the international transmission of U.S. monetary policy shocks, particularly through the
trade balance which is a key determinant of international spillovers. Most noticeably, the
empirical results show that the U.S. trade balance switches signs in recessions compared
to normal times, turning foreign GDP spillovers from favorable into unfavorable following
a monetary policy tightening. In addition, during economic downturns, a U.S. monetary
policy shock is associated with higher exchange rate volatility. The crucial question is
however why these changes in the international transmission of monetary policy occur.
To answer that question, this study estimates the key structural spillover parameters of
a two-country DSGE model by tting the empirical impulse response functions following a
U.S. monetary policy shock as provided by a structural TVP-BVARmodel with stochastic
volatility. Interestingly, the analysis shows that during recessions, the trade elasticity as
well as the exchange rate pass-through to import prices declines, which both support an
increase in the U.S. trade balance as U.S. imports fall by more and U.S. exports decline by
less (via reducing the expenditure switching e¤ect). In turn, this implies that following a
U.S. monetary policy tightening the foreign trade balance is adversely a¤ected despite a
depreciation of their currency vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar and foreign GDP declines due to
negative trade spillovers. For accommodative monetary policy actions, the reverse logic
applies; a decrease in U.S. interest rates during economic downturns will tend to lower
the U.S. trade balance despite a depreciation of the U.S. dollar, creating favorable trade
spillovers to the foreign economy that should support foreign GDP growth. Important to
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note is that although this study focusses on the international transmission in bad vs.
good times the key result that the spillovers and spillbacks of U.S. monetary policy shock
crucially depend on the value of the trade elasticity, and the exchange rate pass-through
to import prices carries applies more generally.
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Tables and Figures
Table 4.8: Median Estimated Structural Parameters (Recessions vs. Normal Times)
Structural Parameters Average Recessions Average Normal Times
Trade Elasticity 1.02 1.48
Exchange Rate Pass-Through 0.72 0.71
Domestic Price Stickiness 0.85 0.87
Taylor Rule: Interest Rate Smoothing 0.87 0.83
Taylor Rule: Output 0.38 0.40
Taylor Rule: Ination 1.57 1.67
Taylor Rule: Shock Size 0.16 0.13
Note: The averages are based on the estimation of the DGSE model as outlined in Section 4.5 for each
quarter over the period 1980Q1 2013Q3. The recessions are dened as NBER recessions.
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Figure 4.3: Estimates of the Structural Parameters of the Two-Country DSGE Model
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Figure 4.4: Estimated Spillovers and Spillbacks of U.S. Monetary Policy: 2005 vs. 2009
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Note: The units are in percentage points following a normalized 10 b.p. restrictive monetary policy
shock for 2005 (representative for good times) vs. 2009 (representative for bad times) using the posterior
estimates of the structural parameters. An increase in the real e¤ective exchange rate is an appreciation.
All variables, including the interest rate, are in quarterly terms and the horizon is quarterly.
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Figure 4.5: Counterfactual Analysis: Determinants of Monetary Policy Spillovers and Spillbacks
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Note: The charts show the contribution of specic parameters in explaining the changes in the e¤ects
of a U.S. monetary policy tightening, starting from the estimated posterior in 2005 and simulating the
impact of a U.S. monetary policy shock forwards into 2009, each time changing the value of a specic
parameter from its estimated value of 2005 to its estimated value of 2009. The units are in percentage
points following a normalized restrictive U.S. monetary policy shock of 10 b.p. on impact.
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Figure 4.6: Matching of DSGE and TVP-BVAR IRFs for Selected Years
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Note: The charts show the matching between the empirical impulse response functions of the TVP-BVAR
and those of the DSGE model for 1982Q1, 1991Q1, 1999Q1, 2005Q1 and 2009Q1. Horizon is quarterly,
the 16th and the 84th percentiles of the posterior distributions are shown. Units are in percentages, the
horizon is in quarters and all variables, including the interest rate, are in quarterly terms.
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Figure 4.7: Estimated TVP-BVAR and simulated DSGE IRFs
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Note: The charts compare the estimated TVP-BVAR responses with the simulated DSGE responses
that are based on the estimated structural parameters for selected years. The responses shown are the
minimum/maximum values over the impulse response function horizon for a negative/positive response
respectively following a one standard deviation increase in the relative interest rate (the U.S. minus
foreign). Units are in percentages and all variables, including the interest rate, are in quarterly terms.
154
Appendix A
Appendices to Chapter 2
155
APPENDIX A. APPENDICES TO CHAPTER 2
A.1 Data Appendix
Table A.1: Data Summary for the U.S.
Variable Description Range Source Code
GDP Gross Domestic Product 1947Q1-2012Q2 BEA NIPA (1.1.5,1)
Gov. Spending Government Consumption
Expenditures and Gross
Investment
1947Q1-2012Q2 BEA NIPA (1.1.5,21)
Ination Log Di¤erence of the GDP
Deator
1947Q1-2012Q2 BEA NIPA (1.1.4,1)
Interest Rate 3-Month Treasury Bills: Sec-
ondary Market Rate
1934Q1-2012Q2 FRED TB3MS
Net Taxes Gov. Receipts minus Trans-
fers and Interest
1947Q1-2012Q2 BEA NIPA (3.1,1), (3.1,9),
(3.1,11)
GDP Deator Price Index for GDP 1947Q1-2012Q2 BEA NIPA (1.1.4,1)
Population Civilian Non-Institutional
Population
1948Q1-2012Q2 FRED CNP16OV
Investment Gross Private Domestic In-
vestment
1947Q1-2012Q2 BEA NIPA (1.1.5,7)
Wages Average Hourly Earnings In-
dex: Business
1947Q1-2012Q3 BLS PRS84006153
Hours Worked Total Weekly Hours Worked:
Whole Economy
1947Q1-2011Q4 FR 
Consumption Personal Consumption Ex-
penditures
1947Q1-2012Q2 BEA NIPA (1.1.5,2)
Exports Exports of Goods and Ser-
vices
1947Q1-2012Q2 FRED EXPGSC96
Imports Imports of Goods and Ser-
vices
1947Q1-2012Q2 FRED IMPGSC96
Exchange Rate Real E¤ective Exchange Rate
- CPI-based
1970Q1-2012Q2 OECD USQCC011H
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Table A.2: Data Summary for the U.K.
Variable Description Range Source Code
GDP Gross Domestic Product 1955Q1-2012Q2 ONS ABMI
Gov. Spending Final Consumption Expendi-
ture of Government
1955Q1-2012Q2 OECD LNBQRSA-P3S13
Ination Log Di¤erence of the GDP
Deator
1955Q1-2012Q2 ONS YBGB
Interest Rate 3-Month Treasury Bills 1964Q1-2012Q2 FRED INTGST-GBM193N
Net Taxes Total Tax Revenues minus
Transfers
1955Q1-2012Q2 ONS ANBO + ANSO +
NJBC + NMYE -
ANLY
GDP Deator GDP (expenditure) at Mar-
ket Prices Deator
1955Q1-2012Q2 ONS YBGB
Population Labour Force Supply: Eco-
nomically Active
1971Q1-2012Q2 ONS MGSF
Investment Total Gross Fixed Capital
Formation
1955Q1-2012Q2 ONS NPQT
Wages Average Earnings Index:
Whole Economy
1990Q1-2010Q3 ONS LNMQ / YBGB
Hours Worked Total Weekly Hours Worked:
Whole Economy
1971Q1-2012Q2 ONS YBUS / MGSF
Consumption Household Final Consump-
tion Expenditure
1955Q1-2012Q2 ONS ABJR
Exports Exports of Goods and Ser-
vices
1955Q1-2012Q2 OECD LNBQRSA-P6
Imports Imports of Goods and Ser-
vices
1955Q1-2012Q2 OECD LNBQRSA-P7
Exchange Rate Real E¤ective Exchange Rate
- CPI-based
1972Q1-2012Q2 OECD UKQCC011H
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A.2 Mathematical Appendix
The estimated matrices A0 of the recursive and Blanchard-Perotti identication ap-
proaches yield similar results, as shown in the following table.
Table A.3: Estimated AB Matrices
U.S. U.K.
RE BP RE BP
EXPINF 0 0.50 0 0.50
GDPREV 0 0.00 [0.92] 0 0.00 [0.86]
INFREV 0 0.00 [0.07] 0 0.05 [0.00]
GDPEXP -0.20 [0.00] -0.19 [0.00] -0.12 [0.04] -0.08 [0.21]
INFEXP 0.00 [0.99] -0.02 [0.20] 0.07 [0.27] -0.21 [0.00]
INFGDP 0.02 [0.40] -0.04 [0.13] 0.16 [0.08] 0.15 [0.13]
REVEXP -0.26 [0.21] 0 -0.12 [0.62] 0
REVGDP -1.85 [0.00] -1.85 -0.62 [0.07] -0.76
REVINF -2.96 [0.00] -1.25 -0.24 [0.48] -1.21
INTEXP 0.06 [0.12] 0.06 [0.13] 0.07 [0.25] 0.07 [0.24]
INTGDP -0.14 [0.02] -0.14 [0.02] 0.03 [0.71] 0.03 [0.68]
INTINF -0.38 [0.03] -0.38 [0.03] -0.13 [0.17] -0.13 [0.14]
INTREV -0.04 [0.00] -0.04 [0.00] -0.05 [0.00] -0.05 [0.00]
REVEXP 0 0.30 [0.14] 0 0.07 [0.77]
Note: H0 : The estimated coe¢ cient is di¤erent from zero. The values in brackets represent the p values.
The values without their respective p values were estimated exogenously from the model.
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B.1 Data Appendix
This Appendix describes the quarterly data used in this study for the period of 1960Q1
2013Q4.
B.1.1 Data Source
The quarterly seasonally adjusted series of real GDP (VPVOBARSA) in millions of U.S.
dollars were taken from the OECDs Quarterly National Accounts (QNA). The headline
quarterly consumer prices indices are sourced from the OECD Statistics database. The
quarterly short-term interest rates were taken from the OECDs Monthly Monetary and
Financial Statistics (MEI). The nominal exchange rates (U.S. dollar monthly average)
were sourced from the OECDs Monthly Monetary and Financial Statistics (MEI). The
CPI-based real exchange rate is computed by multiplying the nominal exchange rate by
the ratio of the U.S. CPI and the foreign country CPI.
B.1.2 Construction of the Relative Variables
Similar to Corsetti et al. (2008b), all data is constructed as U.S. data relative to a foreign
country, with the latter constructed as a weighted average of ve countries: Australia,
Canada, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom. The empirical model includes relative
CPI, relative GDP, di¤erence interest rate, and real exchange rate. The rst step was
to construct the output-weighted aggregates for foreign country comprised of Australia,
Canada, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom. The quarterly output-weights were
constructed by summing the real GDP in U.S. dollars (xed PPPs) of the ve foreign
countries and then taking their respective shares. The second step was to cancel out
any national base e¤ects by taking the log di¤erence of all series, except for the nominal
interest rate which is keep in levels, and multiply them by their respective output-weights.
The next step was to construct the foreign country equivalent growth rate by aggregating
each countrys output-weighted series described above. Finally, I constructed the relative
variables by taking the log di¤erence of the ratio of the indexed U.S. series (in levels) by
the foreign country series. The di¤erence interest rate series is constructed by taking the
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rst di¤erence of the U.S. and foreign interest rate. The dataset is available upon request.
B.2 Markov Chain Monte Carlo Procedure
I estimate the TVP-BVAR model described by the eqs. (3.1)  (3.8) using Bayesian
methods. In the next three subsections, I describe the priors and the Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) procedure, which is used to simulate the posterior distribution of
the hyperparameters and the states conditional on the data.
B.2.1 Prior Distributions and Initial Values
The prior distributions for the initial values states of the time-varying parameters (0), the
covariances (0), and the vector of log volatilities (lnh0) are considered to be: (i) normally
distributed, (ii) independent of each other, and (iii) independent of the hyperparameters,
namely the matrices Q, S and Z  2i for i = 1; : : : ; 4.
B.2.1.1 Time-Varying Parameters Priors (0)
I calibrate the priors of the time-varying parameters 0 based on the estimation of a
xed-coe¢ cient vector autoregression model of the same specication as eq. (3.1). The
time-invariant coe¢ cients for this model are estimated over the sample period, which is
dened in this study to be the rst ten years of data (1960Q1 to 1970Q1). I set the VAR
coe¢ cients priors to
0  N
h
^OLS; 4V^

^OLS
i
(B.1)
where ^OLS collects the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) xed-coe¢ cient estimates over the
training sample (1960Q1 to 1969Q4), and standard deviation is four times the covariance
matrix V^

^OLS

.
B.2.1.2 Log Volatility Priors (lnh0)
As for the log volatilities (lnh0), I proceed as follows: (i) using the estimated xed-
coe¢ cient VAR model, let ^OLS be the variance-covariance matrix of the reduced-form
innovations ("t), (ii) let P =
p
AD be the lower-triangular Cholesky decomposition factor
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of ^OLS, where A is a lower triangular matrix with ones on the diagonal and
p
D is the
diagonal matrix that collects the standard deviations of the residuals, and (iii) set the
priors for the log volatilities (lnh0) to
lnh0  N (ln0; 10 I4) (B.2)
where 0 collects the logs of the squared elements on the diagonal of D, and, in order to
achieve a weakly informative prior, I impose the variance-covariance matrix to equal ten
times the identity matrix (I4).
B.2.1.3 Covariance Priors (0)
In relation to the impact relationships (0), I set the priors for the covariances to
0  N
h
~0; ~V (~0)
i
(B.3)
where ~0 collects all the non-zero and non-one elements of A 1, and ~V (~0) is the covari-
ance matrix, which is postulated to be diagonal. Following Benati and Mumtaz (2007),
each individual diagonal element is arbitrarily set to be equal to ten times the absolute
value of the corresponding element in ~0. The rationale for such scaling of the covariance
matrix is to account for the relative magnitude of the elements in ~0, which is dened as
~0  [~0;21; ~0;31; : : : ; ~0;43]0 (B.4)
B.2.1.4 Hyperparameters
In reference to the hyperparameters, I assume the matrix Q to follow an Inverse Wishart
distribution:
Q  IW   Q 1; T0 (B.5)
where T0 is the prior degrees of freedom, which is equal to T0 = dim

^t

+1, as in Cogley
and Sargent (2005). The choice of such as a weakly informative prior is aimed to recover
as much information in the sample data as possible, thus I am trying to minimize the
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impact of the prior on the results. Turning to the scale matrix T0 Q, I follow Primiceri
(2005) to calibrate Q =   V^

^OLS

, with  = 10 4. This is a rather conservative
prior compared to  = 3:5 10 4 used by Cogley and Sargent (2005). As pointed out by
Baumeister and Peersman (2013), these combined small values of T0 and Q put very little
weight on the prior beliefs regarding the drift in time-varying parameters (0). Following
Cogley and Sargent (2005), the three blocks of S are postulated to follow an Inverse
Wishart distribution, with the prior degrees of freedom set equal to the minimum value
required for the prior to be acceptable for Bayesian inference:
S1  IW
 
S 11 ; 2

(B.6)
S2  IW
 
S 12 ; 3

(B.7)
S3  IW
 
S 13 ; 4

(B.8)
As it is standard in the literature, the scale matrices ( S1; S2, and S3) are calibrated
based on the respective elements of ~0 in eq. (B.4) multiplied by 10 3. The scale matrices
are as follows:
S1 = 10
 3  j~0;21j (B.9)
S2 = 10
 3  diag  [j~0;31j ; j~0;32j]0 (B.10)
S3 = 10
 3  diag  [j~0;41j ; j~0;42j ; j~0;43j]0 (B.11)
Lastly, I follow Cogley and Sargent (2005) in setting the variances of the stochastic
volatility shocks, and by assuming that the elements of 2i are drawn from an Inverse
Gamma distribution:
2i  IG

10 4
2
;
1
2

(B.12)
B.2.2 Simulating the Posterior Distribution
Given that sampling from the joint posterior can be di¢ cult, I simulate the posterior
distribution of the four blocks of parameters: (i) the hyperparameters (Q, S and the 2i ),
the states of (ii) the time-varying parameters T , (iii) the covariances AT , and (iv) the
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volatilities HT . The superscript T refers to the sample length. For notation purposes,
the hyperparameters are jointly named as M . The posterior distribution for each block
are conditional on the observed data Y T using the following MCMC algorithm.
B.2.2.1 Drawing Elements of the Coe¢ cient States
 
T

Conditional on the four blocks of parameters Y T , AT , HT , and M , the eq. (3.1) is
linear, with Gaussian process and known covariance matrix. Following Carter and Kohn
(1994) and Cogley and Sargent (2002), T can be drawn using the following simulation
smoothing:
p
 
T j Y T ; AT ; HT  = p  T j Y T ; AT ; HT  T 1Y
t=1
p
 
t j t+1; Y T ; AT ; HT

(B.13)
Conditional onAT andHT , the standard Kalman lter pin down p
 
T j Y T ; AT ; HT

=
N (t; Pt), where Pt is the precision matrix of t. The following backward recursion algo-
rithm, as described in Kim and Nelson (1999), computes the remaining elements in the
factorization:
tjt+1 = tjt + PtjtP 1t+1jt(t+1   t) (B.14)
Ptjt+1 = Ptjt   PtjtP 1t+1jtPtjt (B.15)
The last iteration of the standard Kalman lter produces the conditional mean T jT
and conditional variance PT jT of the posterior distribution. More specically, for each t
from T   1 to 1, a draw from the distribution N (t; Pt), say ~T jT , provides the input for
the backward recursion algorithm according to eqs. (B.14) and (B.15), which pin down
T 1jT and PT 1jT . These in turn allow us to draw ~T 1jT from N (T 1; PT 1), and so on
until the beginning of the sample.
B.2.2.2 Drawing Elements of the Covariance States
 
AT

The eq. (3.1) can be written as Atut  At (yt  X 0tt) = At"t  ut, where "t are orthogo-
nalized shocks with time-varying covariance V ar (ut) = Ht, and ut = yt   X 0tt are the
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observable residuals. Following Baumeister and Peersman (2013), the equations below
can be estimated to recover AT :
u1;t = "1;t (B.16)
h
  1
2
2;t u2;t

=  2;1

h
  1
2
2;t u1;t

+

h
  1
2
2;t "2;t

(B.17)
h
  1
2
3;t u3;t

=  3;1

h
  1
2
3;t u1;t

  3;2

h
  1
2
3;t u2;t

+

h
  1
2
3;t "3;t

(B.18)
h
  1
2
4;t u4;t

=  4;1

h
  1
2
4;t u1;t

  4;2

h
  1
2
3;t u2;t

  4;3

h
  1
2
4;t u3;t

+

h
  1
2
4;t "4;t

(B.19)
B.2.2.3 Drawing Elements of the Volatility States
 
HT

Conditional on T , AT and Y T , the orthogonal shocks "t  At(yt   X 0tt) with V ar("t) =
Ht are observable. However, as outlined by Baumeister and Peersman (2013), drawing
from the conditional posterior of HT is complicated given that the conditional state-space
representation for lnhi;t is not Gaussian. As described in Cogley and Sargent (2005), I
sample every element of the volatility states hi;ts by using the univariate algorithm by
Jacquier, Polson, and Rossi (1994).
B.2.2.4 Drawing the Hyperparameters
Finally, conditional on T ; AT ; HT , and Y T ; the innovations to T ; AT ; HT are observable.
This allows the hyperparameters M to be drawn directly from their respective posterior
distributions. In summary, the MCMC algorithm used in this study simulate the posterior
distribution of the four blocks of parameters (states and hyperparameters), conditional on
the data, by iterating on Subsections B.2.2.1 B.2.2.4. In order to achieve convergence
to the ergotic distribution, I use a burn-in of 50,000 draws. After that, I carry out
100,000 iterations of the Gibbs sampler, sampling every 10th draw in order to mitigate
the autocorrelation across draws.
B.2.2.5 Summary on the Simulation of the Posterior Distribution
The decomposition of the variance of the reduced-form innovation into impact interrela-
tions between the endogenous model variables and the stochastic volatilities is a crucial
165
APPENDIX B. APPENDICES TO CHAPTER 3
feature of the time varying parameter VAR methodology. Thus, I provide below a sum-
mary on the simulation of the posterior distribution:
Step 1: Draw the elements of the coe¢ cient states T conditional on four blocks of pa-
rameters Y T , AT , HT , and M ;
Step 2: Draw the elements of the covariance states AT conditional on Y T , T and HT ;
Step 3: Draw the elements of the volatility states HT conditional on Y T , T and AT ;
Step 4: Draw the hyperparameters M = (Q, S and 2) from their respective distribu-
tions, conditional on Y T , T , HT , and AT .
The MCMC algorithm simulates the posterior distribution of the states and the hy-
perparameters, conditional on the data, by iterating on steps (1)  (4). In what follows,
I use a burn-in period of 50,000 iterations to converge to the ergodic distribution, and
after that we run 100,000 more iterations sampling every 10th draw in order to reduce
the autocorrelation across draws. For more details on this procedure, see Appendix B of
Cogley and Sargent (2005).
B.2.3 Convergence of MCMC
Following Benati and Mumtaz (2007), I assess the convergence to the ergodic distribution
of the MCMC by evaluating the autocorrelation properties of the ergodic distribution
draws. I inspect the drawsine¢ ciency factors, which are dened to be the inverse of the
relative numerical e¢ ciency measure (RNE) proposed by Geweke (1992)
RNE = (2) 1
1
S(0)
Z 
 
S (!) d! (B.20)
where S(!) is the spectral density of the retained draws from the Gibbs sampling repli-
cations for each set of parameters Q;S1; S2; S3, 21; 
2
2; 
2
3 at the frequency !. Table 3.2
and gure 3.3 provide strong evidence that the autocorrelation of the draws for the model
hyperparameters and for the states is low, with values well below the threshold of 20, as
suggest by Primiceri (2005). Thus, the RNE results conrm convergence to the ergodic
distribution.
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B.3 Computing Time-Varying Impulse Response Functions
Following Rubio-Ramírez et al. (2010), I calculate the time-varying structural impact
matrix, B0;t, as follows. I let 
t = PtDtP 0t be the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition
of the VARs time-varying variance covariance matrix 
t. I draw an N  N matrix, K,
from the N(0; 1) distribution. I take the QR decomposition of K, where Q is a rotation
matrix whose columns are orthogonal to each other, and R is the diagonal matrix whose
elements are positive. In other words, K = QR. I compute the time-varying structural
impact matrix as B0;t = Pt
p
DtP
0
t :Given B0;t, I generate the reduced-form innovations
based on the relationship ut = B0;t"t, where "t is the structural monetary policy shock
drawn from a normal distribution. I compute the IRFs by comparing the e¤ects of a shock
on the evolution of the endogenous variables ("i;t + 1) to the scenario without a shock
("i;t). From these set of IRFs, I select only those IRFs that satisfy the sign restrictions,
as dened in table 3.1. I repeat this procedure until I have 100 iterations of successful
sign restrictions. I then calculate the mean responses of the four endogenous variables.
For each point in time, I randomly draw 500 generalized IRFs. Finally, I take the median
of the distribution.
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C.1 Data Appendix
This Appendix describes the quarterly data used in this study for the period of 1960Q1
2013Q3.
C.1.1 Data Source
The quarterly seasonally adjusted series of real GDP (VPVOBARSA) in millions of U.S.
dollars were taken from the OECDs Quarterly National Accounts (QNA). The headline
quarterly consumer prices indices are sourced from the OECD Statistics database. The
quarterly short-term interest rates were taken from the OECDs Monthly Monetary and
Financial Statistics (MEI). The nominal exchange rates (U.S. dollar monthly average)
were sourced from the OECDs Monthly Monetary and Financial Statistics (MEI). The
CPI-based real exchange rate is computed by multiplying the nominal exchange rate by
the ratio of the U.S. CPI and the foreign country CPI.
C.1.2 Construction of the Relative Variables
Similar to Corsetti et al. (2008b), all data is constructed as U.S. data relative to a foreign
country, with the latter constructed as a weighted average of ve countries: Australia,
Canada, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom. The empirical model includes relative
CPI, relative GDP, di¤erence interest rate, U.S. trade balance and U.S. real exchange rate.
The rst step was to construct the output-weighted aggregates for foreign country com-
prised of Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom. The quarterly
output-weights were constructed by summing the real GDP in U.S. dollars (xed PPPs)
of the ve foreign countries and then taking their respective shares. The second step was
to cancel out any national base e¤ects by taking the log di¤erence of all series, except for
the nominal interest rate which is kept in levels, and multiply them by their respective
output-weights. The next step was to construct the foreign country equivalent growth
rate by aggregating each countrys output-weighted series described above. Finally, we
constructed the relative variables by taking the log of the ratio of the indexed U.S. series
(in levels) by the foreign country series. The di¤erence interest rate series is constructed
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by taking the plain di¤erence between the U.S. and foreign interest rate.
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